Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) 300-410 Practice Test 21
Question 200
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: A branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Select appropriate logging trap severity and separate local debugging policy
- Include required source/destination addresses ports and protocol as match keys
- Permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts
- Investigate applicable client health and onboarding telemetry alongside network status
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts is the direct intervention for this deployment: a branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging. TFTP uses UDP and server-selected transfer ports beyond initial request. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked.
Incorrect Answers
A:Select appropriate logging trap severity and separate local debugging policy addresses a different situation, such as central NMS should receive warning and more severe events without flooding on debugging. IOS syslog severity levels control which messages are exported to remote collectors. In this question the relevant situation is a branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
B:Include required source/destination addresses ports and protocol as match keys addresses a different situation, such as security team must distinguish flows by source/destination port and protocol. Flexible NetFlow records use configured match fields to define distinct flows. In this question the relevant situation is a branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
D:Investigate applicable client health and onboarding telemetry alongside network status addresses a different situation, such as client experiences intermittent access but network equipment overall reports healthy. Client experience metrics can reveal issues not reflected in aggregate device health. In this question the relevant situation is a branch router must retrieve a firmware config from approved TFTP server in isolated staging; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that controlled TFTP file transfer completes while unapproved hosts remain blocked. The specific remedy here concerns permit expected UDP TFTP exchange through staging firewall for authorized hosts.
Question 201
An engineer is investigating Redistribution default route. The expected design is that a remote dynamic routing domain should learn a default only when central internet exit is valid; instead default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Make the hub a route reflector and configure appropriate clients while testing originator handling
- Tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform
- Check stub type agreement and ABR default route instead of enabling external flooding
- Validate route-map direction and associated prefix matches on the correct incoming update path
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform corrects the specific failure: default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes. Announcing a default promises reachability and should be conditional when upstream exit can fail. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that default advertisement withdraws on simulated exit failure and returns after recovery.
Incorrect Answers
A:Make the hub a route reflector and configure appropriate clients while testing originator handling addresses a different situation, such as three internal routers rely on a hub peer to distribute routes without full iBGP mesh. Standard iBGP does not readvertise iBGP-learned routes; route reflectors relax this under loop guards. In this question the relevant situation is default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that default advertisement withdraws on simulated exit failure and returns after recovery. The specific remedy here concerns tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform.
C:Check stub type agreement and ABR default route instead of enabling external flooding addresses a different situation, such as an area should avoid detailed AS-external routes and use a summary/default from its ABR. OSPF stub areas suppress Type-5 externals and typically rely on an ABR default. In this question the relevant situation is default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that default advertisement withdraws on simulated exit failure and returns after recovery. The specific remedy here concerns tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform.
D:Validate route-map direction and associated prefix matches on the correct incoming update path addresses a different situation, such as an internal router must reject a specific received external prefix without changing neighbor sessions. Import filtering controls accepted route information while export filtering controls advertised routes to peers. In this question the relevant situation is default originates even after upstream connectivity is lost and remote traffic blackholes; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that default advertisement withdraws on simulated exit failure and returns after recovery. The specific remedy here concerns tie default origination to validated route or tracking conditions supported by the platform.
Question 202
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: Engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Focus on the single configured hub's NHRP state and underlay reachability first
- Check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase
- Verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility
- Test actual spoke-to-spoke NBMA reachability and NAT firewall policies before forcing shortcuts
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility is the direct intervention for this deployment: engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy. MPLS TTL propagation policies affect whether core label hops are exposed to traceroute. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when captured TTL behavior explains hop visibility without incorrectly declaring a routing loop.
Incorrect Answers
A:Focus on the single configured hub's NHRP state and underlay reachability first addresses a different situation, such as the published ENARSI objective requires troubleshooting a single-hub DMVPN design. A single-hub topology has one designated NHRP resolution point, simplifying fault isolation. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that captured TTL behavior explains hop visibility without incorrectly declaring a routing loop. The specific remedy here concerns verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility.
B:Check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase addresses a different situation, such as direct spoke-to-spoke traffic should bypass hub where DMVPN phase behavior permits. DMVPN shortcut formation depends on appropriate NHRP signaling and routing behavior. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that captured TTL behavior explains hop visibility without incorrectly declaring a routing loop. The specific remedy here concerns verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility.
