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Question 141:
During an audit of an organization’s disaster recovery plan, an IS auditor discovers that the recovery time objective (RTO) for a critical application is 4 hours, but recent tests show actual recovery takes 8 hours. What should be the auditor’s PRIMARY concern?
A) The disaster recovery plan documentation needs updating
B) Business operations may experience unacceptable disruption if disaster occurs
C) The testing methodology requires improvement
D) IT staff need additional training on recovery procedures
Answer: B
Explanation:
Business operations may experience unacceptable disruption if disaster occurs represents the primary concern when actual recovery times significantly exceed documented recovery time objectives. RTO defines the maximum acceptable downtime for a system or application before business impact becomes unacceptable, established through business impact analysis considering operational, financial, reputational, and regulatory consequences of extended outages. The RTO is a business-driven requirement reflecting maximum tolerable disruption, not merely an IT target. When actual recovery capabilities fall short of RTO by 100 percent as in this scenario, the organization faces real risk that disaster recovery will fail to meet business needs. If disaster strikes, the 8-hour actual recovery time could cause significant business harm that the 4-hour RTO was meant to prevent, including lost revenue from halted operations, customer dissatisfaction from service unavailability, regulatory penalties for compliance failures, competitive disadvantage from prolonged outages, and potential permanent business damage if customers defect to competitors. The gap between RTO and actual capability indicates that either recovery procedures are inadequate, resources are insufficient, technology solutions are inappropriate, or the RTO itself was unrealistic. The auditor’s primary concern must focus on business risk and operational impact rather than documentation or procedural issues. The finding requires immediate management attention to either improve recovery capabilities to meet the RTO or work with business stakeholders to adjust RTO expectations based on realistic capabilities, though the latter may require accepting higher business risk. The auditor should recommend that management conduct additional business impact analysis to fully understand consequences of the actual 8-hour recovery time and prioritize investments in recovery capabilities accordingly.
Option A is incorrect because while documentation accuracy is important for effective plan execution, the primary issue is not documentation but the fundamental gap between business requirements and technical capabilities. Even if documentation perfectly reflects the 8-hour reality, the business risk from inadequate recovery capabilities remains. Documentation updates address symptoms but not the underlying business continuity risk.
Option C is incorrect because although testing methodology should ensure realistic scenarios and accurate measurement, the issue is not whether testing accurately measures recovery time but that actual recovery capability is inadequate regardless of how it was measured. Even perfect testing methodology would still reveal the problematic 8-hour recovery time. Testing methodology is a secondary concern compared to the substantive gap in recovery capability.
Option D is incorrect because while staff training may contribute to recovery delays and could be part of the solution, insufficient training is likely just one factor among many including technology limitations, process inefficiencies, or resource constraints. Focusing primarily on training without addressing systemic issues would be incomplete. The business impact from inadequate recovery capability is the overriding concern regardless of root cause.
Question 142:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s change management process finds that emergency changes to production systems can be implemented without prior approval from the change advisory board. What is the auditor’s BEST recommendation?
A) Eliminate emergency change procedures to ensure all changes follow standard approval
B) Require retroactive review and approval of emergency changes by the change advisory board
C) Document emergency changes in a separate log not subject to review
D) Allow emergency changes without any oversight or documentation
Answer: B
Explanation:
Requiring retroactive review and approval of emergency changes by the change advisory board balances the operational need for rapid response to critical issues with proper governance and control. Emergency changes address urgent situations like security breaches, critical system failures, or severe service disruptions where standard change approval timelines would result in unacceptable business impact. Organizations must maintain ability to respond rapidly to emergencies even when this necessitates bypassing normal approval processes. However, allowing emergency changes without subsequent oversight creates risks including potential abuse where changes are falsely classified as emergencies to avoid scrutiny, inadequate documentation and knowledge transfer about system modifications, lack of proper testing and validation before implementation, circumvention of segregation of duties controls, and absence of change impact assessment. Retroactive review provides necessary oversight while acknowledging emergency situations require expedited action. The change advisory board should review emergency changes after implementation to verify the emergency classification was justified, ensure changes were properly documented, assess whether changes achieved intended objectives without adverse effects, evaluate whether the root cause of the emergency has been addressed to prevent recurrence, and determine if permanent solutions are needed versus temporary fixes. The review process should occur within a defined timeframe such as the next scheduled CAB meeting. Organizations should define clear criteria for what constitutes legitimate emergencies, require appropriate management authorization for emergency changes even if CAB pre-approval is not possible, mandate thorough documentation of emergency changes including business justification and technical details, implement post-implementation verification that changes function correctly, and periodically analyze emergency change patterns to identify process improvements or systemic issues requiring attention.
Option A is incorrect because eliminating emergency change procedures entirely creates unacceptable operational risk by removing the organization’s ability to respond rapidly to critical situations. Some circumstances genuinely require immediate action where delaying for standard approval processes would cause severe business harm. Rigid insistence on standard processes without emergency provisions reflects poor governance that fails to balance control with operational reality.
Option C is incorrect because documenting emergency changes in separate logs not subject to review defeats the purpose of change management oversight. Without review, emergency changes could circumvent controls, introduce risks, or be improperly classified. Segregating emergency changes from governance review creates a compliance gap and eliminates accountability. All changes regardless of classification require appropriate oversight even if timing differs.
Option D is incorrect because allowing emergency changes without any oversight or documentation creates uncontrolled environments where changes lack accountability, systems become undocumented, knowledge is lost when individuals leave, troubleshooting becomes difficult, and audit trails are incomplete. Complete absence of oversight for any category of changes represents control failure and is unacceptable in any well-governed IT environment.
Question 143:
During a review of database security controls, an IS auditor finds that database administrators have both administrative privileges and the ability to access production data directly. What is the GREATEST risk associated with this finding?
A) Inefficient database performance and resource utilization
B) Inadequate database backup and recovery capabilities
C) Unauthorized access to or modification of sensitive data without detection
D) Increased complexity in database configuration management
Answer: C
Explanation:
Unauthorized access to or modification of sensitive data without detection represents the greatest risk when database administrators possess both administrative privileges and direct data access. Database administrators require elevated privileges to perform legitimate duties including configuring database parameters, managing storage and performance, implementing security controls, applying patches and updates, and conducting backup and recovery operations. However, combining administrative privileges with unrestricted production data access violates segregation of duties principles and creates significant risks. DBAs with dual privileges can access sensitive information including personal data, financial records, intellectual property, and confidential business information without business justification or oversight. They can modify data to commit fraud, cover unauthorized transactions, alter audit trails, or benefit personally from information access. The administrative privileges enable them to disable or modify logging and monitoring, making detection of unauthorized activities extremely difficult. DBAs could circumvent application-level access controls by directly accessing database tables, bypassing business logic and audit trails that application interfaces provide. The combination creates insider threat scenarios where trusted individuals with technical expertise can abuse access with low detection probability. Best practices require implementing segregation of duties through role-based access where administrative functions and data access are separated, using privileged access management solutions that control and monitor administrative actions, implementing database activity monitoring to detect unusual access patterns, requiring business justification and approval for DBA access to production data, using data masking or anonymization in non-production environments to limit exposure, conducting regular access reviews and audit log analysis, and implementing break-glass procedures for legitimate emergency data access with enhanced logging and review. Organizations should recognize that while DBAs may occasionally need data access for troubleshooting, such access should be exception-based, logged, justified, and reviewed rather than granted as standing privilege.
