Certified Information Security Manager CISM Practice Test 24
Question 230
The agency is operating and processing data, yet exception and supplier compliance evidence are stale. An updated assessment raises concern that customer data may reach the agency before evidence and contractual incident duties exist. Which response keeps the management decision current and accountable?
- Report delivery of the existing supplier onboarding controls plan without reopening the previous risk assumptions.
- Have service and program owners assess the new supplier onboarding controls evidence, validate the treatment to track supplier security performance exceptions and contractual changes and escalate material deviations.
- Continue the approved supplier onboarding controls exception until its original expiry, keeping the existing acceptance decision.
- Let the delivery team revise the supplier onboarding controls response immediately and seek management ratification afterward.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Control implementation alone does not prove sustained protection. In this case customer data may reach the agency before evidence and contractual incident duties exist. The service and program owners should test observed performance, reassess the decision to track supplier security performance exceptions and contractual changes and report material exceptions rather than rely only on implementation counts.
Incorrect Answers
A:Historical approvals and task counts do not show that the changed risk remains within tolerance. The new condition warrants a refreshed analysis and accountable response, not solely activity reporting.
C:An exception record is not a substitute for assessing the significance of the new evidence to supplier onboarding controls. Earlier acceptance was conditional on facts that may no longer hold.
D:Urgent actions may be allowed within predelegated incident authority, but unilateral changes by implementers do not replace accountable reassessment and escalation when business impact changes.
Question 231
Backup encryption keys are administered by the same staff who control backup servers, without named key custodians. A director recommends: "Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery." What response best addresses the evidence and decision authority in the case?
- Authorize a bounded pilot to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery, then use its results to determine whether the team still needs to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties.
- Begin with the alternative action to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access and reassess whether the team still needs to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties after observing outcomes.
- Address the unmet requirement to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties, while separately coordinating urgent protective steps within approved authority.
- Combine work to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery and separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access in a single funded milestone; document the decision to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties for later closure.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:This preserves the outstanding delegated ownership decision without treating analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery as inherently invalid. The immediate requirement is an approved decision and escalation record. Any urgent safety or containment action can continue if it is authorized under a separate response plan.
Incorrect Answers
A:The proposal to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery might be a useful pilot, but the case already identifies a missing delegated ownership requirement. A pilot cannot replace an approved decision and escalation record; it should be assessed only within authorized boundaries.
B:Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access can be useful in encryption key separation, but it does not eliminate the unmet requirement to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties. The proposed order risks assessing the wrong outcome or missing accountable authorization for the case.
D:Bundling treatment activities can be efficient, but funding two other actions does not show the named delegated ownership gap is resolved. The present management decision still needs a responsible owner and supporting evidence.
Question 232
Backup encryption keys are administered by the same staff who control backup servers, without named key custodians. Which record would BEST show the immediate management deficiency has been resolved?
- Deployment and representative operating tests demonstrating the decision to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access was implemented.
- An assurance log of outcomes, exceptions and follow-up after the decision to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events.
- A signed exposure and control assessment informing the decision to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery.
- An approved responsibility and delegation record authorizing the decision to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:An approved responsibility and delegation record authorizing the decision to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties. It specifically verifies an approved decision and escalation record, the outstanding requirement in this case. This matters because an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary and an assertion of compliance alone cannot show that the risk has been managed.
Incorrect Answers
A:This demonstrates a later implementation objective, but it cannot substitute for the unresolved delegated ownership decision in the case. The evidence is valuable only when that prerequisite is met.
B:This demonstrates a later control assurance objective, but it cannot substitute for the unresolved delegated ownership decision in the case. The evidence is valuable only when that prerequisite is met.
C:This demonstrates a later risk evaluation objective, but it cannot substitute for the unresolved delegated ownership decision in the case. The evidence is valuable only when that prerequisite is met.
Question 233
Backup encryption keys are administered by the same staff who control backup servers, without named key custodians. What management gap should be addressed based on the evidence given?
- Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties.
- Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events.
- Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery.
- Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties. The scenario's unresolved need is delegated ownership, and this action produces an approved decision and escalation record for encryption key separation. That directly addresses the risk that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary.