D:Test actual spoke-to-spoke NBMA reachability and NAT firewall policies before forcing shortcuts addresses a different situation, such as two spokes behind restrictive NATs fail to form direct tunnel even though each reaches hub. Dynamic endpoint resolution cannot overcome underlay security policy or inaccessible NAT mappings. In this question the relevant situation is engineers need to understand visible hops in a labeled path under TTL propagation policy; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that captured TTL behavior explains hop visibility without incorrectly declaring a routing loop. The specific remedy here concerns verify configured MPLS TTL propagation before interpreting provider-hop visibility.
Question 203
An engineer is investigating BGP aggregate address qualification. The expected design is that a border should originate an aggregate only while at least one contributing route is available; instead an aggregate is expected but no component route exists in the BGP table. Which focused correction should be tested first?
- Provide reachable next-hop advertisement or configure next-hop-self at the edge
- Tune BFD transmit receive and multiplier values for measured underlay characteristics
- Add explicit intended permits after selective denies and verify the implicit deny boundary
- Verify qualifying component BGP prefixes and aggregate-address options before forcing an advertisement
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Verify qualifying component BGP prefixes and aggregate-address options before forcing an advertisement corrects the specific failure: an aggregate is expected but no component route exists in the BGP table. BGP aggregation normally depends on an eligible more-specific BGP route. A change to an adjacent but healthy component would not fix this failure mechanism. Evidence of restoration would be that aggregate appears with valid contributors and withdraws when no contributors remain.
Incorrect Answers
A:Provide reachable next-hop advertisement or configure next-hop-self at the edge addresses a different situation, such as iBGP speakers learn internet prefixes from an edge but cannot install them. BGP path usability depends on routing to the advertised next hop. In this question the relevant situation is an aggregate is expected but no component route exists in the BGP table; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that aggregate appears with valid contributors and withdraws when no contributors remain. The specific remedy here concerns verify qualifying component BGP prefixes and aggregate-address options before forcing an advertisement.
B:Tune BFD transmit receive and multiplier values for measured underlay characteristics addresses a different situation, such as fast BFD thresholds are proposed across a jittery underlay that occasionally loses bursts. Aggressive BFD timers trade detection speed for sensitivity to transient loss and congestion. In this question the relevant situation is an aggregate is expected but no component route exists in the BGP table; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that aggregate appears with valid contributors and withdraws when no contributors remain. The specific remedy here concerns verify qualifying component BGP prefixes and aggregate-address options before forcing an advertisement.
C:Add explicit intended permits after selective denies and verify the implicit deny boundary addresses a different situation, such as a redistribution route-map permits one prefix but other legitimate routes unexpectedly disappear. A route map with permit matches does not automatically permit unmatched prefixes. In this question the relevant situation is an aggregate is expected but no component route exists in the BGP table; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that aggregate appears with valid contributors and withdraws when no contributors remain. The specific remedy here concerns verify qualifying component BGP prefixes and aggregate-address options before forcing an advertisement.
Question 204
An incident caused this behavior: The backup static route takes traffic while the primary learned prefix is still healthy. The engineer implements the correction to configure and verify the backup static route with administrative distance higher than the primary routing source. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- VRF-qualified ping succeeds and management packet captures show the intended source/return path
- The preferred learned route is installed normally and removing it causes the fallback route to become active
- Normal paths recover after link restoration without persistent external loops
- BFD neighbor state becomes Up before testing fault-triggered BGP withdrawal
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The preferred learned route is installed normally and removing it causes the fallback route to become active. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to configure and verify the backup static route with administrative distance higher than the primary routing source addresses the observed incident: the backup static route takes traffic while the primary learned prefix is still healthy. A static route with a higher administrative distance remains out of the RIB while an equally specific preferred source exists. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:VRF-qualified ping succeeds and management packet captures show the intended source/return path would validate the different intervention to configure the management source and transport to use the correct VRF-aware path for a scenario such as sNMP queries time out because responses are sourced through the wrong routing context. It does not test the present fault—the backup static route takes traffic while the primary learned prefix is still healthy—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the preferred learned route is installed normally and removing it causes the fallback route to become active.