Option A is incorrect because database performance and resource utilization are unrelated to the access control issue described. DBA privileges do not inherently cause performance problems. While administrators might misconfigure systems affecting performance, this represents technical competence issues not security risks from excessive access privileges. Performance concerns are secondary to data security and integrity risks from inadequate access controls.
Option B is incorrect because backup and recovery capabilities depend on proper procedures, technology solutions, and resources, not on whether DBAs have segregated privileges. DBAs need appropriate access to implement backups regardless of whether their data access is restricted. The risk described relates to inappropriate access to production data, not backup infrastructure adequacy. Backup capability is a separate control objective from access segregation.
Option D is incorrect because configuration management complexity is not increased by privilege segregation and represents an administrative convenience issue rather than a risk. While separating privileges may require more sophisticated access management, configuration complexity is vastly less significant than the data security risks from unrestricted access. Organizations must prioritize security risks over administrative preferences. Complexity concerns should not override fundamental security principles.
Question 144:
An IS auditor is reviewing an organization’s incident response procedures and finds that the organization has no formal process for conducting post-incident reviews. What is the MOST significant consequence of this deficiency?
A) Inability to comply with regulatory reporting requirements
B) Missed opportunities to learn from incidents and improve security posture
C) Increased costs for incident response activities
D) Reduced confidence in the incident response team
Answer: B
Explanation:
Missed opportunities to learn from incidents and improve security posture represents the most significant consequence of lacking formal post-incident review processes. Post-incident reviews, also called post-mortems or lessons learned sessions, provide critical opportunities to analyze what occurred, why it happened, how effectively the organization responded, and what improvements are needed. Without systematic post-incident review, organizations repeatedly experience similar incidents because root causes are not identified and addressed, fail to recognize systemic vulnerabilities that enabled incidents, cannot assess incident response effectiveness or identify process improvements, miss opportunities to update defensive controls based on attacker techniques observed, do not capture institutional knowledge about incident patterns and response strategies, and cannot demonstrate continuous improvement in security management. Post-incident reviews should examine the complete incident lifecycle including initial detection and how it could be improved, containment effectiveness and whether procedures worked as designed, eradication success and whether the root cause was eliminated, recovery process efficiency and completeness, and communication effectiveness both internally and with external parties. The review should identify specific action items for improving prevention through better controls or detection through enhanced monitoring, streamlining response through process refinements or better tools, strengthening recovery through improved procedures or resources, and enhancing communication through clearer protocols or better coordination. Action items require assignment to responsible parties with deadlines and follow-up verification. Organizations that conduct thorough post-incident reviews develop mature security programs that adapt to evolving threats, demonstrate security investment effectiveness through measurable improvements, build organizational knowledge and capability over time, and develop realistic expectations about incident response timelines and resource needs. The lessons learned process contributes to overall security program maturity and resilience.
Option A is incorrect because regulatory reporting requirements typically focus on timely notification of incidents to authorities and affected parties, not on internal post-incident analysis. While some regulations may require root cause analysis or remediation documentation, the primary compliance risk is notification failure, not absence of lessons learned processes. Post-incident review serves primarily organizational improvement purposes rather than compliance obligations.
Option C is incorrect because post-incident reviews generally reduce long-term costs by preventing recurrence and improving efficiency, rather than increasing costs. While reviews themselves consume resources, the investment is offset by improvements that prevent costly repeated incidents. The absence of reviews likely increases costs through repeated incidents and inefficient response processes. Cost is not the most significant consequence compared to security improvement opportunities.
Option D is incorrect because while lack of formal review processes may eventually affect team confidence and morale, particularly if the same problems recur, this is less significant than the substantive security improvements that are foregone. Team confidence is important but secondary to actual security effectiveness. Organizations must prioritize measurable security outcomes over subjective team perceptions, though both are relevant.
Question 145:
During an audit of privileged access management, an IS auditor notes that system administrators share a common privileged account rather than having individual privileged accounts. What is the PRIMARY risk of this practice?
A) Difficulty in tracking and attributing specific actions to individual administrators
B) Reduced system performance from multiple concurrent users
C) Increased licensing costs for administrative software
D) Complexity in managing administrative credentials
Answer: A
Explanation:
Difficulty in tracking and attributing specific actions to individual administrators represents the primary risk from shared privileged accounts. Privileged accounts with administrative, root, or elevated access can perform critical functions including system configuration changes, user account management, security control modifications, access to sensitive data, and system-level changes affecting availability and integrity. When multiple administrators share common privileged credentials, accountability is eliminated because the organization cannot determine which individual performed specific actions. This creates significant risks including inability to conduct effective incident investigations when malicious or erroneous changes occur, lack of non-repudiation allowing administrators to deny responsibility for their actions, reduced deterrent effect when individuals know their actions cannot be traced, complications in access reviews and privilege certification, and difficulty implementing least-privilege principles based on individual job responsibilities. Shared accounts prevent organizations from conducting meaningful audit log reviews because logs show account names not actual users, making it impossible to correlate actions with specific individuals for investigation, training, or disciplinary purposes. The practice violates fundamental security principles of individual accountability and non-repudiation that underpin effective security controls. Best practices require implementing individual privileged accounts for each administrator with unique credentials, using privileged access management solutions that enforce individual authentication and session recording, implementing strong authentication methods like multi-factor authentication for privileged access, maintaining comprehensive audit logging of all privileged activities with alerts for high-risk actions, conducting regular reviews of privileged user activities and access rights, and establishing clear accountability through policies requiring individual rather than shared accounts. Organizations may use session management tools that allow administrators to use individual credentials to gain access to shared service accounts, maintaining accountability while accommodating technical requirements for certain shared accounts.
Option B is incorrect because shared accounts do not inherently cause performance degradation. System performance depends on workload and resource capacity, not on whether accounts are shared or individual. Multiple administrators using separate accounts would create similar performance impacts as sharing accounts. Performance is unrelated to the accountability and audit risks that shared accounts create.
Option C is incorrect because licensing costs are typically based on system capacity, features, or number of processors rather than number of user accounts. Most licensing models do not charge per administrator account, and even if they did, the marginal cost of additional accounts is negligible compared to the security risks of shared accounts. Cost considerations should not drive decisions compromising fundamental security principles like individual accountability.
Option D is incorrect because individual accounts actually simplify credential management by eliminating shared secret distribution problems, allowing automated password management, enabling access revocation when individuals leave without affecting others, and facilitating privilege assignment based on roles. Shared accounts are more complex because credential changes require coordination across all users, access removal is difficult when individuals change roles, and credential compromise affects all users. Individual accounts reduce rather than increase management complexity.
Question 146:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s patch management process finds that patches are tested in a test environment, but the test environment configuration differs significantly from production. What should be the auditor’s PRIMARY recommendation?