Incorrect Answers
B:Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events is pertinent to control assurance, but it depends on a still-missing delegated ownership decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
C:Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery is pertinent to risk evaluation, but it depends on a still-missing delegated ownership decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
D:Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access is pertinent to implementation, but it depends on a still-missing delegated ownership decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
Question 234
Custody roles are established, but nobody has examined how one credential compromise would affect restore capability. The committee needs evidence about encryption key separation. Which deliverable would address the identified deficiency most directly?
- A traceable deployment record and operating test confirming action to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access for the outstanding impact assessment.
- A management-endorsed assessment documenting the evidence needed to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery for the outstanding impact assessment.
- An assurance review and corrective-action record confirming results from a decision to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events for the outstanding impact assessment.
- A signed delegation and escalation record authorizing the organization to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties for the outstanding impact assessment.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery. The scenario's unresolved need is risk evaluation, and this action produces an evidence-backed assessment of consequences for encryption key separation. That directly addresses the risk that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary.
Incorrect Answers
A:Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access is pertinent to implementation, but it depends on a still-missing risk evaluation decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
C:Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events is pertinent to control assurance, but it depends on a still-missing risk evaluation decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
D:Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties is pertinent to delegated ownership, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide an evidence-backed assessment of consequences now needed for encryption key separation.
Question 235
Custody roles are established, but nobody has examined how one credential compromise would affect restore capability. The team proposes to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery. Who should authorize that decision within documented business and security limits?
- The independent assurance reviewer who will later test the control — using independent review duties as approval authority for encryption key separation.
- The technical control operator because that role implements the approved configuration — using technical implementation responsibility as approval authority for encryption key separation.
- The accountable business or information owner acting within delegated limits and advised by security and affected functions — for the decision to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery.
- The service provider because its contract covers the infrastructure — using contractual delivery responsibility as approval authority for encryption key separation.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:For encryption key separation, the named accountable authority can balance business, security and legal consequences under its delegated mandate. Specialist staff implement or advise; material deviations require escalation. The decision also addresses the risk that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary.
Incorrect Answers
A:Independent assurance should test and challenge the encryption key separation decision, not ordinarily authorize the activity it will later evaluate. That would blur accountability and separation of duties.
B:Access to technical systems does not automatically confer enterprise authority over encryption key separation. The operator may recommend or execute a properly authorized decision but cannot unilaterally accept the business consequences.
D:Contractual delivery responsibility and technical expertise do not transfer the enterprise’s ultimate accountability for encryption key separation. The responsible internal authority must approve consequential decisions.
Question 236
Key separation and independent recovery access were approved, but keys remain in the same administration boundary. What governance or response action addresses the stated gap?
- Revisit assessed exposure to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery.
- Prepare an effectiveness review to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events.
- Reconfirm delegated approval to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties.
- Put the approved plan into operation to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access. The scenario's unresolved need is implementation, and this action produces an implemented and tested treatment for encryption key separation. That directly addresses the risk that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary.
Incorrect Answers
A:Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery is pertinent to risk evaluation, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide an implemented and tested treatment now needed for encryption key separation.
B:Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events is pertinent to control assurance, but it depends on a still-missing implementation decision or record. Applying it first would leave the current encryption key separation exposure unresolved, even if that later action is worthwhile.
C:Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties is pertinent to delegated ownership, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide an implemented and tested treatment now needed for encryption key separation.
Question 237
Key separation and independent recovery access were approved, but keys remain in the same administration boundary. A director recommends: "Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events." What response best addresses the evidence and decision authority in the case?
- Address the unmet requirement to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access, while separately coordinating urgent protective steps within approved authority.
- Combine work to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events and define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties in a single funded milestone; document the decision to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access for later closure.
- Authorize a bounded pilot to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events, then use its results to determine whether the team still needs to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access.
- Begin with the alternative action to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties and reassess whether the team still needs to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access after observing outcomes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:This preserves the outstanding implementation decision without treating test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events as inherently invalid. The immediate requirement is an implemented and tested treatment. Any urgent safety or containment action can continue if it is authorized under a separate response plan.
