Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) 300-410 Practice Test 65
Question 640
An incident caused this behavior: A client receives an IP already reserved for gateway and causes duplicate IP alarm. The engineer implements the correction to configure exclusions and check existing lease conflicts in correct DHCP pool. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- Authorized SNMPv3 secure walk succeeds and capture does not expose cleartext community
- Collector receives linkDown notification on controlled interface shutdown
- Physical LLDP/neighbors align with Catalyst Center topology and path analysis
- Newly offered leases exclude reserved addresses and collision alerts cease
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Newly offered leases exclude reserved addresses and collision alerts cease. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to configure exclusions and check existing lease conflicts in correct DHCP pool addresses the observed incident: a client receives an IP already reserved for gateway and causes duplicate IP alarm. DHCP exclusion prevents automatic allocation of infrastructure addresses. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Authorized SNMPv3 secure walk succeeds and capture does not expose cleartext community would validate the different intervention to migrate managed router and collector to compatible SNMPv3 authPriv configuration for a scenario such as captured SNMPv2c community reveals privileged monitoring data in clear text. It does not test the present fault—a client receives an IP already reserved for gateway and causes duplicate IP alarm—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that newly offered leases exclude reserved addresses and collision alerts cease.
B:Collector receives linkDown notification on controlled interface shutdown would validate the different intervention to configure tested event notifications to correct SNMP trap receiver for a scenario such as interface drops but NMS detects fault only at next five-minute GET poll. It does not test the present fault—a client receives an IP already reserved for gateway and causes duplicate IP alarm—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that newly offered leases exclude reserved addresses and collision alerts cease.
C:Physical LLDP/neighbors align with Catalyst Center topology and path analysis would validate the different intervention to refresh discovery, inventory and topology correlation for changed network state for a scenario such as assurance path diagnosis follows old connectivity associations and misidentifies hop. It does not test the present fault—a client receives an IP already reserved for gateway and causes duplicate IP alarm—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that newly offered leases exclude reserved addresses and collision alerts cease.
Question 641
The ENARSI operational team is validating DHCP lease binding troubleshooting for this design: A host says its IPv4 address conflicts although DHCP pool has ample capacity. They intend to examine DHCP bindings and conflicts and perform authorized cleanup after confirming ownership. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- DHCP server still holds stale binding for a disconnected client due to bad conflict handling
- Interface stays up but primary ISP drops all internet packets and static default remains installed
- Interface drops but NMS detects fault only at next five-minute GET poll
- SSH clients receive negotiation failure although TCP 22 reaches router
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:DHCP server still holds stale binding for a disconnected client due to bad conflict handling. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: examine DHCP bindings and conflicts and perform authorized cleanup after confirming ownership. DHCP address conflicts and stale binding states can cause lease failure independent of routing. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that corrected binding allows a clean DORA sequence with no repeated duplicate-address report.
Incorrect Answers
B:Interface stays up but primary ISP drops all internet packets and static default remains installed is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for couple reliable IP SLA reachability with object tracking of primary static route. Tracked static routing can react to remote reachability not visible in line protocol. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with dHCP server still holds stale binding for a disconnected client due to bad conflict handling; the alternative is not the most specific justification for examine DHCP bindings and conflicts and perform authorized cleanup after confirming ownership.
C:Interface drops but NMS detects fault only at next five-minute GET poll is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for configure tested event notifications to correct SNMP trap receiver. SNMP polling requests data; traps or informs provide asynchronous event notifications. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with dHCP server still holds stale binding for a disconnected client due to bad conflict handling; the alternative is not the most specific justification for examine DHCP bindings and conflicts and perform authorized cleanup after confirming ownership.
D:SSH clients receive negotiation failure although TCP 22 reaches router is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for configure supported hostname/domain and cryptographic SSH key with approved SSH version. SSH server requires usable cryptographic host keys and compatible protocol negotiation. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with dHCP server still holds stale binding for a disconnected client due to bad conflict handling; the alternative is not the most specific justification for examine DHCP bindings and conflicts and perform authorized cleanup after confirming ownership.