A) Eliminate patch testing to speed deployment to production
B) Ensure test environment closely mirrors production configuration for realistic testing
C) Deploy patches directly to production without testing
D) Reduce the number of systems requiring patches
Answer: B
Explanation:
Ensuring the test environment closely mirrors production configuration for realistic testing addresses the fundamental issue that inadequate test environment similarity undermines patch testing effectiveness. Patch management aims to apply security and functionality updates while avoiding operational disruptions from patch-induced problems. Testing patches before production deployment identifies compatibility issues, performance impacts, and unintended consequences, but test validity depends on environment similarity. When test environments differ significantly from production in terms of system configurations, application versions, network topology, integration points, data characteristics, or workload patterns, testing may fail to reveal problems that will occur in production. Patches that work correctly in simplified test environments may cause production failures due to complex configurations, integration dependencies, or scale factors not present in testing. Similarly, tests may identify false positive problems that would not occur in production due to configuration differences. Best practices require maintaining test environments that accurately represent production through configuration management ensuring test systems match production system configurations, using production-like data volumes and characteristics for realistic testing, implementing similar network architectures and security controls, including representative integration points with dependent systems, and conducting performance testing under realistic load conditions. While perfect test-production parity may be impractical due to cost or complexity, organizations should minimize critical differences and understand limitations of their testing. The patch management process should document test environment configurations, acknowledge testing limitations from environment differences, implement compensating controls like enhanced monitoring during initial production deployment, maintain procedures for rapid rollback if problems occur, and prioritize environment improvement to increase test environment similarity over time. Change management processes should assess patch risk considering test environment limitations.
Option A is incorrect because eliminating patch testing entirely exposes production systems to unacceptable risks from patches that cause failures, incompatibilities, or service disruptions. Testing is essential risk mitigation despite environment differences. The solution is improving test environment quality, not abandoning testing. Organizations must balance deployment speed with change risk, and completely untested changes represent excessive risk.
Option C is incorrect because deploying patches directly to production without any testing is essentially the same as eliminating testing and represents poor practice. All production changes should undergo appropriate testing based on change criticality and risk. Direct production deployment should be reserved for emergency situations requiring immediate response. Normal patch deployment should include testing phases.
Option D is incorrect because reducing systems requiring patches does not address the test environment adequacy issue and may be impractical or undesirable. Systems need patches for security and functionality regardless of testing challenges. Organizations should not avoid necessary patching due to testing limitations but should improve testing capabilities. System reduction is a separate architectural consideration from test environment management.
Question 147:
During a security audit, an IS auditor discovers that an organization’s firewall rules have not been reviewed in over two years. What is the GREATEST risk associated with this finding?
A) Increased firewall hardware maintenance costs
B) Presence of outdated or unnecessary rules allowing inappropriate access
C) Reduced network performance from excessive rules
D) Incompatibility with newer firewall technologies
Answer: B
Explanation:
Presence of outdated or unnecessary rules allowing inappropriate access represents the greatest risk from not reviewing firewall rules regularly. Firewall rules implement network security policy by controlling traffic between network segments based on source, destination, protocol, and port. Over time, firewall rule sets degrade without regular review as business requirements change, temporary rules intended for specific projects remain after projects end, rules created for employees who have left remain active, rules for decommissioned systems continue allowing access to nonexistent resources, overly permissive rules granted for troubleshooting are not removed, and rules conflicting with current security policies accumulate. This rule set entropy creates security vulnerabilities where attackers can exploit forgotten access paths, unnecessary services remain exposed to threats, least-privilege principles are violated by excessive permissions, troubleshooting and incident response are complicated by unclear rule purposes, and audit trails are obscured because traffic purposes are unclear. Without regular review, organizations cannot ensure firewall configurations align with current security requirements, maintain confidence that documented policies match implemented rules, or identify opportunities to strengthen security by removing unnecessary access. Best practices require implementing regular firewall rule reviews on a defined schedule such as quarterly or semi-annually, involving security teams and business stakeholders to validate rule business justification, documenting the business purpose, owner, and expiration date for each rule, implementing automatic expiration for temporary rules requiring periodic renewal, using rule cleanup processes to remove or disable unused rules, maintaining change management procedures ensuring all rule changes are documented and justified, conducting technical analysis to identify redundant, shadowed, or conflicting rules, and using firewall management tools to visualize rule relationships and identify optimization opportunities. Rule review documentation should record who conducted the review, when it occurred, what changes resulted, and any approved exceptions to standard policies.
Option A is incorrect because firewall hardware maintenance costs are unrelated to rule review frequency. Hardware maintenance depends on equipment lifecycle, support contracts, and failure rates, not on rule management practices. While large rule sets might theoretically affect hardware performance requiring upgrades, this is not the primary risk from not reviewing rules. Cost considerations are secondary to security implications.
Option C is incorrect because while excessive or poorly optimized rules can impact performance, the security risk from inappropriate access permissions vastly exceeds performance concerns. Modern firewalls handle large rule sets efficiently, and performance degradation from rules is typically gradual and observable. Performance impacts can be addressed through hardware upgrades, but security vulnerabilities from inappropriate rules create immediate and serious risks that hardware cannot address.
Option D is incorrect because firewall rule compatibility with newer technologies is a separate consideration from rule review frequency. Organizations can review rules regularly while using older firewall technologies, and conversely can deploy newest technologies without reviewing rules. Technology compatibility relates to migration and upgrade planning, not to the security risks from outdated rules. New technologies do not inherently resolve rule governance problems.
Question 148:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s data backup procedures finds that backups are performed daily and stored in the same data center as production systems. What should be the auditor’s PRIMARY concern?
A) Backup frequency is insufficient for business needs
B) Backups are vulnerable to same disaster affecting production systems
C) Backup media capacity is inadequate for data growth
D) Backup process impacts production system performance
Answer: B
Explanation:
Backups are vulnerable to the same disaster affecting production systems represents the primary concern when backup storage is co-located with production systems. Data backup serves disaster recovery and business continuity purposes by enabling data restoration after corruption, deletion, system failures, or disasters. However, backups stored in the same physical location as production systems provide no protection against site-wide disasters including fires, floods, earthquakes, acts of terrorism, or other events affecting the entire facility. A disaster destroying the data center would simultaneously destroy both production systems and backups, leaving the organization unable to recover and facing potential business failure. Geographic separation of backups from production systems is fundamental to disaster recovery, ensuring that regional disasters affecting one location do not impact backup availability. Best practices require implementing the 3-2-1 backup rule: maintaining at least three copies of data, storing copies on two different media types, keeping one copy offsite. Offsite backup storage should be geographically distant enough that regional disasters cannot impact both locations simultaneously, typically meaning different cities or climate zones. Organizations should consider risks including natural disasters common to their regions, infrastructure dependencies like shared power grids, and access logistics for backup retrieval during emergencies. Modern cloud-based backup solutions provide geographic distribution through multi-region storage, though organizations must verify that cloud provider regions are actually physically separated and that data residency requirements are met. The backup strategy should address backup frequency based on recovery point objectives, retention periods based on business and compliance requirements, encryption for backup confidentiality, regular testing to verify recovery functionality, and documentation of recovery procedures. Organizations should periodically test complete disaster recovery using offsite backups to verify viability.
Option A is incorrect because backup frequency adequacy depends on the organization’s recovery point objective and cannot be determined from the daily frequency alone. Some organizations can tolerate 24 hours of data loss making daily backups sufficient, while others require more frequent backups or continuous replication. Without knowing RPO requirements, daily backups cannot be deemed insufficient. The auditor’s primary concern should focus on the storage location vulnerability affecting disaster recovery regardless of frequency.
