Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) 300-410 Practice Test 5
Question 40
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: A route has feasible distance 1000 and a neighbor reports distance 1000 but needs instant backup. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Check strict reported-distance less-than feasible-distance condition before declaring feasible successor
- Configure appropriate eBGP multihop and matching update-source with reachable loopbacks
- Compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics
- Apply and verify prefix policy on the intended outbound BGP neighbor and address family
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Check strict reported-distance less-than feasible-distance condition before declaring feasible successor is the direct intervention for this deployment: a route has feasible distance 1000 and a neighbor reports distance 1000 but needs instant backup. EIGRP feasibility condition requires RD < current feasible distance, not less-than-or-equal. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when topology table identifies only valid feasible successors and convergence matches that set.
Incorrect Answers
B:Configure appropriate eBGP multihop and matching update-source with reachable loopbacks addresses a different situation, such as eBGP peers are separated by a transit hop and need neighbor connection to loopbacks. Default eBGP neighbor reachability assumes directly connected peer unless multihop is configured. In this question the relevant situation is a route has feasible distance 1000 and a neighbor reports distance 1000 but needs instant backup; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that topology table identifies only valid feasible successors and convergence matches that set. The specific remedy here concerns check strict reported-distance less-than feasible-distance condition before declaring feasible successor.
C:Compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics addresses a different situation, such as a branch router learns the same /24 through OSPF and EIGRP and the design calls for consistent source preference. Administrative distance chooses between routing sources for the same prefix whereas each protocol calculates its own best path internally. In this question the relevant situation is a route has feasible distance 1000 and a neighbor reports distance 1000 but needs instant backup; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that topology table identifies only valid feasible successors and convergence matches that set. The specific remedy here concerns check strict reported-distance less-than feasible-distance condition before declaring feasible successor.
D:Apply and verify prefix policy on the intended outbound BGP neighbor and address family addresses a different situation, such as a BGP edge must stop one private prefix from leaving an external neighbor while retaining allowed advertisements. Export policy affects what a given peer receives and must be attached in the right direction and family. In this question the relevant situation is a route has feasible distance 1000 and a neighbor reports distance 1000 but needs instant backup; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that topology table identifies only valid feasible successors and convergence matches that set. The specific remedy here concerns check strict reported-distance less-than feasible-distance condition before declaring feasible successor.
Question 41
An incident caused this behavior: An engineer changes interface cost expecting an external seed metric to change automatically. The engineer implements the correction to trace the external route source metric-type tag and route-map before changing intra-domain link cost. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- The selected external route and originating redistribution policy explain the observed metric
- Interface address, per-VRF neighbors and tenant forwarding are restored after migration
- OSPFv3 neighbor Full and remote IPv6 prefixes appear in IPv6 RIB
- Route table installs multiple valid next hops with expected traffic share
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The selected external route and originating redistribution policy explain the observed metric. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to trace the external route source metric-type tag and route-map before changing intra-domain link cost addresses the observed incident: an engineer changes interface cost expecting an external seed metric to change automatically. External route attributes are introduced at redistribution and can differ from internal link metrics. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Interface address, per-VRF neighbors and tenant forwarding are restored after migration would validate the different intervention to reapply intended interface addressing after VRF binding and retest the tenant adjacency for a scenario such as the interface loses its prior IP configuration after the ip vrf forwarding change. It does not test the present fault—an engineer changes interface cost expecting an external seed metric to change automatically—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the selected external route and originating redistribution policy explain the observed metric.
C:OSPFv3 neighbor Full and remote IPv6 prefixes appear in IPv6 RIB would validate the different intervention to enable correct OSPFv3 IPv6 process and interface context with viable link-local communication for a scenario such as iPv4 OSPF neighbors work but IPv6 OSPFv3 address family has no adjacency. It does not test the present fault—an engineer changes interface cost expecting an external seed metric to change automatically—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the selected external route and originating redistribution policy explain the observed metric.
D:Route table installs multiple valid next hops with expected traffic share would validate the different intervention to set an appropriate EIGRP variance and verify feasibility and traffic-share constraints for a scenario such as a backup route remains unused because variance remains 1 even though it qualifies as feasible successor. It does not test the present fault—an engineer changes interface cost expecting an external seed metric to change automatically—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the selected external route and originating redistribution policy explain the observed metric.
