Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) 300-410 Practice Test 44
Question 430
An engineer is investigating MPLS label imposition. The expected design is that a provider edge needs to forward an ingress IP packet across an MPLS LSP; instead a core router receives unlabeled customer traffic when the ingress was expected to impose a transport label. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class
- Evaluate EIGRP split horizon behavior on the hub overlay interface
- Allocate unique overlay tunnel addresses for each spoke and clear stale NHRP mappings
- Apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class corrects the specific failure: a core router receives unlabeled customer traffic when the ingress was expected to impose a transport label. MPLS ingress LER classifies traffic and pushes the label stack required for the LSP. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that packet trace shows an imposed label at ingress and swapped labels through transit.
Incorrect Answers
B:Evaluate EIGRP split horizon behavior on the hub overlay interface addresses a different situation, such as two spokes run EIGRP across a shared hub mGRE interface and need mutual routes. Split horizon can suppress forwarding spoke-learned routes back on same multipoint interface. In this question the relevant situation is a core router receives unlabeled customer traffic when the ingress was expected to impose a transport label; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that packet trace shows an imposed label at ingress and swapped labels through transit. The specific remedy here concerns verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class.
C:Allocate unique overlay tunnel addresses for each spoke and clear stale NHRP mappings addresses a different situation, such as two new spokes use duplicate tunnel IPv4 addresses despite unique public WAN addresses. A shared multipoint overlay still requires unique inside tunnel identities. In this question the relevant situation is a core router receives unlabeled customer traffic when the ingress was expected to impose a transport label; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that packet trace shows an imposed label at ingress and swapped labels through transit. The specific remedy here concerns verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class.
D:Apply compatible tunnel protection ipsec profile and verify security associations addresses a different situation, such as dMVPN spokes must encrypt GRE transport without static peer-by-peer crypto maps. DMVPN integrates GRE routing flexibility with IPsec protection on tunnel interfaces. In this question the relevant situation is a core router receives unlabeled customer traffic when the ingress was expected to impose a transport label; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that packet trace shows an imposed label at ingress and swapped labels through transit. The specific remedy here concerns verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class.
Question 431
An incident caused this behavior: Interfaces ping but both nodes remain without an OSPF adjacency. The engineer implements the correction to place neighbor interfaces in the same intended OSPF area and verify hello parameters. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- Interface address, per-VRF neighbors and tenant forwarding are restored after migration
- VRF neighbor and route output show the partner routes, with global routing unchanged
- Show ip ospf interface and neighbor display matching area and Full state
- Compare topology FD/RD and routing next hops to identify eligible installed successors
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Show ip ospf interface and neighbor display matching area and Full state. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to place neighbor interfaces in the same intended OSPF area and verify hello parameters addresses the observed incident: interfaces ping but both nodes remain without an OSPF adjacency. OSPF neighbors on a common link must agree on area identification. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Interface address, per-VRF neighbors and tenant forwarding are restored after migration would validate the different intervention to reapply intended interface addressing after VRF binding and retest the tenant adjacency for a scenario such as the interface loses its prior IP configuration after the ip vrf forwarding change. It does not test the present fault—interfaces ping but both nodes remain without an OSPF adjacency—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that show ip ospf interface and neighbor display matching area and Full state.
B:VRF neighbor and route output show the partner routes, with global routing unchanged would validate the different intervention to enable a supported VRF-aware routing process or address family on the correct tenant interfaces for a scenario such as oSPF global neighbor remains down on a VRF-bound interface and no partner prefixes arrive. It does not test the present fault—interfaces ping but both nodes remain without an OSPF adjacency—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that show ip ospf interface and neighbor display matching area and Full state.
D:Compare topology FD/RD and routing next hops to identify eligible installed successors would validate the different intervention to distinguish learned topology candidates from successor selection and variance-qualified RIB installation for a scenario such as show ip eigrp topology lists an alternative but show ip route lists only one successor. It does not test the present fault—interfaces ping but both nodes remain without an OSPF adjacency—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that show ip ospf interface and neighbor display matching area and Full state.
Question 432
An engineer is investigating DMVPN spoke dynamic routing next-hop. The expected design is that spoke routes learned across hub use hub next-hop, preventing expected direct shortcut; instead branch-to-branch flows remain hub-routed despite a registered destination spoke. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Activate appropriate vpnv4 address family and exchange extended communities
- Verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class
- Verify protocol next-hop preservation or redirection settings appropriate to deployed DMVPN phase
- Compare upstream LFIB next-label expectation against downstream advertised binding
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify protocol next-hop preservation or redirection settings appropriate to deployed DMVPN phase corrects the specific failure: branch-to-branch flows remain hub-routed despite a registered destination spoke. Dynamic routing next-hop handling affects whether a spoke can resolve a remote NBMA address. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that spoke route next-hop and NHRP shortcut correspond to remote spoke when design requires.