Option C is incorrect because backup media capacity is a separate consideration from storage location and represents an operational issue rather than a fundamental disaster recovery vulnerability. While inadequate capacity could cause backup failures, capacity problems are typically evident and addressable through monitoring and capacity planning. The strategic risk from co-located backups vastly exceeds the operational risk from capacity constraints.
Option D is incorrect because backup process performance impact is a technical consideration that can be managed through scheduling, technology choices, and system design. Performance impacts are typically addressed by running backups during off-peak hours or using technologies that minimize production impact. While performance is a legitimate concern, it is secondary to the fundamental disaster recovery vulnerability from not having offsite backups.
Question 149:
During an audit of access controls, an IS auditor finds that user access reviews are conducted annually, but several employees who terminated employment months ago still have active system access. What is the PRIMARY reason this situation occurred?
A) Annual access review frequency is inadequate
B) HR termination process does not promptly notify IT of employee departures
C) Access review procedures are not thorough enough
D) IT staff lack training on access review procedures
Answer: B
Explanation:
HR termination process does not promptly notify IT of employee departures represents the primary reason terminated employees retain system access despite annual reviews. Access management requires two distinct processes: access reviews periodically verifying that current access remains appropriate for existing employees, and access termination immediately removing access when employment ends. The scenario describes a failure in access termination processes rather than access review processes. Effective access termination requires formal notification workflows where human resources promptly informs IT of employment terminations, separations, or status changes requiring access modification. Without timely notification, IT cannot disable accounts and terminated employees may retain access for extended periods creating significant security risks. Former employees with continued access can steal data, disrupt operations, commit fraud, or provide credentials to outsiders. The risk is particularly acute for disgruntled former employees terminated for cause who may seek retribution. Best practices require implementing automated integration between HR systems and identity management platforms triggering immediate access revocation upon termination, establishing formal termination procedures requiring HR to notify IT before or concurrent with employee notification, implementing termination checklists ensuring all access types are addressed including network accounts, application access, physical access, and remote access, conducting immediate account disabling for terminated employees with subsequent account deletion after appropriate retention periods, implementing automated monitoring detecting orphaned accounts of former employees, and requiring manager involvement in termination process to verify access removal. Organizations should consider access risks when planning termination timing, such as disabling access before notifying employees of involuntary terminations. The process should address various separation types including resignations, retirements, and involuntary terminations, with procedures appropriate to circumstances. Access termination should be verified and documented for compliance and security purposes.
Option A is incorrect because while more frequent access reviews could theoretically detect terminated employees sooner, annual review frequency is reasonable for verifying that current employees have appropriate access rights. The problem is not review frequency but the lack of prompt termination procedures. Access reviews are not intended to be the primary control for detecting terminated employee access, which should be handled through immediate termination procedures, not periodic reviews.
Option C is incorrect because access review thoroughness relates to assessing whether access is appropriate for current employees’ roles, not whether individuals are still employed. Even the most thorough access review process would not necessarily identify terminated employees if the reviewer lacks current employee status information. The review process depends on accurate input data about employment status. The root cause is missing termination notification, not review procedure quality.
Option D is incorrect because IT staff training on access review procedures would not address the fundamental problem of not knowing when employees terminate. Well-trained staff cannot terminate access for departed employees if HR never informs them of departures. Training might improve review execution but cannot compensate for missing termination notifications. The systemic issue is process integration between HR and IT, not individual staff capabilities.
Question 150:
An IS auditor is reviewing an organization’s vendor management process and finds that vendor access to the organization’s network is granted on request without formal approval or periodic review. What is the MOST significant risk of this practice?
A) Increased network bandwidth consumption
B) Unauthorized access to sensitive data through vendor accounts
C) Higher licensing costs for vendor access
D) Complexity in network configuration management
Answer: B
Explanation:
Unauthorized access to sensitive data through vendor accounts represents the most significant risk when vendor access lacks proper approval and review processes. Third-party vendors including contractors, consultants, service providers, and business partners frequently require network access to provide services such as system maintenance, application support, infrastructure management, or integrated business processes. However, vendor access creates extended attack surface through accounts that may be poorly managed, less monitored than employee accounts, or compromised without organizational knowledge. Vendor accounts have been implicated in numerous high-profile breaches where attackers compromised vendors with access to target organizations then used that access as entry points. Without formal approval processes, vendor access may be excessive relative to business needs, granted without management awareness, lacking oversight or accountability, or continued beyond the period of legitimate business relationship. Without periodic reviews, vendor access continues indefinitely with organizations losing visibility into who has access and why, vendors no longer providing services retaining unnecessary access, vendors gaining access through acquisitions or relationships unknown to the organization, and individual vendor employees who changed roles or left employment retaining access. The extended attack surface from poorly managed vendor access creates risks that attackers compromise vendor credentials through phishing or other attacks against vendor organization, vendors inadvertently or maliciously access sensitive data beyond service needs, vendor employees misuse access for personal gain or corporate espionage, and vendors serve as pivots allowing attackers to move laterally into more sensitive systems. Best practices for vendor access management require implementing formal approval processes requiring business justification and management authorization for vendor access, conducting vendor risk assessments before granting access, implementing least-privilege access based on specific service needs, establishing access termination dates aligned with contract periods, conducting periodic access reviews verifying continued business need, using separate network segments or VPNs isolating vendor access from internal networks, implementing enhanced monitoring of vendor account activities, requiring multi-factor authentication for vendor remote access, including security requirements in vendor contracts, and maintaining vendor inventory documenting which vendors have access and for what purposes.
Option A is incorrect because bandwidth consumption is an operational consideration typically not related to vendor access approval processes. Vendor network activities might consume bandwidth, but this is independent of whether access was formally approved or reviewed. Bandwidth management is a capacity planning issue, not a security risk comparable to unauthorized data access. Infrastructure capacity concerns are secondary to security implications.
Option C is incorrect because licensing costs are typically based on system capacity, features, or employee counts rather than vendor access. Even in scenarios where vendors are counted in licensing, cost considerations are minor compared to security risks from uncontrolled access. Organizations should not compromise security controls to avoid nominal licensing costs. Financial impacts from potential data breaches vastly exceed any licensing expenses.
Option D is incorrect because network configuration complexity is an administrative consideration that does not represent significant risk compared to data security threats. While managing vendor access requires administrative effort, complexity does not inherently create security risk and is manageable through proper tools and procedures. Organizations must implement proper vendor access controls regardless of administrative overhead. Operational convenience should not override security requirements.
Question 151:
During an application security audit, an IS auditor discovers that the application stores passwords using MD5 hashing without salting. What should be the auditor’s PRIMARY recommendation?