Question 42
The ENARSI operational team is validating Discontiguous summary blackhole for this design: Remote branches use separated /24s and proposed /16 summarization spans unrelated active networks. They intend to narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- After the primary OSPF link restores, a feedback route still attracts traffic to the backup border
- Default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes
- A private /24 is learned by an upstream peer after an outbound prefix filter was applied to the wrong neighbor
- After summary deployment traffic for an unowned subnet follows a discard or wrong border path
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:After summary deployment traffic for an unowned subnet follows a discard or wrong border path. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses. Overly broad aggregation trades routing size for false reachability across unused space. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that all intended branch subnets pass reachability tests and invalid holes do not misroute.
Incorrect Answers
A:After the primary OSPF link restores, a feedback route still attracts traffic to the backup border is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for combine route tagging/denial with tested administrative preference and reconvergence. Redistributed feedback can outlive the original failure unless return paths are explicitly filtered. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with after summary deployment traffic for an unowned subnet follows a discard or wrong border path; the alternative is not the most specific justification for narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses.
B:Default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform. Announcing a default promises reachability and should be conditional when upstream exit can fail. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with after summary deployment traffic for an unowned subnet follows a discard or wrong border path; the alternative is not the most specific justification for narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses.
C:A private /24 is learned by an upstream peer after an outbound prefix filter was applied to the wrong neighbor is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for apply and verify prefix policy on the intended outbound BGP neighbor and address family. Export policy affects what a given peer receives and must be attached in the right direction and family. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with after summary deployment traffic for an unowned subnet follows a discard or wrong border path; the alternative is not the most specific justification for narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses.
Question 43
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: An enterprise wants to make one inbound transit less attractive to upstream ASes. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Verify both neighbors support and enable compatible BFD parameters and interface reachability
- Use permitted outbound AS-path prepending and verify upstream view without assuming absolute control
- Combine route tagging/denial with tested administrative preference and reconvergence
- Match only authorized connected loopback prefixes with a redistribution route map
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Use permitted outbound AS-path prepending and verify upstream view without assuming absolute control is the direct intervention for this deployment: an enterprise wants to make one inbound transit less attractive to upstream ASes. AS-path prepending influences external best-path decisions but cannot guarantee remote preference. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when upstream advertised route carries longer AS path and measured ingress shifts only where policy permits.
Incorrect Answers
A:Verify both neighbors support and enable compatible BFD parameters and interface reachability addresses a different situation, such as a BFD-enabled BGP pair needs fast failover but one side never reaches Up. Routing protocol integration requires a successful bidirectional BFD session. In this question the relevant situation is an enterprise wants to make one inbound transit less attractive to upstream ASes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route carries longer AS path and measured ingress shifts only where policy permits. The specific remedy here concerns use permitted outbound AS-path prepending and verify upstream view without assuming absolute control.
C:Combine route tagging/denial with tested administrative preference and reconvergence addresses a different situation, such as a backup redistributor should not turn a temporary external route into a persistent primary route. Redistributed feedback can outlive the original failure unless return paths are explicitly filtered. In this question the relevant situation is an enterprise wants to make one inbound transit less attractive to upstream ASes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route carries longer AS path and measured ingress shifts only where policy permits. The specific remedy here concerns use permitted outbound AS-path prepending and verify upstream view without assuming absolute control.
D:Match only authorized connected loopback prefixes with a redistribution route map addresses a different situation, such as an enterprise wants only loopback services from connected routes injected into OSPF. Redistribution without filtering may leak many interface prefixes into a routing domain. In this question the relevant situation is an enterprise wants to make one inbound transit less attractive to upstream ASes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route carries longer AS path and measured ingress shifts only where policy permits. The specific remedy here concerns use permitted outbound AS-path prepending and verify upstream view without assuming absolute control.