Question 642
The ENARSI operational team is validating Syslog UDP reachability for this design: Router sends UDP syslog to collector yet remote dashboard remains empty. They intend to validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Lease points to obsolete DNS resolver after migration
- Engineers compare sampled records to packet counts as if every packet were observed
- Lease lacks default gateway option because pool configured only network and DNS
- Packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity. Syslog export requires working application/transport reachability independent of local logging. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that collector receives controlled log event from router and attribution matches source.
Incorrect Answers
A:Lease points to obsolete DNS resolver after migration is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for correct DHCP DNS server options and renew a client lease. DHCP DNS option supplies resolver addresses separately from routing or IP lease. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity.
B:Engineers compare sampled records to packet counts as if every packet were observed is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for document packet sampling rate and interpret collector estimates correctly. Sampled flow observation is statistical and not identical to unsampled packet accounting. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity.
C:Lease lacks default gateway option because pool configured only network and DNS is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for set valid default-router option for client subnet. DHCP option 3 tells client which router to use for off-subnet destinations. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity.
Question 643
The ENARSI operational team is validating BGP MED versus local preference for this design: Two neighboring AS paths need a documented exit preference without confusing attributes. They intend to compare attribute scope and prefer local preference for internal outbound decision. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Operator changes MED expecting internal routers to prefer a particular internet exit
- OSPF global neighbor remains down on a VRF-bound interface and no partner prefixes arrive
- A jumbo-frames interface exchanges DBD packets with a smaller MTU peer and adjacency stalls
- Routing remains Established without a working negotiated BFD neighbor
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Operator changes MED expecting internal routers to prefer a particular internet exit. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: compare attribute scope and prefer local preference for internal outbound decision. MED expresses entry preference to a neighboring AS whereas local preference is internal to an AS. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that bGP table confirms correct attribute and intended local egress on internal peers.
Incorrect Answers
B:OSPF global neighbor remains down on a VRF-bound interface and no partner prefixes arrive is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for enable a supported VRF-aware routing process or address family on the correct tenant interfaces. Routing protocol adjacencies and RIB updates must be scoped to the intended VRF. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with operator changes MED expecting internal routers to prefer a particular internet exit; the alternative is not the most specific justification for compare attribute scope and prefer local preference for internal outbound decision.
C:A jumbo-frames interface exchanges DBD packets with a smaller MTU peer and adjacency stalls is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for correct L3 interface MTU mismatch rather than routinely bypassing OSPF MTU checks. OSPF database description MTU mismatch can block reliable exchange. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with operator changes MED expecting internal routers to prefer a particular internet exit; the alternative is not the most specific justification for compare attribute scope and prefer local preference for internal outbound decision.
D:Routing remains Established without a working negotiated BFD neighbor is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for verify both neighbors support and enable compatible BFD parameters and interface reachability. Routing protocol integration requires a successful bidirectional BFD session. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with operator changes MED expecting internal routers to prefer a particular internet exit; the alternative is not the most specific justification for compare attribute scope and prefer local preference for internal outbound decision.
Question 644
During the design review, iPv6 hosts need to receive legitimate router advertisements on an access VLAN. A technician proposes to review interface IPv6 ACL and relevant ICMPv6 RA treatment before blocking all control traffic. Which network principle best explains the proposal?
- Class definitions alone do not protect CPU until applied to control-plane interface
- Router-destined management traffic consumes CPU resources distinct from transit forwarding
- IPv6 router advertisement is essential to host default route and SLAAC behavior when used
- AAA framework and line method-list binding are required for central login decision processing
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:IPv6 router advertisement is essential to host default route and SLAAC behavior when used. The recommended action is to review interface IPv6 ACL and relevant ICMPv6 RA treatment before blocking all control traffic because the network requirement is iPv6 hosts need to receive legitimate router advertisements on an access VLAN. It tests the specific operating property responsible for the behavior, not a generic device reboot. Its predicted observable result is that client receives legitimate RA and acquires intended IPv6 prefix with working default route.