A) Continue using MD5 as it is computationally efficient
B) Implement strong password hashing using algorithms like bcrypt or Argon2 with unique salts
C) Store passwords in plaintext for easier password recovery
D) Encrypt passwords using symmetric encryption
Answer: B
Explanation:
Implementing strong password hashing using algorithms like bcrypt or Argon2 with unique salts addresses multiple password storage security deficiencies. MD5 is a cryptographic hash function designed for speed, which is actually undesirable for password hashing because rapid hashing enables attackers to quickly test many password guesses in brute force attacks. MD5 has known cryptographic weaknesses including collision vulnerabilities where different inputs produce identical hashes. Modern password cracking tools using graphics processing units can test billions of MD5 hashes per second, making brute force attacks highly effective. The absence of salting compound
s weaknesses because identical passwords produce identical hashes, enabling rainbow table attacks where precomputed hash tables allow instant password discovery, attackers identifying users with common passwords through identical hashes, and password reuse detection across different accounts. Strong password hashing requires using algorithms specifically designed for password storage like bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, or PBKDF2 that incorporate work factors making hashing computationally expensive to slow brute force attacks, implementing unique random salts for each password preventing rainbow tables and ensuring identical passwords have different hashes, and using adequate iteration counts or memory hardness parameters to make attacks infeasible even with specialized hardware. Salts should be cryptographically random, sufficiently long (at least 128 bits), and stored alongside password hashes. Work factors should be set as high as system performance allows while maintaining acceptable user experience, and should be increased over time as computing power advances. Password hash migration requires careful planning because passwords cannot be recovered from existing hashes, necessitating either forcing password resets which disrupts user experience, or opportunistic migration where passwords are rehashed to new algorithm when users next authenticate, gradually migrating the password database. The application should implement security practices including minimum password complexity requirements, protection against brute force through account lockout or throttling, secure transmission of passwords using HTTPS, never logging or displaying passwords in any form, and regular security assessments of authentication implementations.
Option A is incorrect because MD5’s computational efficiency is actually a security weakness for password storage. Password hashing should be deliberately slow to hinder brute force attacks. MD5’s speed enables attackers to test passwords rapidly. The cryptographic weaknesses in MD5 and absence of salting create unacceptable security risks regardless of efficiency. Security should be prioritized over performance for credential storage.
Option C is incorrect because storing passwords in plaintext represents complete absence of password protection and is fundamentally unacceptable. Plaintext storage enables anyone accessing the database to immediately view all passwords, administrators can see user passwords creating privacy and security issues, breaches immediately compromise all user credentials with no computational work required, and users reusing passwords across services face immediate compromise of all accounts. Plaintext storage violates basic security principles and industry regulations.
Option D is incorrect because symmetric encryption is inappropriate for password storage because encryption is reversible given the key, requiring the application to store decryption keys where they could be compromised, administrators or attackers obtaining keys can decrypt all passwords, and key management introduces complexity and risk. Password verification should use one-way hashing where comparing hashes confirms password correctness without enabling password recovery. Hashing provides adequate security without encryption’s key management burdens and risks.
Question 152:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s software development lifecycle finds that security requirements are addressed only during the testing phase, not during design and development. What is the PRIMARY risk of this approach?
A) Increased software licensing costs
B) Security vulnerabilities embedded in architecture that are costly to remediate later
C) Reduced application performance
D) Longer development timelines
Answer: B
Explanation:
Security vulnerabilities embedded in architecture that are costly to remediate later represents the primary risk when security is addressed only in testing rather than throughout the development lifecycle. Introducing security late in development creates fundamental problems because architectural decisions made without security consideration may require complete redesign to secure properly, security testing identifies problems after significant development investment has occurred, remediation requires rework of completed code which is expensive and time-consuming, security becomes an afterthought rather than integral design element, and fundamental security flaws may be impossible to fix without major refactoring. Research consistently shows that fixing security issues discovered after deployment costs 30 to 100 times more than addressing them during design. Architectural decisions like authentication mechanisms, authorization models, data encryption approaches, session management, input validation, error handling, and logging are difficult to retrofit if not designed from the beginning. Security testing may identify specific vulnerabilities like SQL injection or cross-site scripting, but cannot easily detect architectural security flaws requiring redesign. Best practices require implementing security throughout the software development lifecycle through threat modeling during design phase identifying potential attack vectors, security requirements definition specifying what security controls are needed, secure coding practices during development following established guidelines, automated security testing integrated into continuous integration pipelines, manual security code reviews by security experts, dynamic application security testing on running applications, and remediation processes addressing identified vulnerabilities before deployment. Security should be integrated into every SDLC phase including requirements gathering to understand security needs, design to architect secure solutions, development to implement secure code, testing to verify security controls, deployment to ensure secure configurations, and maintenance to address emerging threats. The shift-left security approach emphasizes early security integration reducing costs and improving outcomes. Organizations should provide security training for developers, establish secure coding standards, use security libraries and frameworks, implement automated security scanning tools, and conduct regular security assessments throughout development.
Option A is incorrect because software licensing costs are unrelated to when security is addressed in the development lifecycle. Licensing typically depends on product features, user counts, or deployment scale, not security implementation timing. While security tools may have costs, these are minimal compared to remediation costs from late security integration. Financial considerations should focus on remediation costs, not licensing.
Option C is incorrect because application performance is a separate concern from security integration timing. Performance issues can arise from poor coding, inefficient algorithms, or resource constraints regardless of when security is considered. While some security controls may impact performance, this can be addressed through design optimization. Performance concerns do not justify delaying security consideration, and well-designed security can be performant.
Option D is incorrect because integrating security from the beginning actually reduces overall development timelines compared to retrofitting security after testing identifies issues. While upfront security work adds time to initial phases, it eliminates costly late-stage rework. The net effect is shorter, more predictable timelines. Organizations that delay security experience timeline extensions when serious vulnerabilities require major redesign before deployment approval.
Question 153:
During an audit of an organization’s IT asset management, an IS auditor finds that the organization maintains no inventory of network devices or their configurations. What is the GREATEST risk presented by this deficiency?
A) Inability to track warranty expiration dates
B) Compromised or unauthorized devices on the network going undetected
C) Difficulty planning technology refresh cycles
D) Increased hardware maintenance costs
Answer: B
Explanation:
Compromised or unauthorized devices on the network going undetected represents the greatest risk from not maintaining network device inventory and configuration records. Network devices including routers, switches, firewalls, wireless access points, and security appliances form the infrastructure foundation controlling traffic flow, enforcing security policies, and connecting systems. Without comprehensive inventory, organizations lack visibility into their network perimeter and internal segmentation. Unknown or unauthorized devices can be introduced through rogue employee installations, contractor equipment left behind, forgotten test equipment, or attacker-placed devices providing persistent access. Compromised devices may have backdoors, malware, or unauthorized configuration changes that go undetected without baseline configuration monitoring. The risks include attackers using unauthorized devices to bypass security controls and access sensitive networks, compromised devices serving as command and control points for lateral movement, unauthorized wireless access points creating security gaps, shadow IT devices operating without security oversight, orphaned devices running vulnerable firmware without patching, and network topology becoming undocumented making troubleshooting and incident response difficult. Network asset inventory should document all devices including make, model, serial number, location, purpose, responsible party, IP addresses, firmware versions, configuration baselines, and security posture. Configuration management tracks authorized configurations enabling detection of unauthorized changes through configuration drift analysis. Automated discovery tools can identify network-connected devices, though complete inventory requires combining automated discovery with manual documentation. Best practices include implementing network access control requiring device authentication before network access, conducting regular network scans identifying all connected devices, establishing device onboarding procedures requiring approval and documentation, implementing configuration management tools monitoring device configurations, maintaining current documentation of network topology and device locations, conducting periodic physical audits verifying device presence and authorization, and establishing decommissioning procedures ensuring devices are properly removed.