C:Normal paths recover after link restoration without persistent external loops would validate the different intervention to combine route tagging/denial with tested administrative preference and reconvergence for a scenario such as after the primary OSPF link restores, a feedback route still attracts traffic to the backup border. It does not test the present fault—the backup static route takes traffic while the primary learned prefix is still healthy—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the preferred learned route is installed normally and removing it causes the fallback route to become active.
D:BFD neighbor state becomes Up before testing fault-triggered BGP withdrawal would validate the different intervention to verify both neighbors support and enable compatible BFD parameters and interface reachability for a scenario such as routing remains Established without a working negotiated BFD neighbor. It does not test the present fault—the backup static route takes traffic while the primary learned prefix is still healthy—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that the preferred learned route is installed normally and removing it causes the fallback route to become active.
Question 205
The ENARSI operational team is validating SNMPv3 user/group access for this design: A monitoring account may read interface counters but must not change device configuration. They intend to set read-only SNMP group view and restrict write access to approved admin identity. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector
- An SNMPv3 user maps to overly permissive write view and sets configuration-related MIB objects
- New VLAN clients time out even though router can ping DHCP server
- Lease lacks default gateway option because pool configured only network and DNS
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:An SNMPv3 user maps to overly permissive write view and sets configuration-related MIB objects. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: set read-only SNMP group view and restrict write access to approved admin identity. SNMPv3 group and view policy controls which OIDs an authenticated user can access. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that monitoring account GET succeeds but attempted SET is rejected.
Incorrect Answers
A:Packet capture shows router sourcing UDP 514 but firewall denies path into collector is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for validate collector listener, source address and UDP path policy before altering message severity. Syslog export requires working application/transport reachability independent of local logging. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with an SNMPv3 user maps to overly permissive write view and sets configuration-related MIB objects; the alternative is not the most specific justification for set read-only SNMP group view and restrict write access to approved admin identity.
C:New VLAN clients time out even though router can ping DHCP server is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for move DHCP relay/helper to correct client-side L3 interface. Relay listens for DHCP broadcast on client segment where initial request enters. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with an SNMPv3 user maps to overly permissive write view and sets configuration-related MIB objects; the alternative is not the most specific justification for set read-only SNMP group view and restrict write access to approved admin identity.
D:Lease lacks default gateway option because pool configured only network and DNS is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for set valid default-router option for client subnet. DHCP option 3 tells client which router to use for off-subnet destinations. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with an SNMPv3 user maps to overly permissive write view and sets configuration-related MIB objects; the alternative is not the most specific justification for set read-only SNMP group view and restrict write access to approved admin identity.
Question 206
An incident caused this behavior: NMS packets arrive in MGMT VRF while SNMP replies follow global routing. The engineer implements the correction to verify VRF-aware SNMP source, return route and ACL for NMS destination. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- NMS receives authenticated polling response from expected management source
- Client event timeline identifies failure stage and post-fix score recovers
- Statistics show jitter and packet loss correlated with voice quality incident
- Simulated single-target outage does not cause unjustified global WAN failover
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:NMS receives authenticated polling response from expected management source. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to verify VRF-aware SNMP source, return route and ACL for NMS destination addresses the observed incident: nMS packets arrive in MGMT VRF while SNMP replies follow global routing. Network management protocols need bidirectional reachability in intended VRF. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Client event timeline identifies failure stage and post-fix score recovers would validate the different intervention to investigate applicable client health and onboarding telemetry alongside network status for a scenario such as team uses only device health score and misses wireless/client-specific failures. It does not test the present fault—nMS packets arrive in MGMT VRF while SNMP replies follow global routing—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that nMS receives authenticated polling response from expected management source.
C:Statistics show jitter and packet loss correlated with voice quality incident would validate the different intervention to use platform-supported IP SLA UDP jitter operations and examine jitter/loss results for a scenario such as monitoring only average ping RTT misses one-way delay variation affecting RTP quality. It does not test the present fault—nMS packets arrive in MGMT VRF while SNMP replies follow global routing—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that nMS receives authenticated polling response from expected management source.
D:Simulated single-target outage does not cause unjustified global WAN failover would validate the different intervention to use validated multiple measurements or target-selection policy where supported for a scenario such as a third-party server outage triggers incorrect route failover despite healthy primary WAN. It does not test the present fault—nMS packets arrive in MGMT VRF while SNMP replies follow global routing—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that nMS receives authenticated polling response from expected management source.