Incorrect Answers
A:Activate appropriate vpnv4 address family and exchange extended communities addresses a different situation, such as provider PE routers have established global BGP session but no customer VPN routes traverse. MP-BGP requires address-family negotiation and route-target extended communities for VPN membership. In this question the relevant situation is branch-to-branch flows remain hub-routed despite a registered destination spoke; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that spoke route next-hop and NHRP shortcut correspond to remote spoke when design requires. The specific remedy here concerns verify protocol next-hop preservation or redirection settings appropriate to deployed DMVPN phase.
B:Verify the ingress label imposition step and its forwarding equivalence class addresses a different situation, such as a provider edge needs to forward an ingress IP packet across an MPLS LSP. MPLS ingress LER classifies traffic and pushes the label stack required for the LSP. In this question the relevant situation is branch-to-branch flows remain hub-routed despite a registered destination spoke; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that spoke route next-hop and NHRP shortcut correspond to remote spoke when design requires. The specific remedy here concerns verify protocol next-hop preservation or redirection settings appropriate to deployed DMVPN phase.
D:Compare upstream LFIB next-label expectation against downstream advertised binding addresses a different situation, such as one transit LSR lacks an expected label binding for a core loopback. MPLS forwarding continuity depends on valid per-hop label bindings. In this question the relevant situation is branch-to-branch flows remain hub-routed despite a registered destination spoke; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that spoke route next-hop and NHRP shortcut correspond to remote spoke when design requires. The specific remedy here concerns verify protocol next-hop preservation or redirection settings appropriate to deployed DMVPN phase.
Question 433
The ENARSI operational team is validating DMVPN BGP overlay peering for this design: BGP peers use tunnel addresses but reachability to overlay next hops changes during shortcut formation. They intend to keep BGP overlay peer and next-hop reachability consistent with NHRP and underlay design. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- BGP flaps only when overlay tunnel routing changes despite stable WAN public addresses
- Show bgp summary is Established yet vpnv4 unicast table empty
- Customer router pings PE interface but its private prefixes never reach remote sites
- Traffic for a VPN route dies at a P router despite underlay IP reachability
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:BGP flaps only when overlay tunnel routing changes despite stable WAN public addresses. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: keep BGP overlay peer and next-hop reachability consistent with NHRP and underlay design. Dynamic tunnel routing must sustain control-plane reachability during shortcut changes. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that bGP session stays Established and branches retain prefixes during overlay reconvergence.
Incorrect Answers
B:Show bgp summary is Established yet vpnv4 unicast table empty is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for activate appropriate vpnv4 address family and exchange extended communities. MP-BGP requires address-family negotiation and route-target extended communities for VPN membership. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with bGP flaps only when overlay tunnel routing changes despite stable WAN public addresses; the alternative is not the most specific justification for keep BGP overlay peer and next-hop reachability consistent with NHRP and underlay design.
C:Customer router pings PE interface but its private prefixes never reach remote sites is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for verify PE-CE address-family routing session and VRF membership of relevant interface. PE-CE routing exchanges customer prefixes before provider MP-BGP transports them between PEs. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with bGP flaps only when overlay tunnel routing changes despite stable WAN public addresses; the alternative is not the most specific justification for keep BGP overlay peer and next-hop reachability consistent with NHRP and underlay design.
D:Traffic for a VPN route dies at a P router despite underlay IP reachability is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for compare upstream LFIB next-label expectation against downstream advertised binding. MPLS forwarding continuity depends on valid per-hop label bindings. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with bGP flaps only when overlay tunnel routing changes despite stable WAN public addresses; the alternative is not the most specific justification for keep BGP overlay peer and next-hop reachability consistent with NHRP and underlay design.