Incorrect Answers
A:Class definitions alone do not protect CPU until applied to control-plane interface is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to attach verified control-plane service policy in supported direction when a detailed CPU class map is configured but never affects live router traffic. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to review interface IPv6 ACL and relevant ICMPv6 RA treatment before blocking all control traffic. The controlling principle is instead that iPv6 router advertisement is essential to host default route and SLAAC behavior when used.
B:Router-destined management traffic consumes CPU resources distinct from transit forwarding is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy when only approved jump-host SSH should receive reliable CPU service during a control plane DoS. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to review interface IPv6 ACL and relevant ICMPv6 RA treatment before blocking all control traffic. The controlling principle is instead that iPv6 router advertisement is essential to host default route and SLAAC behavior when used.
D:AAA framework and line method-list binding are required for central login decision processing is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to enable aaa new-model and bind an explicit authentication method list to intended VTY lines when administrators need TACACS+ login validation on IOS XE with central accounting. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to review interface IPv6 ACL and relevant ICMPv6 RA treatment before blocking all control traffic. The controlling principle is instead that iPv6 router advertisement is essential to host default route and SLAAC behavior when used.
Question 645
An engineer is investigating Local AAA emergency access. The expected design is that enterprise WAN failure must not permanently lock administrators out of infrastructure; instead both central AAA servers are unreachable and no approved local break-glass account works. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Add explicit scoped DNS permit where authorized while retaining terminal default deny
- Apply the IPv6 traffic-filter on correct interface and direction independent of IPv4 ACL
- Configure protected local fallback method for server-unavailable events and verify access restrictions
- Apply IPv6 source guard backed by accurate per-port binding or trusted policy
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Configure protected local fallback method for server-unavailable events and verify access restrictions corrects the specific failure: both central AAA servers are unreachable and no approved local break-glass account works. Resilient management authentication needs a constrained emergency path that does not weaken normal checks. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that simulated AAA outage permits only intended emergency local login; incorrect central credentials remain denied.
Incorrect Answers
A:Add explicit scoped DNS permit where authorized while retaining terminal default deny addresses a different situation, such as a security policy allows several application flows through an interface and should reject everything else. Every IPv4 ACL has an implicit deny at the end if no entry matches. In this question the relevant situation is both central AAA servers are unreachable and no approved local break-glass account works; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that simulated AAA outage permits only intended emergency local login; incorrect central credentials remain denied. The specific remedy here concerns configure protected local fallback method for server-unavailable events and verify access restrictions.
B:Apply the IPv6 traffic-filter on correct interface and direction independent of IPv4 ACL addresses a different situation, such as an IPv6 security filter should protect the campus server subnet from guest networks. IPv4 and IPv6 ACL enforcement use separate address-family configuration. In this question the relevant situation is both central AAA servers are unreachable and no approved local break-glass account works; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that simulated AAA outage permits only intended emergency local login; incorrect central credentials remain denied. The specific remedy here concerns configure protected local fallback method for server-unavailable events and verify access restrictions.
D:Apply IPv6 source guard backed by accurate per-port binding or trusted policy addresses a different situation, such as a guest machine sends IPv6 packets using an address not assigned or allowed on its switch port. IPv6 source guard checks packet source eligibility at the access edge. In this question the relevant situation is both central AAA servers are unreachable and no approved local break-glass account works; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that simulated AAA outage permits only intended emergency local login; incorrect central credentials remain denied. The specific remedy here concerns configure protected local fallback method for server-unavailable events and verify access restrictions.
Question 646
An engineer is investigating Management DNS mismatch. The expected design is that a router uses hostname-based SCP destination but management VRF has no working DNS; instead sCP by IP succeeds but SCP by FQDN fails with name resolution errors. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session
- Use IPFIX or supported flexible NetFlow format suitable for IPv6 records
- Document packet sampling rate and interpret collector estimates correctly
- Configure appropriate management DNS resolvers and source reachability
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Configure appropriate management DNS resolvers and source reachability corrects the specific failure: sCP by IP succeeds but SCP by FQDN fails with name resolution errors. Management name resolution is an independent dependency from IP transport connectivity. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that device resolves management hostname and SCP by FQDN matches direct-IP transfer.