Question 207
An incident caused this behavior: Neighbor to another DROTHER stays 2-Way even though DR and BDR are Full. The engineer implements the correction to verify DR/BDR roles before treating normal DROTHER 2-Way neighbor state as failure. Which test result best establishes that the specific fault is resolved?
- Both the specific exclusion and remaining allowed routes match a documented acceptance matrix
- DR/BDR elected and all required Full adjacencies exist without chasing harmless 2-Way states
- BGP table rejects default while other eligible prefixes remain
- Tests for present components succeed and unused summary hole is discarded locally
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:DR/BDR elected and all required Full adjacencies exist without chasing harmless 2-Way states. This is the most direct proof that the targeted correction to verify DR/BDR roles before treating normal DROTHER 2-Way neighbor state as failure addresses the observed incident: neighbor to another DROTHER stays 2-Way even though DR and BDR are Full. Broadcast OSPF optimizes LSA exchange by requiring Full adjacencies with DR and BDR. A successful configuration commit without this measurable outcome would be insufficient validation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Both the specific exclusion and remaining allowed routes match a documented acceptance matrix would validate the different intervention to add explicit intended permits after selective denies and verify the implicit deny boundary for a scenario such as permitted networks remain while all routes not matching any policy statement are lost. It does not test the present fault—neighbor to another DROTHER stays 2-Way even though DR and BDR are Full—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that dR/BDR elected and all required Full adjacencies exist without chasing harmless 2-Way states.
C:BGP table rejects default while other eligible prefixes remain would validate the different intervention to apply inbound prefix filter to specific neighbor address family for a scenario such as default appears in received BGP routes because route policy was attached outbound. It does not test the present fault—neighbor to another DROTHER stays 2-Way even though DR and BDR are Full—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that dR/BDR elected and all required Full adjacencies exist without chasing harmless 2-Way states.
D:Tests for present components succeed and unused summary hole is discarded locally would validate the different intervention to verify generated EIGRP summary discard route and avoid advertising unsupported component space for a scenario such as a packet to an absent component follows aggregate toward local Null0 instead of looping indefinitely. It does not test the present fault—neighbor to another DROTHER stays 2-Way even though DR and BDR are Full—or show that the proposed remedy is working. The discriminating observation here is that dR/BDR elected and all required Full adjacencies exist without chasing harmless 2-Way states.
Question 208
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: Customer ASNs from private range should not propagate toward public transit where policy forbids them. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Validate summary ownership and add precise exception routes or fail-closed discard behavior as designed
- Configure OSPF inter-area range at the area border router for the area being summarized
- Configure suitable EIGRP stub advertisement and summarization at designed query boundaries
- Evaluate supported remove-private-as behavior and exception cases on external neighbor
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Evaluate supported remove-private-as behavior and exception cases on external neighbor is the direct intervention for this deployment: customer ASNs from private range should not propagate toward public transit where policy forbids them. Private AS filtering can clean customer AS numbers in controlled eBGP export but depends on path conditions. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when upstream advertised route omits intended private ASN segments without disrupting allowed paths.
Incorrect Answers
A:Validate summary ownership and add precise exception routes or fail-closed discard behavior as designed addresses a different situation, such as a broad summary stays present across a border even after its only useful component subnet disappears. Summaries can conceal loss of component routes and may create loops if downstream specifics disappear. In this question the relevant situation is customer ASNs from private range should not propagate toward public transit where policy forbids them; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route omits intended private ASN segments without disrupting allowed paths. The specific remedy here concerns evaluate supported remove-private-as behavior and exception cases on external neighbor.
B:Configure OSPF inter-area range at the area border router for the area being summarized addresses a different situation, such as a campus wants a group of area 10 subnets summarized toward backbone area 0. OSPF inter-area summarization is performed by ABRs rather than ordinary internal routers. In this question the relevant situation is customer ASNs from private range should not propagate toward public transit where policy forbids them; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route omits intended private ASN segments without disrupting allowed paths. The specific remedy here concerns evaluate supported remove-private-as behavior and exception cases on external neighbor.