Option A is incorrect because warranty tracking is an administrative convenience supporting maintenance planning but does not represent significant security or operational risk. While warranty information aids in cost management and support planning, missing warranty data does not create immediate operational or security threats. Organizations can often determine warranty status through vendor portals when needed. Warranty tracking is vastly less critical than security visibility.
Option C is incorrect because technology refresh planning is important for capital budgeting and lifecycle management but does not present immediate risk. Organizations can conduct refresh planning using other information sources like purchase records or approximate device ages. While refresh planning benefits from accurate inventory, the lack of inventory represents a planning inconvenience rather than a security threat. Refresh timing flexibility provides mitigation.
Option D is incorrect because maintenance costs relate to support contracts, failure rates, and repair expenses which are not directly impacted by inventory documentation. Devices require maintenance whether or not they are inventoried. While inventory helps track maintenance needs and costs, the absence of inventory does not inherently increase maintenance expenses. The financial impact is less significant than security risks from unknown devices.
Question 154:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s email security controls finds that SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records are not configured. What is the PRIMARY security risk this creates?
A) Reduced email delivery performance
B) Increased susceptibility to email spoofing and phishing attacks
C) Higher email storage costs
D) Inability to encrypt emails in transit
Answer: B
Explanation:
Increased susceptibility to email spoofing and phishing attacks represents the primary security risk when SPF, DKIM, and DMARC email authentication protocols are not implemented. Email spoofing allows attackers to forge sender addresses making malicious emails appear to originate from legitimate sources including trusted organizations, internal executives, or business partners. Without email authentication, recipients cannot verify message authenticity, enabling sophisticated phishing attacks where attackers impersonate executives for business email compromise, spoof vendor emails requesting payment to fraudulent accounts, impersonate IT support soliciting credentials, forge customer service communications for information gathering, and conduct targeted spear-phishing using apparent trusted senders. SPF (Sender Policy Framework) allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email for their domain, enabling receiving servers to verify sender legitimacy. DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds digital signatures to email headers allowing recipients to verify messages were authorized by the domain and not modified in transit. DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance) builds on SPF and DKIM by specifying policies for handling authentication failures and providing reporting on email authentication results. Together, these protocols create a framework where receiving mail servers can verify sender authenticity, organizations can specify how to handle failed authentication, and domain owners receive visibility into email authentication attempts including potential abuse. Without these protections, attackers can freely spoof organizational domains without detection, employee and customer awareness training is less effective because technical controls don’t validate what training teaches, brand reputation suffers when attackers use organizational domains for attacks, and the organization loses visibility into email spoofing attempts against their domain. Implementation requires publishing DNS records specifying authentication policies, configuring mail servers to sign outbound messages, monitoring authentication reports to identify legitimate sources and potential abuse, and gradually strengthening policies from monitoring to rejection as legitimate sources are identified.
Option A is incorrect because email delivery performance is not significantly impacted by authentication record presence or absence. Authentication checks add minimal processing overhead. While DMARC policies might cause some legitimate emails to be rejected if authentication is misconfigured, this represents a configuration issue rather than performance impact. Delivery reliability improves with proper authentication as receiving servers trust authenticated mail, but performance is not the primary concern.
Option C is incorrect because email storage costs are unrelated to authentication protocols. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC affect email validation during transmission but do not impact storage requirements. Storage costs depend on email volume, retention policies, and archiving practices regardless of authentication implementation. Cost considerations are irrelevant to the security benefits of email authentication.
Option D is incorrect because email encryption in transit is provided by TLS/SSL protocols when mail servers negotiate encrypted connections, not by SPF, DKIM, or DMARC. Email authentication and encryption serve different purposes: authentication verifies sender identity while encryption protects content confidentiality. Organizations should implement both authentication and encryption, but they are separate controls addressing different threats.
Question 155:
During an audit of an organization’s mobile device management program, an IS auditor finds that employees can access corporate email and data on personal devices without any MDM controls. What is the MOST significant risk of this practice?
A) Increased cellular data costs for the organization
B) Data leakage through unsecured personal devices and lack of remote wipe capability
C) Reduced employee productivity
D) Incompatibility with corporate applications
Answer: B
Explanation:
Data leakage through unsecured personal devices and lack of remote wipe capability represents the most significant risk when corporate data is accessed on unmanaged personal devices. Bring Your Own Device policies allowing personal device use for business purposes create security challenges because personal devices typically lack enterprise security controls, may be used by family members, connect to unsecured networks, have unknown security postures with potentially outdated operating systems and unpatched applications, and may have malicious apps installed compromising security. Without mobile device management solutions, organizations cannot enforce security policies on personal devices including encryption requirements, password/PIN policies, prohibited applications, security patching requirements, or network connection restrictions. The inability to remotely wipe devices when they are lost, stolen, or when employment ends means corporate data remains accessible on devices outside organizational control. Additional risks include data stored locally on devices being accessible to other apps or users, lost or stolen devices providing attackers access to corporate resources, malware on personal devices compromising corporate data or credentials, lack of visibility into device security posture and compliance, inability to detect compromised devices accessing corporate resources, and data remaining on personal devices after employment ends. MDM solutions provide critical capabilities including enforcing encryption and password requirements, requiring device passcodes meeting security standards, implementing remote wipe to remove corporate data from lost or stolen devices, containerizing corporate data separating it from personal data, monitoring device compliance with security policies, deploying applications and configurations remotely, detecting jailbroken or rooted devices, and providing visibility into devices accessing corporate resources. Organizations should establish clear BYOD policies documenting acceptable use, security requirements, privacy considerations, and support limitations. Privacy-conscious MDM implementations can containerize corporate data protecting employee personal information while securing corporate assets. Alternative approaches include providing corporate devices for employees requiring mobile access, using mobile application management focusing on application-level rather than device-level controls, or implementing cloud-based productivity tools requiring only web browser access limiting data stored on devices.
Option A is incorrect because cellular data costs are typically borne by employees for personal devices in BYOD scenarios, not by organizations. Even if organizations subsidize employee plans, data cost is an expense management issue not a security risk. Financial impacts from potential data breaches vastly exceed cellular service costs. Cost considerations should not drive security decision-making for sensitive data access.
Option C is incorrect because productivity impacts from personal device use are unclear and potentially positive as employees have familiar devices available at all times. While MDM implementation might temporarily affect productivity during deployment, this is short-term and vastly less significant than security risks. Personal device access may increase rather than reduce productivity. Productivity considerations are secondary to data protection.
Option D is incorrect because application compatibility is a technical consideration that can be addressed through application design and testing. Modern applications are typically designed for multiple platforms and devices. While some applications may have device requirements, compatibility is an implementation detail not a fundamental security risk comparable to data leakage. Compatibility issues are solvable technical problems.
Question 156:
An IS auditor reviewing an organization’s database security discovers that database activity monitoring is not implemented and database access logs are not regularly reviewed. What is the PRIMARY risk this presents?