Question 434
An incident caused this behavior: An abandoned SSH VTY session persists indefinitely and consumes all available login lines. The engineer implements the correction to configure appropriate VTY exec-timeout and verify graceful session cleanup. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- Only approved management source increments SNMP poll counters while guest requests fail
- Collector receives controlled log event from router and attribution matches source
- Device appears with fresh health metrics after credential and collection validation
- Idle test login terminates after policy period while active sessions remain usable
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Idle test login terminates after policy period while active sessions remain usable. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to configure appropriate VTY exec-timeout and verify graceful session cleanup addresses the observed incident: an abandoned SSH VTY session persists indefinitely and consumes all available login lines. Idle session controls reduce unauthorized reuse and resource exhaustion in management plane. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Only approved management source increments SNMP poll counters while guest requests fail would validate the different intervention to restrict SNMP community or group access with source ACL and upgrade to v3 where feasible for a scenario such as unauthorized host can query v2c community from a user VLAN. It does not test the present fault—an abandoned SSH VTY session persists indefinitely and consumes all available login lines—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that idle test login terminates after policy period while active sessions remain usable.
B:Collector receives controlled log event from router and attribution matches source would validate the different intervention to validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity for a scenario such as packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector. It does not test the present fault—an abandoned SSH VTY session persists indefinitely and consumes all available login lines—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that idle test login terminates after policy period while active sessions remain usable.
C:Device appears with fresh health metrics after credential and collection validation would validate the different intervention to check Cisco Catalyst Center device credentials, telemetry enablement and collection status for a scenario such as inventory shows the device while telemetry credentials or subscription is missing. It does not test the present fault—an abandoned SSH VTY session persists indefinitely and consumes all available login lines—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that idle test login terminates after policy period while active sessions remain usable.
Question 435
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: Engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session
- Check server policy on trusted relay Option 82 and matching circuit identifiers
- Verify IPFIX template export and field compatibility at collector
- Use IPFIX or supported flexible NetFlow format suitable for IPv6 records
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session is the direct intervention for this deployment: engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls. Model-driven telemetry depends on a valid sensor path, transport and active subscription. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when collector receives timestamped interface updates on expected path and cadence.
Incorrect Answers
B:Check server policy on trusted relay Option 82 and matching circuit identifiers addresses a different situation, such as branch relay inserts Option 82 but a DHCP server rejects unfamiliar circuit identifiers. DHCP relay agent information may identify client location for policy and must be accepted consistently. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that collector receives timestamped interface updates on expected path and cadence. The specific remedy here concerns validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session.
C:Verify IPFIX template export and field compatibility at collector addresses a different situation, such as collector sees flow packets but cannot decode custom enterprise fields. Template-based flow protocols communicate record layouts separately from data records. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that collector receives timestamped interface updates on expected path and cadence. The specific remedy here concerns validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session.
D:Use IPFIX or supported flexible NetFlow format suitable for IPv6 records addresses a different situation, such as an IPv6-heavy enterprise expects detailed v6 flow telemetry from legacy NetFlow v5. Legacy NetFlow v5 format has limited fixed IPv4-oriented fields compared with newer template formats. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need frequent interface statistics without repeated high-cost CLI polls; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that collector receives timestamped interface updates on expected path and cadence. The specific remedy here concerns validate platform-supported streaming telemetry subscription, sensor path and collector session.
Question 436
An engineer is investigating BFD fast failure signal. The expected design is that oSPF neighbors should detect dead forwarding within subsecond intervals across a critical WAN; instead oSPF hello/dead timers recover too slowly after a forwarding-only fault. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Correct remote-as on each peer to the real neighbor ASN
- Check stub type agreement and ABR default route instead of enabling external flooding
- Correct L3 interface MTU mismatch rather than routinely bypassing OSPF MTU checks
- Enable and validate BFD sessions tied to supported routing neighbors on both ends
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Enable and validate BFD sessions tied to supported routing neighbors on both ends corrects the specific failure: oSPF hello/dead timers recover too slowly after a forwarding-only fault. BFD quickly detects forwarding path failure while routing protocol reacts to session state. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that show bfd neighbors changes promptly on path failure and OSPF reroutes accordingly.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct remote-as on each peer to the real neighbor ASN addresses a different situation, such as two external routers establish BGP with documented AS 65010 and 65020. BGP OPEN validation requires the agreed neighbor autonomous system. In this question the relevant situation is oSPF hello/dead timers recover too slowly after a forwarding-only fault; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show bfd neighbors changes promptly on path failure and OSPF reroutes accordingly. The specific remedy here concerns enable and validate BFD sessions tied to supported routing neighbors on both ends.
B:Check stub type agreement and ABR default route instead of enabling external flooding addresses a different situation, such as an area should avoid detailed AS-external routes and use a summary/default from its ABR. OSPF stub areas suppress Type-5 externals and typically rely on an ABR default. In this question the relevant situation is oSPF hello/dead timers recover too slowly after a forwarding-only fault; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show bfd neighbors changes promptly on path failure and OSPF reroutes accordingly. The specific remedy here concerns enable and validate BFD sessions tied to supported routing neighbors on both ends.