Question 44
An engineer is investigating VPNv4 route target import. The expected design is that customer BLUE should receive only BLUE VPN routes across PE routers; instead bLUE VRF imports another customer's routes after a broad route-target import. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping
- Correct VPN route-target import and export community policy
- Verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility
- Evaluate EIGRP split horizon behavior on the hub overlay interface
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Correct VPN route-target import and export community policy corrects the specific failure: bLUE VRF imports another customer's routes after a broad route-target import. Route targets control membership and routing distribution between VPN VRFs while RD primarily distinguishes prefixes. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that show ip route vrf BLUE includes approved VPN routes and excludes unrelated customer prefixes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping addresses a different situation, such as a spoke migrates from wired ISP to LTE with a new public source interface. Dynamic multipoint registration must track actual public transport identity. In this question the relevant situation is bLUE VRF imports another customer's routes after a broad route-target import; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show ip route vrf BLUE includes approved VPN routes and excludes unrelated customer prefixes. The specific remedy here concerns correct VPN route-target import and export community policy.
C:Verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility addresses a different situation, such as engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy. MPLS TTL propagation policies affect whether core label hops are exposed to traceroute. In this question the relevant situation is bLUE VRF imports another customer's routes after a broad route-target import; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show ip route vrf BLUE includes approved VPN routes and excludes unrelated customer prefixes. The specific remedy here concerns correct VPN route-target import and export community policy.
D:Evaluate EIGRP split horizon behavior on the hub overlay interface addresses a different situation, such as two spokes run EIGRP across a shared hub mGRE interface and need mutual routes. Split horizon can suppress forwarding spoke-learned routes back on same multipoint interface. In this question the relevant situation is bLUE VRF imports another customer's routes after a broad route-target import; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show ip route vrf BLUE includes approved VPN routes and excludes unrelated customer prefixes. The specific remedy here concerns correct VPN route-target import and export community policy.
Question 45
The ENARSI operational team is validating SSH management VRF for this design: A core router's SSH management interface must be accessible only from a dedicated out-of-band VRF. They intend to test VRF-specific management route, source interface, and VTY admission instead of changing data-plane routes. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Team uses only device health score and misses wireless/client-specific failures
- IP SLA counts every latency spike as a total timeout because thresholds were confused
- Troubleshooter blames routing protocol order instead of inspecting NTP offset
- SSH times out on management VLAN while the router replies to global routing pings
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:SSH times out on management VLAN while the router replies to global routing pings. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: test VRF-specific management route, source interface, and VTY admission instead of changing data-plane routes. Management traffic needs a valid two-way route in its own routing context and authorized VTY access. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that sSH from approved jump host establishes and no transit tenant routes are leaked.
Incorrect Answers
A:Team uses only device health score and misses wireless/client-specific failures is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for investigate applicable client health and onboarding telemetry alongside network status. Client experience metrics can reveal issues not reflected in aggregate device health. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with sSH times out on management VLAN while the router replies to global routing pings; the alternative is not the most specific justification for test VRF-specific management route, source interface, and VTY admission instead of changing data-plane routes.
B:IP SLA counts every latency spike as a total timeout because thresholds were confused is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for set a realistic latency threshold separately from operation timeout. IP SLA threshold can flag degraded performance even when responses arrive before timeout. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with sSH times out on management VLAN while the router replies to global routing pings; the alternative is not the most specific justification for test VRF-specific management route, source interface, and VTY admission instead of changing data-plane routes.
C:Troubleshooter blames routing protocol order instead of inspecting NTP offset is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for verify NTP synchronization, time zone display, and event log timestamp source. Cross-device fault correlation is unreliable when clocks differ materially. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with sSH times out on management VLAN while the router replies to global routing pings; the alternative is not the most specific justification for test VRF-specific management route, source interface, and VTY admission instead of changing data-plane routes.
Question 46
During the design review, aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF. A technician proposes to test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials. Which network principle best explains the proposal?
- ICMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity
- Management polling is handled by CPU and should be rate controlled without starving essentials
- IPv6 ACL entries use IPv6 prefixes rather than IPv4 wildcard-mask matching
- Source reachability policy must reflect the actual tenant routing context
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:ICMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity. The recommended action is to test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials because the network requirement is aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF. It tests the specific operating property responsible for the behavior, not a generic device reboot. Its predicted observable result is that server logs show an authenticated TCP 49 request and router login succeeds.
Incorrect Answers
B:Management polling is handled by CPU and should be rate controlled without starving essentials is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads when sNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials. The controlling principle is instead that iCMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity.