Incorrect Answers
B:Bundling treatment activities can be efficient, but funding two other actions does not show the named implementation gap is resolved. The present management decision still needs a responsible owner and supporting evidence.
C:The proposal to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events might be a useful pilot, but the case already identifies a missing implementation requirement. A pilot cannot replace an implemented and tested treatment; it should be assessed only within authorized boundaries.
D:Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties can be useful in encryption key separation, but it does not eliminate the unmet requirement to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access. The proposed order risks assessing the wrong outcome or missing accountable authorization for the case.
Question 238
Key separation and independent recovery access were approved, but keys remain in the same administration boundary. Which artifact provides the most relevant proof of an effective response at this point?
- A version-controlled delegation and escalation memo establishing the authority to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties.
- An accountable implementation sign-off and test result for the action to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access.
- A risk treatment justification with service impact evidence supporting the decision to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery.
- A control-performance review recording exceptions and corrections following work to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:An accountable implementation sign-off and test result for the action to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access. It specifically verifies an implemented and tested treatment, the outstanding requirement in this case. This matters because an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary and an assertion of compliance alone cannot show that the risk has been managed.
Incorrect Answers
A:This would document earlier delegated ownership, which the case has already established. It does not demonstrate an implemented and tested treatment required to resolve the current issue.
C:This would document earlier risk evaluation, which the case has already established. It does not demonstrate an implemented and tested treatment required to resolve the current issue.
D:This demonstrates a later control assurance objective, but it cannot substitute for the unresolved implementation decision in the case. The evidence is valuable only when that prerequisite is met.
Question 239
Key isolation is deployed, but restore exercises have not tested recovery from a loss of the primary key custodian. An updated assessment raises concern that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary. Which response keeps the management decision current and accountable?
- Report delivery of the existing encryption key separation plan without reopening the previous risk assumptions.
- Continue the approved encryption key separation exception until its original expiry, keeping the existing acceptance decision.
- Have service and program owners assess the new encryption key separation evidence, validate the treatment to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events and escalate material deviations.
- Let the delivery team revise the encryption key separation response immediately and seek management ratification afterward.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Control implementation alone does not prove sustained protection. In this case an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary. The service and program owners should test observed performance, reassess the decision to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events and report material exceptions rather than rely only on implementation counts.
Incorrect Answers
A:Historical approvals and task counts do not show that the changed risk remains within tolerance. The new condition warrants a refreshed analysis and accountable response, not solely activity reporting.
B:An exception record is not a substitute for assessing the significance of the new evidence to encryption key separation. Earlier acceptance was conditional on facts that may no longer hold.
D:Urgent actions may be allowed within predelegated incident authority, but unilateral changes by implementers do not replace accountable reassessment and escalation when business impact changes.
Question 240
Key isolation is deployed, but restore exercises have not tested recovery from a loss of the primary key custodian. The committee needs evidence about encryption key separation. Which deliverable would address the identified deficiency most directly?
- A signed delegation and escalation record authorizing the organization to define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties for the operation needing effectiveness evidence.
- A management-endorsed assessment documenting the evidence needed to analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery for the operation needing effectiveness evidence.
- A traceable deployment record and operating test confirming action to separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access for the operation needing effectiveness evidence.
- An assurance review and corrective-action record confirming results from a decision to test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events for the operation needing effectiveness evidence.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Test key recovery and audit custody and decryption events. The scenario's unresolved need is control assurance, and this action produces monitoring evidence and accountable corrective actions for encryption key separation. That directly addresses the risk that an attacker with shared administrative access could defeat both backups and the decryption boundary.
Incorrect Answers
A:Define encryption-key custodians and enforce separation of duties is pertinent to delegated ownership, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide monitoring evidence and accountable corrective actions now needed for encryption key separation.
B:Analyze combined-credential compromise and loss of independent recovery is pertinent to risk evaluation, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide monitoring evidence and accountable corrective actions now needed for encryption key separation.
C:Separate protected keys and establish independent restoration access is pertinent to implementation, but the scenario already assumes that prerequisite is established. Repeating it does not provide monitoring evidence and accountable corrective actions now needed for encryption key separation.