C:Correct L3 interface MTU mismatch rather than routinely bypassing OSPF MTU checks addresses a different situation, such as two WAN routers have OSPF neighbors repeatedly stuck Exstart/Exchange. OSPF database description MTU mismatch can block reliable exchange. In this question the relevant situation is oSPF hello/dead timers recover too slowly after a forwarding-only fault; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that show bfd neighbors changes promptly on path failure and OSPF reroutes accordingly. The specific remedy here concerns enable and validate BFD sessions tied to supported routing neighbors on both ends.
Question 437
An engineer is investigating Catalyst Center site scope. The expected design is that monitoring should separate data-center and branch health in different site hierarchies; instead health dashboard mixes unrelated sites and obscures one failing branch. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Reconcile local SNMPv3 engine ID, USM credentials and user localization at collector
- Verify NTP synchronization, time zone display, and event log timestamp source
- Correct site hierarchy assignment and device membership in Catalyst Center
- Advertise appropriate O flag and configure stateless DHCPv6 information service
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Correct site hierarchy assignment and device membership in Catalyst Center corrects the specific failure: health dashboard mixes unrelated sites and obscures one failing branch. Assurance aggregation is contextual and requires appropriate site/network grouping. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that branch dashboard isolates affected assets and remains accurate after site move.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reconcile local SNMPv3 engine ID, USM credentials and user localization at collector addresses a different situation, such as sNMPv3 collector loses access after router replacement with a new engine identifier. SNMPv3 keys can be localized to authoritative engine identifier. In this question the relevant situation is health dashboard mixes unrelated sites and obscures one failing branch; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that branch dashboard isolates affected assets and remains accurate after site move. The specific remedy here concerns correct site hierarchy assignment and device membership in Catalyst Center.
B:Verify NTP synchronization, time zone display, and event log timestamp source addresses a different situation, such as two routers report contradictory failure timelines because one clock is minutes ahead. Cross-device fault correlation is unreliable when clocks differ materially. In this question the relevant situation is health dashboard mixes unrelated sites and obscures one failing branch; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that branch dashboard isolates affected assets and remains accurate after site move. The specific remedy here concerns correct site hierarchy assignment and device membership in Catalyst Center.
D:Advertise appropriate O flag and configure stateless DHCPv6 information service addresses a different situation, such as hosts use SLAAC address but need DNS server information from DHCPv6. Stateless DHCPv6 can deliver ancillary data while SLAAC supplies IPv6 addresses. In this question the relevant situation is health dashboard mixes unrelated sites and obscures one failing branch; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that branch dashboard isolates affected assets and remains accurate after site move. The specific remedy here concerns correct site hierarchy assignment and device membership in Catalyst Center.
Question 438
An engineer is investigating Administrative distance versus metrics. The expected design is that a branch router learns the same /24 through OSPF and EIGRP and the design calls for consistent source preference; instead the OSPF and EIGRP processes both show a path but the RIB installs the unexpected routing source. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics
- Tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform
- Narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses
- Verify supported 4-byte AS syntax and exact remote ASN on both peers
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics corrects the specific failure: the OSPF and EIGRP processes both show a path but the RIB installs the unexpected routing source. Administrative distance chooses between routing sources for the same prefix whereas each protocol calculates its own best path internally. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that the route table selects the intended source and alternate protocol retains its independent topology entry.
Incorrect Answers
B:Tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform addresses a different situation, such as a remote dynamic routing domain should learn a default only when central internet exit is valid. Announcing a default promises reachability and should be conditional when upstream exit can fail. In this question the relevant situation is the OSPF and EIGRP processes both show a path but the RIB installs the unexpected routing source; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that the route table selects the intended source and alternate protocol retains its independent topology entry. The specific remedy here concerns compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics.
C:Narrow the summary boundary to valid contiguous ownership and test unmatched addresses addresses a different situation, such as remote branches use separated /24s and proposed /16 summarization spans unrelated active networks. Overly broad aggregation trades routing size for false reachability across unused space. In this question the relevant situation is the OSPF and EIGRP processes both show a path but the RIB installs the unexpected routing source; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that the route table selects the intended source and alternate protocol retains its independent topology entry. The specific remedy here concerns compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics.