C:IPv6 ACL entries use IPv6 prefixes rather than IPv4 wildcard-mask matching is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to build a native IPv6 access list with IPv6 prefix syntax and proper interface binding when iPv6 application access should be limited to a permitted source /64 and TCP destination port. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials. The controlling principle is instead that iCMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity.
D:Source reachability policy must reflect the actual tenant routing context is a real technical distinction, but it supports the different operation to verify supported per-interface uRPF lookup in the correct VRF forwarding table when customer BLUE traffic enters VRF interface and source validation should use customer-specific routing. It does not explain the selected intervention in this case, namely to test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials. The controlling principle is instead that iCMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity.
Question 47
The ENARSI operational team is validating MPLS penultimate hop popping for this design: A provider expects egress PE to avoid redundant outer transport label processing. They intend to validate implicit-null advertisement and PHP behavior on the relevant LSP. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Packet capture on the penultimate hop still shows an unnecessary outgoing transport label toward egress
- Spoke registers with one overlay while expected hub mapping never becomes usable
- IKE authentication fails after certificate rollover while NHRP and GRE addressing still match
- Hub learns prefix from spoke A but does not re-advertise toward spoke B
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Packet capture on the penultimate hop still shows an unnecessary outgoing transport label toward egress. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: validate implicit-null advertisement and PHP behavior on the relevant LSP. Penultimate hop popping removes the outer label before the egress when advertised behavior permits. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that penultimate hop advertises implicit null and egress receives the expected remaining stack.
Incorrect Answers
B:Spoke registers with one overlay while expected hub mapping never becomes usable is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for correct NHRP network ID on tunnel peers within the intended overlay. NHRP overlay membership uses matching network identification values. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture on the penultimate hop still shows an unnecessary outgoing transport label toward egress; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate implicit-null advertisement and PHP behavior on the relevant LSP.
C:IKE authentication fails after certificate rollover while NHRP and GRE addressing still match is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for check peer trustpoint validity chain EKU and accepted identity for IKE authentication. Certificate-based IKE requires verifiable chain and identity compatible with configured policy. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture on the penultimate hop still shows an unnecessary outgoing transport label toward egress; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate implicit-null advertisement and PHP behavior on the relevant LSP.
D:Hub learns prefix from spoke A but does not re-advertise toward spoke B is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for evaluate EIGRP split horizon behavior on the hub overlay interface. Split horizon can suppress forwarding spoke-learned routes back on same multipoint interface. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with packet capture on the penultimate hop still shows an unnecessary outgoing transport label toward egress; the alternative is not the most specific justification for validate implicit-null advertisement and PHP behavior on the relevant LSP.
Question 48
An engineer is investigating DMVPN tunnel source change. The expected design is that a spoke migrates from wired ISP to LTE with a new public source interface; instead nHRP registration references old tunnel source and hub forwards to decommissioned ISP. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping
- Verify PE-CE address-family routing session and VRF membership of relevant interface
- Assign intended unique route distinguishers for overlapping VPNv4 NLRI
- Repair IGP loopback reachability and transport LSP resolution before changing VPN import policy
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping corrects the specific failure: nHRP registration references old tunnel source and hub forwards to decommissioned ISP. Dynamic multipoint registration must track actual public transport identity. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that hub NHRP entry and packet capture reflect LTE NBMA and branch routes recover.
Incorrect Answers
B:Verify PE-CE address-family routing session and VRF membership of relevant interface addresses a different situation, such as a CE must exchange routes with its local PE in a customer VRF. PE-CE routing exchanges customer prefixes before provider MP-BGP transports them between PEs. In this question the relevant situation is nHRP registration references old tunnel source and hub forwards to decommissioned ISP; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that hub NHRP entry and packet capture reflect LTE NBMA and branch routes recover. The specific remedy here concerns update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping.
C:Assign intended unique route distinguishers for overlapping VPNv4 NLRI addresses a different situation, such as two customers use identical 10.1.0.0/16 and must remain distinguishable in an MPLS L3VPN. RD distinguishes otherwise identical IPv4 prefixes in the VPNv4 control plane but does not enforce import policy. In this question the relevant situation is nHRP registration references old tunnel source and hub forwards to decommissioned ISP; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that hub NHRP entry and packet capture reflect LTE NBMA and branch routes recover. The specific remedy here concerns update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping.