A) Inability to optimize database performance
B) Failure to detect unauthorized access or malicious activity within databases
C) Increased database licensing costs
D) Reduced database storage efficiency
Answer: B
Explanation:
Failure to detect unauthorized access or malicious activity within databases represents the primary risk when database activity monitoring and log review are absent. Databases store an organization’s most valuable data including customer information, financial records, intellectual property, and confidential business data, making them primary targets for external attackers and malicious insiders. Without database activity monitoring and log analysis, organizations lack visibility into database access patterns, cannot detect suspicious activities like unusual data access volumes, access to sensitive tables by unauthorized users, administrative actions taken at unusual times, privilege escalation attempts, SQL injection attacks, or data exfiltration. Database logs record activities including successful and failed login attempts, queries executed, data modifications, administrative actions, privilege changes, and security setting modifications. Regular log review enables detection of security incidents, accountability for actions taken, forensic investigation after incidents, compliance demonstration for regulations requiring activity monitoring, and identification of policy violations. Database activity monitoring solutions provide real-time analysis of database activities, alerting on suspicious patterns, policy violations, or known attack signatures. Without these capabilities, attacks may go undetected for extended periods allowing attackers to steal large data volumes, insider threats can abuse access without detection, compliance violations occur without remediation, and organizations lack forensic evidence for incident investigation. Best practices require implementing database activity monitoring tools providing real-time alerting and analysis, establishing baseline normal activity patterns to identify anomalies, defining alert rules for high-risk activities like access to sensitive tables or excessive data retrieval, conducting regular log reviews by security personnel, retaining logs for appropriate periods based on retention policies and compliance requirements, protecting logs from tampering through write-once storage or external log management, and integrating database monitoring with security information and event management systems. Organizations should monitor both authorized and unauthorized access as legitimate users can misuse privileges. Database monitoring should cover all database access paths including application connections, direct database access, and administrative tools.
Option A is incorrect because database performance optimization uses performance metrics and query analysis tools, not security activity logs. While activity logs may provide some performance insights, performance monitoring has dedicated tools measuring query execution times, resource utilization, and bottlenecks. Security monitoring and performance monitoring serve different purposes. Performance is not the primary concern compared to detecting security threats.
Option C is incorrect because database licensing costs typically depend on processor cores, named users, or capacity factors, not on monitoring implementation. Activity monitoring does not inherently increase licensing costs. While monitoring tools themselves may have licensing costs, these are security investments, and the absence of monitoring does not reduce database licensing expenses. Cost considerations are irrelevant to the security need for monitoring.
Option D is incorrect because storage efficiency depends on database design, data compression, archiving practices, and capacity management, not on activity monitoring. Security logs require storage but this is negligible compared to database content. The absence of monitoring does not improve storage efficiency and the minimal storage costs for logs are vastly outweighed by security benefits. Storage considerations should not prevent implementing necessary security controls.
Question 157:
During an audit of IT operations, an IS auditor finds that change management procedures require changes to be documented, but documentation review shows that many changes were implemented without documented rollback plans. What is the PRIMARY risk this presents?
A) Increased change implementation costs
B) Inability to quickly recover if changes cause unexpected problems
C) Reduced system performance
D) Compliance violations in documentation
Answer: B
Explanation:
Inability to quickly recover if changes cause unexpected problems represents the primary risk when changes lack documented rollback plans. Change management aims to implement necessary modifications while minimizing service disruptions and business impact. Even well-planned and tested changes can cause unexpected issues in production due to unforeseen interactions, environmental differences from testing, timing factors, or undiscovered bugs. Rollback plans provide critical contingency enabling rapid return to previous stable states when changes cause problems. Without documented rollback procedures, organizations face risks including extended outages while teams determine how to reverse changes, knowledge dependency on specific individuals who implemented changes, incomplete reversals missing some change elements, data corruption or loss from improper rollback attempts, cascading failures as teams scramble to reverse problematic changes, and business impact from prolonged service disruptions. Rollback plans document specific steps to reverse changes including configuration changes to undo, commands to execute, data restoration procedures if needed, validation steps confirming successful rollback, and communication procedures notifying stakeholders. Effective rollback planning requires understanding change scope and all affected components, identifying dependencies that must be considered during rollback, determining rollback feasibility for the change type as some changes cannot be fully reversed, establishing rollback decision criteria and authority, and testing rollback procedures when feasible to verify viability. Some changes like database schema modifications or data migrations may require different approaches than simple rollback such as forward fixes applying additional changes to resolve issues, partial rollback reversing some components while maintaining others, or data recovery from backups. Change approvers should verify that adequate rollback plans exist before authorizing changes, and implementation teams should understand rollback procedures before executing changes. Post-implementation monitoring should include defined criteria triggering rollback consideration and clear authority for rollback decisions to avoid delayed responses.
Option A is incorrect because rollback plan documentation does not significantly increase change implementation costs. Planning overhead is minimal compared to extended outage costs from failed changes without recovery plans. The investment in rollback planning reduces overall costs by enabling rapid recovery from problems. Short-term planning costs are vastly outweighed by risk mitigation benefits.
Option C is incorrect because system performance is unrelated to rollback plan documentation. Performance depends on system design, capacity, and code efficiency, not on change management documentation. While problematic changes might impact performance, the risk is the inability to quickly reverse such changes, not the performance impact itself. Rollback plans address recovery capabilities, not performance factors.
Option D is incorrect because while missing rollback plans constitute compliance violations of change management procedures, the documentation compliance issue is less significant than the operational risk of not being able to recover from failed changes. Compliance documentation serves the purpose of ensuring operational effectiveness. The auditor should focus on the substantive business risk from inadequate recovery capabilities rather than the procedural compliance gap.
Question 158:
An IS auditor discovers that an organization’s business continuity plan has not been updated in three years despite significant changes in business processes, technology infrastructure, and key personnel. What should be the auditor’s PRIMARY recommendation?
A) Maintain the current plan as changes are unnecessary
B) Update the BCP to reflect current business requirements, processes, and IT environment
C) Eliminate the BCP as it is outdated and unusable
D) Create entirely new BCP from scratch discarding existing plan
Answer: B
Explanation:
Updating the BCP to reflect current business requirements, processes, and IT environment addresses the core issue that business continuity plans must remain current to be effective. Business continuity planning documents procedures, resources, and strategies for maintaining critical operations during disruptions. BCPs become outdated when business processes change altering critical function definitions and recovery priorities, technology infrastructure evolves changing recovery procedures and dependencies, key personnel changes mean documented contacts and responsibilities are incorrect, vendors and third parties change affecting dependency relationships, regulatory requirements evolve imposing new continuity obligations, and threat landscapes change requiring different preparedness measures. Outdated BCPs create false confidence where organizations believe they have viable recovery capabilities while actual plans are inaccurate and ineffective. During actual disasters, outdated plans may direct responders to obsolete procedures, reference decommissioned systems, list departed employees in critical roles, or omit new critical systems. BCP update processes should conduct regular reviews on defined schedules such as annually or semi-annually, trigger updates when significant changes occur in business processes, technology infrastructure, organizational structure, or external environment, involve stakeholders from business units, IT, facilities, and security ensuring comprehensive updates, test updated plans through exercises verifying viability, document changes and version control maintaining plan history, communicate updates to relevant personnel ensuring awareness, and maintain governance oversight including senior management approval. Updates should revisit core BCP elements including business impact analysis to revalidate critical functions and recovery objectives, risk assessment to identify new threats or changing risk profiles, recovery strategies to ensure approaches remain viable, personnel roles and responsibilities to reflect organizational changes, contact information for internal and external parties, vendor and third-party dependencies documenting current relationships, and resource requirements for implementing continuity strategies. Organizations should treat BCP as living documents requiring continuous maintenance rather than static plans developed once and filed away.