C:Configure suitable EIGRP stub advertisement and summarization at designed query boundaries addresses a different situation, such as a remote stub should not become transit for arbitrary EIGRP queries during branch failure. Stub behavior and summarization reduce diffusion of route queries across nontransit portions. In this question the relevant situation is customer ASNs from private range should not propagate toward public transit where policy forbids them; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that upstream advertised route omits intended private ASN segments without disrupting allowed paths. The specific remedy here concerns evaluate supported remove-private-as behavior and exception cases on external neighbor.
Question 209
An ENARSI engineer is designing an enterprise deployment: AAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF. Which action most directly implements the technical requirement?
- Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter
- Test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials
- Distinguish router-destined punt traffic from hardware-switched transit flows in diagnosis
- Apply the IPv6 traffic-filter on correct interface and direction independent of IPv4 ACL
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials is the direct intervention for this deployment: aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF. ICMP connectivity alone does not establish TACACS+ application transport connectivity. This matters because the engineering outcome must be measured in actual path selection, adjacency or service behavior rather than relying on a saved configuration. Confirm the change when server logs show an authenticated TCP 49 request and router login succeeds.
Incorrect Answers
A:Enable a suitable loose uRPF source-route check or explicit anti-spoofing filter addresses a different situation, such as an edge receives traffic with source addresses that have no route in any relevant RIB. Loose uRPF validates existence of a usable source route without demanding the same ingress interface. In this question the relevant situation is aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show an authenticated TCP 49 request and router login succeeds. The specific remedy here concerns test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials.
C:Distinguish router-destined punt traffic from hardware-switched transit flows in diagnosis addresses a different situation, such as a throughput reduction in switched forwarding is blamed on CoPP though traffic does not punt. CoPP polices traffic handled by route processor, not all ordinary hardware-forwarded traffic. In this question the relevant situation is aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show an authenticated TCP 49 request and router login succeeds. The specific remedy here concerns test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials.
D:Apply the IPv6 traffic-filter on correct interface and direction independent of IPv4 ACL addresses a different situation, such as an IPv6 security filter should protect the campus server subnet from guest networks. IPv4 and IPv6 ACL enforcement use separate address-family configuration. In this question the relevant situation is aAA design requires a router to contact TACACS+ at port 49 over management VRF; the alternative changes another control and would not establish that server logs show an authenticated TCP 49 request and router login succeeds. The specific remedy here concerns test TCP port 49 reachability from proper source and VRF before replacing credentials.
Question 210
The ENARSI operational team is validating DMVPN NHRP redirect shortcut for this design: Direct spoke-to-spoke traffic should bypass hub where DMVPN phase behavior permits. They intend to check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase. Which distinct failure symptom would justify that specific engineering control?
- Packet capture shows transport label but downstream PE has no VPN label to select egress VRF
- Physical and IGP links work but no LDP neighbor forms on intended interface
- Customer router pings PE interface but its private prefixes never reach remote sites
- Traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations. That symptom motivates the specified safeguard: check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase. DMVPN shortcut formation depends on appropriate NHRP signaling and routing behavior. It identifies the operating failure rather than a loosely related network concern. The expected verification is that tunnel trace shows spoke-to-spoke NBMA path after shortcut resolution.
Incorrect Answers
A:Packet capture shows transport label but downstream PE has no VPN label to select egress VRF is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for verify both the transport LSP label and advertised VPN service label binding. MPLS L3VPN commonly uses an outer transport label and an inner VPN label to select customer forwarding context. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations; the alternative is not the most specific justification for check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase.
B:Physical and IGP links work but no LDP neighbor forms on intended interface is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for enable and verify MPLS LDP discovery and suitable transport address reachability. LDP label exchange requires an established session separate from IGP reachability. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations; the alternative is not the most specific justification for check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase.
C:Customer router pings PE interface but its private prefixes never reach remote sites is a symptom of a different control gap that calls for verify PE-CE address-family routing session and VRF membership of relevant interface. PE-CE routing exchanges customer prefixes before provider MP-BGP transports them between PEs. The proposed safeguard in this question instead deals with traffic between branches always hairpins through hub despite valid spoke registrations; the alternative is not the most specific justification for check NHRP redirect on hub and shortcut behavior on spokes for the chosen DMVPN phase.