D:Repair IGP loopback reachability and transport LSP resolution before changing VPN import policy addresses a different situation, such as a provider advertises LDP labels for loopbacks but transport next-hop resolves through an unstable IGP path. MPLS transport availability depends on stable IGP routing and valid label distribution. In this question the relevant situation is nHRP registration references old tunnel source and hub forwards to decommissioned ISP; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that hub NHRP entry and packet capture reflect LTE NBMA and branch routes recover. The specific remedy here concerns update tunnel source and ensure NHRP advertises the new valid NBMA mapping.
Question 49
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: SNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads
- Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter
- Apply the intended named AAA authentication method list to VTY lines
- Reorder ACE sequence so the specific deny is evaluated before broad permit
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads is the direct intervention for this deployment: sNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization. Management polling is handled by CPU and should be rate controlled without starving essentials. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when authorized baseline SNMP polling succeeds and excess bursts increment expected CoPP drops.
Incorrect Answers
B:Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter addresses a different situation, such as an edge receives traffic with source addresses that have no route in any relevant RIB. Loose uRPF validates existence of a usable source route without demanding the same ingress interface. In this question the relevant situation is sNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that authorized baseline SNMP polling succeeds and excess bursts increment expected CoPP drops. The specific remedy here concerns set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads.
C:Apply the intended named AAA authentication method list to VTY lines addresses a different situation, such as sSH login is required to invoke the secure TACACS authentication list. Different lines can use different AAA lists even on the same device. In this question the relevant situation is sNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that authorized baseline SNMP polling succeeds and excess bursts increment expected CoPP drops. The specific remedy here concerns set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads.
D:Reorder ACE sequence so the specific deny is evaluated before broad permit addresses a different situation, such as a specific deny for host traffic should override a broad subnet permit. IOS ACL processes access control entries in order and stops on first match. In this question the relevant situation is sNMP poller sends high-rate gets to many devices and spikes route processor utilization; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that authorized baseline SNMP polling succeeds and excess bursts increment expected CoPP drops. The specific remedy here concerns set proportionate SNMP class policing and monitor drops under realistic poll loads.
Question 50
The ENARSI operational team is validating VRF route leaking controlled for this design: Application services in RED must reach a shared DNS service in BLUE without general tenant connectivity. They intend to implement minimal supported static or policy route leaking for the approved shared-service prefix. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- TCP connectivity exists yet the remote OPEN message rejects an unexpected AS
- Both departments are redirected because a broad ACL match was used in the route map
- Traffic for the /25 follows the static path although an engineer expects lower OSPF administrative distance to override it
- A broad route import breaks tenant isolation while attempting to provide one shared /32
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A broad route import breaks tenant isolation while attempting to provide one shared /32. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: implement minimal supported static or policy route leaking for the approved shared-service prefix. Cross-VRF reachability needs explicit import policy rather than automatic mutual routing. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that only approved shared /32 reaches across VRFs and tenant-private destinations are unreachable.
Incorrect Answers
A:TCP connectivity exists yet the remote OPEN message rejects an unexpected AS is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for correct remote-as on each peer to the real neighbor ASN. BGP OPEN validation requires the agreed neighbor autonomous system. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with a broad route import breaks tenant isolation while attempting to provide one shared /32; the alternative is not the most specific justification for implement minimal supported static or policy route leaking for the approved shared-service prefix.
B:Both departments are redirected because a broad ACL match was used in the route map is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for narrow the PBR ACL source and destination match to the authorized finance flows. Policy routing acts only on packets matched by the route map ACL semantics. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with a broad route import breaks tenant isolation while attempting to provide one shared /32; the alternative is not the most specific justification for implement minimal supported static or policy route leaking for the approved shared-service prefix.
C:Traffic for the /25 follows the static path although an engineer expects lower OSPF administrative distance to override it is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for test both destinations by longest-prefix route lookup instead of changing global routing distances. A longer matching prefix wins over a less-specific route even if the latter protocol normally has a lower distance. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with a broad route import breaks tenant isolation while attempting to provide one shared /32; the alternative is not the most specific justification for implement minimal supported static or policy route leaking for the approved shared-service prefix.