Incorrect Answers
A:Validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session addresses a different situation, such as engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls. Model-driven telemetry depends on a valid sensor path, transport and active subscription. In this question the relevant situation is sCP by IP succeeds but SCP by FQDN fails with name resolution errors; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that device resolves management hostname and SCP by FQDN matches direct-IP transfer. The specific remedy here concerns configure appropriate management DNS resolvers and source reachability.
B:Use IPFIX or supported flexible NetFlow format suitable for IPv6 records addresses a different situation, such as an IPv6-heavy enterprise expects detailed v6 flow telemetry from legacy NetFlow v5. Legacy NetFlow v5 format has limited fixed IPv4-oriented fields compared with newer template formats. In this question the relevant situation is sCP by IP succeeds but SCP by FQDN fails with name resolution errors; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that device resolves management hostname and SCP by FQDN matches direct-IP transfer. The specific remedy here concerns configure appropriate management DNS resolvers and source reachability.
C:Document packet sampling rate and interpret collector estimates correctly addresses a different situation, such as core link requires flow visibility with reduced CPU/bandwidth overhead. Sampled flow observation is statistical and not identical to unsampled packet accounting. In this question the relevant situation is sCP by IP succeeds but SCP by FQDN fails with name resolution errors; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that device resolves management hostname and SCP by FQDN matches direct-IP transfer. The specific remedy here concerns configure appropriate management DNS resolvers and source reachability.
Question 647
An incident caused this behavior: Traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations. The engineer implements the correction to check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- Label forwarding succeeds through P routers whose IP RIB lacks customer VRF subnets
- MP-BGP shows distinct VPNv4 NLRI for overlapping customer addresses
- Tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution
- Reachability to LDP IDs succeeds and a TCP-based LDP session forms
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase addresses the observed incident: traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations. DMVPN shortcut formation depends on appropriate NHRP signaling and routing behavior. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Label forwarding succeeds through P routers whose IP RIB lacks customer VRF subnets would validate the different intervention to inspect LFIB label-switched paths rather than assuming P routers must hold customer routes for a scenario such as operator expects customer prefixes in every P-router RIB and flags their absence as outage. It does not test the present fault—traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution.
B:MP-BGP shows distinct VPNv4 NLRI for overlapping customer addresses would validate the different intervention to assign intended unique route distinguishers for overlapping VPNv4 NLRI for a scenario such as provider BGP displays conflicting customer routes when a route distinguisher was omitted or duplicated incorrectly. It does not test the present fault—traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution.
D:Reachability to LDP IDs succeeds and a TCP-based LDP session forms would validate the different intervention to ensure chosen LDP transport router IDs are routable by underlay and not filtered for a scenario such as lDP discovery shows hello neighbor but operational neighbor state stays absent. It does not test the present fault—traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution.
Question 648
An engineer is investigating TFTP service firewall. The expected design is that a branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging; instead tFTP transfer starts but times out after request because reply UDP data path is filtered. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts
- Restrict SNMP community or group access with source ACL and upgrade to v3 where feasible
- Include required source/destination addresses ports and protocol as match keys
- Check server policy on trusted relay Option 82 and matching circuit identifiers
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts corrects the specific failure: tFTP transfer starts but times out after request because reply UDP data path is filtered. TFTP uses UDP and server-selected transfer ports beyond initial request. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked.