D:Verify supported 4-byte AS syntax and exact remote ASN on both peers addresses a different situation, such as an edge connects to a partner using a four-byte ASN not representable in old two-byte conventions. BGP four-octet AS support allows larger AS numbers with proper capability negotiation. In this question the relevant situation is the OSPF and EIGRP processes both show a path but the RIB installs the unexpected routing source; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that the route table selects the intended source and alternate protocol retains its independent topology entry. The specific remedy here concerns compare the routes for the exact prefix and set the intended administrative distance without modifying unrelated protocol metrics.
Question 439
An engineer is investigating CoPP SSH management policy. The expected design is that only approved jump-host SSH should receive reliable CPU service during a control plane DoS; instead unclassified inbound TCP/22 consumes excessive CPU and management sessions time out. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy
- Enable supported IPv6 ND inspection and maintain reliable binding data
- Check AAA server-group members, deadtime and availability behavior before raising login timers
- Permit required ICMPv6 neighbor discovery control messages while filtering other traffic appropriately
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy corrects the specific failure: unclassified inbound TCP/22 consumes excessive CPU and management sessions time out. Router-destined management traffic consumes CPU resources distinct from transit forwarding. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that approved management login remains available under simulated untrusted SSH load.
Incorrect Answers
B:Enable supported IPv6 ND inspection and maintain reliable binding data addresses a different situation, such as access switch needs to validate neighbor advertisements against trusted device bindings. ND inspection helps detect neighbor identity spoofing using binding information. In this question the relevant situation is unclassified inbound TCP/22 consumes excessive CPU and management sessions time out; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that approved management login remains available under simulated untrusted SSH load. The specific remedy here concerns classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy.
C:Check AAA server-group members, deadtime and availability behavior before raising login timers addresses a different situation, such as a pair of central TACACS servers provides redundant management login. AAA group failover depends on valid member definitions and a detected service outage. In this question the relevant situation is unclassified inbound TCP/22 consumes excessive CPU and management sessions time out; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that approved management login remains available under simulated untrusted SSH load. The specific remedy here concerns classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy.
D:Permit required ICMPv6 neighbor discovery control messages while filtering other traffic appropriately addresses a different situation, such as router's IPv6 ACL denies all ICMPv6 and adjacent hosts lose neighbor reachability. IPv6 depends on essential ICMPv6 neighbor discovery for address-to-link-layer resolution. In this question the relevant situation is unclassified inbound TCP/22 consumes excessive CPU and management sessions time out; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that approved management login remains available under simulated untrusted SSH load. The specific remedy here concerns classify approved management SSH and police unauthorized to-device traffic by policy.
Question 440
An engineer is investigating TACACS vs RADIUS purpose. The expected design is that administrators require detailed per-command network device authorization with centralized logging; instead an engineer selects generic RADIUS authentication but cannot enforce TACACS-specific command policies. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Examine uRPF drop counters and reverse-path route for the reported sender
- Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter
- Apply IPv6 source guard backed by accurate per-port binding or trusted policy
- Use TACACS+ for device administration where supported command authorization is required
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Use TACACS+ for device administration where supported command authorization is required corrects the specific failure: an engineer selects generic RADIUS authentication but cannot enforce TACACS-specific command policies. TACACS+ supports separate device-administrator authentication authorization and accounting. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that server logs show a command-specific policy decision and accounting audit.
Incorrect Answers
A:Examine uRPF drop counters and reverse-path route for the reported sender addresses a different situation, such as a new uRPF setting causes selective UDP packet loss from one branch. Reverse path filtering can discard packets before normal destination forwarding. In this question the relevant situation is an engineer selects generic RADIUS authentication but cannot enforce TACACS-specific command policies; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show a command-specific policy decision and accounting audit. The specific remedy here concerns use TACACS+ for device administration where supported command authorization is required.
B:Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter addresses a different situation, such as an edge receives traffic with source addresses that have no route in any relevant RIB. Loose uRPF validates existence of a usable source route without demanding the same ingress interface. In this question the relevant situation is an engineer selects generic RADIUS authentication but cannot enforce TACACS-specific command policies; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show a command-specific policy decision and accounting audit. The specific remedy here concerns use TACACS+ for device administration where supported command authorization is required.
C:Apply IPv6 source guard backed by accurate per-port binding or trusted policy addresses a different situation, such as a guest machine sends IPv6 packets using an address not assigned or allowed on its switch port. IPv6 source guard checks packet source eligibility at the access edge. In this question the relevant situation is an engineer selects generic RADIUS authentication but cannot enforce TACACS-specific command policies; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show a command-specific policy decision and accounting audit. The specific remedy here concerns use TACACS+ for device administration where supported command authorization is required.