Option A is incorrect because maintaining outdated plans without updates creates unacceptable risk that continuity procedures will be ineffective during actual events. Changes in business, technology, and personnel over three years make plan accuracy unlikely. Organizations cannot rely on obsolete plans for business continuity. Avoiding updates due to effort or cost considerations is poor risk management prioritizing convenience over preparedness.
Option C is incorrect because eliminating the BCP entirely removes all continuity capabilities including elements that remain valid and leaves the organization without any disaster response framework. Even outdated plans typically contain valuable information that can be updated rather than discarded. Elimination represents overreaction to the need for updates and creates worse situation than maintaining outdated plan.
Option D is incorrect because creating entirely new plans from scratch is inefficient and unnecessary when existing plans can be updated. Complete redevelopment consumes significantly more resources than updates, discards valuable existing content requiring recreation, and may introduce errors through rushed development. Updates leveraging existing documentation are more efficient and practical than complete redevelopment.
Question 159:
An IS auditor reviewing web application security finds that the application does not implement CAPTCHA or similar bot protection mechanisms on user registration and login forms. What is the PRIMARY risk associated with this deficiency?
A) Reduced application performance from excessive processing
B) Automated attacks such as credential stuffing, account enumeration, and spam registrations
C) Inability to provide multi-language support
D) Increased database storage requirements
Answer: B
Explanation:
Automated attacks such as credential stuffing, account enumeration, and spam registrations represent the primary risk when web applications lack bot protection mechanisms. CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) and similar technologies like reCAPTCHA, hCaptcha, or behavioral analysis distinguish human users from automated bots attempting to interact with web applications. Without bot protection, applications are vulnerable to automated attacks including credential stuffing where attackers use compromised username/password combinations from other breaches testing them against the target application, account enumeration where automated tools test many usernames to identify valid accounts for targeting, brute force password guessing testing common passwords against known accounts, spam registrations creating fraudulent accounts for sending spam or other abuse, scraping valuable content or data through automated access, denial of service through excessive automated requests, click fraud for advertising abuse, and inventory denial attacks rapidly purchasing limited inventory. These automated attacks occur at scale impossible for human attackers, with botnets testing millions of credentials or creating thousands of accounts in minutes. The attacks can compromise legitimate user accounts, degrade service availability, create fraudulent accounts for various abuses, pollute databases with junk registrations, and enable downstream attacks using compromised accounts. Bot protection provides defense by requiring interactions that are easy for humans but difficult for bots such as image recognition challenges, checkbox interactions with behavioral analysis, invisible CAPTCHAs analyzing user behavior, risk-based authentication challenging suspicious requests, and rate limiting restricting request frequencies. Modern bot protection balances security with user experience using invisible or minimal-friction approaches that analyze behavioral signals like mouse movements, click patterns, and navigation flows distinguishing humans from bots without degrading legitimate user experience. Implementation should protect critical functions like authentication, registration, password reset, and any forms subject to abuse or automation. Organizations should monitor for bot activity through metrics like high failure rates, unusual request patterns, and traffic from suspicious sources.
Option A is incorrect because lack of CAPTCHA does not cause performance problems. Bot protection adds minimal processing overhead and may actually improve performance by blocking automated attacks that consume resources. Performance degradation results from excessive bot traffic, which CAPTCHA prevents. The absence of bot protection allows performance-impacting automated attacks rather than improving performance.
Option C is incorrect because multi-language support is completely unrelated to bot protection. CAPTCHA implementations typically support multiple languages and internationalization. Bot protection and multi-language support are separate application features addressing different requirements. Language support depends on application design and localization efforts, not on bot protection presence.
Option D is incorrect because bot protection does not significantly impact database storage requirements. While CAPTCHAs might store minimal challenge data, storage impact is negligible. Without bot protection, automated spam registrations actually increase database storage through fraudulent accounts. Bot protection reduces rather than increases storage requirements by preventing automated account creation and spam.
Question 160:
During an audit of an organization’s security awareness program, an IS auditor finds that security training is provided only during new employee onboarding and no ongoing training is conducted. What is the MOST significant risk presented by this approach?
A) Increased training administration costs
B) Employees lack current knowledge of evolving threats and security practices
C) Reduced employee productivity from training time
D) Difficulty in tracking training completion
Answer: B
Explanation:
Employees lack current knowledge of evolving threats and security practices represents the most significant risk when security awareness training is limited to onboarding without ongoing reinforcement. Security awareness aims to create a security-conscious culture where employees recognize threats, follow security policies, and respond appropriately to incidents. Onboarding training provides foundational knowledge but becomes outdated as threat landscapes evolve with new attack techniques, phishing campaigns grow more sophisticated, regulations impose new compliance requirements, organizational policies change, technology platforms introduce new risks, and employees forget training content over time. Without ongoing training, employees remain unaware of current threats like recent phishing techniques or social engineering tactics, lack understanding of newly implemented security controls or policy changes, forget best practices leading to insecure behaviors, develop poor security habits without reinforcement, and cannot adapt to evolving organizational security requirements. Research shows that security behaviors decline without regular reinforcement and that current, relevant training is more effective than one-time instruction. The risk is amplified because attackers constantly adapt techniques and employees represent critical security layers through their actions in identifying suspicious emails, protecting credentials, handling sensitive data appropriately, and reporting potential incidents. Comprehensive security awareness programs require conducting initial training during onboarding establishing foundation knowledge, providing regular ongoing training through multiple channels, delivering targeted training addressing current threats and recent incidents, conducting simulated phishing exercises testing and training simultaneously, making security reminders available through posters, newsletters, and electronic communications, tailoring training to role-specific risks and responsibilities, measuring program effectiveness through metrics like phishing simulation results and incident rates, and updating content regularly reflecting current threats and organizational changes. Training should be engaging and relevant using real-world examples, short modules accommodating busy schedules, various formats including videos, interactive modules, and in-person sessions, and positive reinforcement celebrating good security behaviors. Organizations should track training completion and incorporate security awareness into performance expectations.
Option A is incorrect because training administration costs are operational expenses that should not drive security program decisions. Ongoing training investment is minimal compared to potential breach costs from inadequately trained employees. Modern learning management systems make training delivery efficient and scalable. Cost considerations should not override the fundamental need for current employee security knowledge.
Option C is incorrect because productivity impacts from training time are temporary and far outweighed by security benefits. Security training typically requires only hours annually, negligible compared to total work time. Training prevents security incidents that cause far greater productivity losses through system downtime, incident response, and breach remediation. Organizations should view training as productivity investment rather than cost.
Option D is incorrect because tracking training completion is an administrative function that can be managed through learning management systems or other tools. Tracking difficulty is not a risk comparable to employees lacking current security knowledge. While tracking is necessary for compliance and program management, it represents an implementation consideration not a substantive security risk affecting organizational security posture.