Incorrect Answers
B:Restrict SNMP community or group access with source ACL and upgrade to v3 where feasible addresses a different situation, such as a router should accept SNMP requests only from dedicated telemetry collector. SNMP credentials alone should not define the full reachability boundary. In this question the relevant situation is tFTP transfer starts but times out after request because reply UDP data path is filtered; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
C:Include required source/destination addresses ports and protocol as match keys addresses a different situation, such as security team must distinguish flows by source/destination port and protocol. Flexible NetFlow records use configured match fields to define distinct flows. In this question the relevant situation is tFTP transfer starts but times out after request because reply UDP data path is filtered; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
D:Check server policy on trusted relay Option 82 and matching circuit identifiers addresses a different situation, such as branch relay inserts Option 82 but a DHCP server rejects unfamiliar circuit identifiers. DHCP relay agent information may identify client location for policy and must be accepted consistently. In this question the relevant situation is tFTP transfer starts but times out after request because reply UDP data path is filtered; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
Question 649
An engineer is investigating DMVPN tunnel protection IPsec profile. The expected design is that dMVPN spokes must encrypt GRE transport without static peer-by-peer crypto maps; instead tunnel routes work unencrypted because IPsec profile was never attached to tunnel. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations
- Verify both the transport LSP label and advertised VPN service label binding
- Inspect LFIB label-switched paths rather than assuming P routers must hold customer routes
- Compare both PEs' import/export RT sets and ensure intended bidirectional exchange
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations corrects the specific failure: tunnel routes work unencrypted because IPsec profile was never attached to tunnel. DMVPN integrates GRE routing flexibility with IPsec protection on tunnel interfaces. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that show crypto ipsec sa counters increase for protected tunnel traffic.
Incorrect Answers
B:Verify both the transport LSP label and advertised VPN service label binding addresses a different situation, such as an ingress PE transports VPN packets through core using transport and VPN service labels. MPLS L3VPN commonly uses an outer transport label and an inner VPN label to select customer forwarding context. In this question the relevant situation is tunnel routes work unencrypted because IPsec profile was never attached to tunnel; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show crypto ipsec sa counters increase for protected tunnel traffic. The specific remedy here concerns apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations.
C:Inspect LFIB label-switched paths rather than assuming P routers must hold customer routes addresses a different situation, such as a core P router forwards labeled traffic without customer VPN IP routes. MPLS core forwarding can rely on transport labels without customer VRF awareness. In this question the relevant situation is tunnel routes work unencrypted because IPsec profile was never attached to tunnel; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show crypto ipsec sa counters increase for protected tunnel traffic. The specific remedy here concerns apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations.
D:Compare both PEs' import/export RT sets and ensure intended bidirectional exchange addresses a different situation, such as site A receives Site B routes while Site B cannot reach A despite healthy MPLS core. Customer reachability often needs compatible import and export policies in both directions. In this question the relevant situation is tunnel routes work unencrypted because IPsec profile was never attached to tunnel; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show crypto ipsec sa counters increase for protected tunnel traffic. The specific remedy here concerns apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations.
Question 650
An incident caused this behavior: A remote ASBR remains selected despite high internal cost because E2 costs tie. The engineer implements the correction to evaluate E1 route type or explicit policy when total internal path cost should influence exit. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- LSA metric types and resulting route selection align with design
- Logs show no new SIA events and query/reply convergence succeeds on failover
- Multiple iBGP routers select the intended egress consistent with local preference
- Interface policy show output and traceroute correlate matches with the intended alternate egress
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:LSA metric types and resulting route selection align with design. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to evaluate E1 route type or explicit policy when total internal path cost should influence exit addresses the observed incident: a remote ASBR remains selected despite high internal cost because E2 costs tie. OSPF E2 primarily compares external cost whereas E1 adds internal cost to ASBR. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Logs show no new SIA events and query/reply convergence succeeds on failover would validate the different intervention to constrain queries with EIGRP stubs or summaries and repair delayed replies on the slow segment for a scenario such as routes remain active waiting for downstream query replies until neighbors reset. It does not test the present fault—a remote ASBR remains selected despite high internal cost because E2 costs tie—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that lSA metric types and resulting route selection align with design.
C:Multiple iBGP routers select the intended egress consistent with local preference would validate the different intervention to set local preference for AS-wide exit preference rather than relying only on Cisco-local weight for a scenario such as only one router changes exit after weight alteration while internal peers choose old exit. It does not test the present fault—a remote ASBR remains selected despite high internal cost because E2 costs tie—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that lSA metric types and resulting route selection align with design.
D:Interface policy show output and traceroute correlate matches with the intended alternate egress would validate the different intervention to verify PBR attachment, matching packets, and real flow next-hop rather than RIB alone for a scenario such as engineer tests only the route table and misses a policy route map attached to wrong interface. It does not test the present fault—a remote ASBR remains selected despite high internal cost because E2 costs tie—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that lSA metric types and resulting route selection align with design.