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Question 121:
A Security Administrator discovers that the Firewall is not applying URL Filtering to traffic generated by IoT devices. Logs show that the IoT devices communicate using hardcoded IP addresses instead of domain names, causing URL Filtering to be skipped. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The URL Filtering IP-based categorization fallback settings and enforcement for non-DNS traffic
B) The SMTP dial-on-demand retrieval settings
C) The DHCP auto-superscope generation
D) The cluster custom MAC assignment table
Answer:
A
Explanation:
URL Filtering relies heavily on DNS queries to map domain names to categories. When IoT devices bypass DNS lookups by using hardcoded IP addresses, the Firewall cannot categorize the traffic based on URL because no hostname exists within the request. This results in URL Filtering being skipped entirely. Many IoT devices communicate directly with cloud servers using fixed IPs for firmware updates, telemetry uploads, or command channels. Without a hostname, URL Filtering has no basis to apply category-based enforcement, leading to logs showing “URL category unavailable” or “No domain information.”
The first configuration to review is the Firewall’s IP-based categorization fallback settings. Check Point URL Filtering can perform fallback categorization by mapping IP addresses to known URL categories when DNS information is missing. However, this feature may be disabled by default or limited in scope. Enabling IP-based categorization allows the Firewall to classify traffic even when no hostname is available. This enables filtering decisions based on IP reputation, ownership, CDN classification, or historical mappings.
Another factor involves HTTPS Inspection. Without HTTPS Inspection, the Firewall cannot extract SNI fields from TLS connections. If an IoT device makes HTTPS requests to IP addresses but still uses SNI in the TLS handshake, HTTPS Inspection must be enabled for the Firewall to view that information. Otherwise, URL Filtering cannot interpret the traffic.
Administrators may also need to enforce stricter rules for IoT segments. IoT devices often use proprietary protocols that must be categorized using Application Control rather than URL Filtering. Pairing Application Control with URL Filtering ensures deeper inspection when DNS information is missing.
SecureXL acceleration may also cause IoT flows to bypass deep inspection. If accelerated paths skip URL categorization checks, traffic appears unfiltered. Disabling acceleration for IoT VLANs may be necessary.
Option B relates to SMTP. Option C concerns DHCP superscopes. Option D refers to cluster MAC settings. None of these impact URL Filtering behavior.
Thus, reviewing IP-based URL categorization fallback settings is the correct starting point.
Question 122:
A Security Administrator reports that Anti-Bot signatures are not triggering against malware callbacks routed through a SOCKS5 proxy inside the network. Logs show all outbound connections share the same internal proxy address. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SOCKS5 client attribution settings and Anti-Bot identity-based correlation
B) The SMTP smarthost routing
C) The DHCP failover MAC reservation
D) The cluster pivot-state timeout
Answer:
A
Explanation:
When internal devices use a SOCKS5 proxy for outbound traffic, all flows appear to originate from the proxy instead of the actual clients. This masks individual host identities and prevents the Firewall from detecting malicious callback patterns. Anti-Bot depends on associating suspicious behavior with specific endpoints. If the Firewall cannot distinguish traffic based on original client information, it cannot trigger signature-based detections or reputation-based alerts. Logs show all traffic coming from a single proxy IP, effectively hiding malware-infected devices.
The first configuration to review is the SOCKS5 attribution settings. Check Point Firewalls rely on client identity tagging to decode which user or device is behind a proxy. Without this configuration, Anti-Bot cannot correlate suspicious outbound connections with individual devices. Administrators must enable identity propagation from the SOCKS5 proxy so the Firewall can extract user identity or client metadata.
Another factor is that SOCKS5 proxies sometimes modify payload headers or strip identity fields. If the proxy does not support transparent identity injection, the Firewall cannot assess which client generated the traffic. Enabling X-Forwarded-For equivalents for SOCKS, or configuring the proxy to log and forward client metadata, improves correlation accuracy.
Additionally, HTTPS Inspection must be applied to outbound traffic when inspecting encrypted C2 channels. If SSL/TLS connections through the SOCKS proxy remain opaque, Anti-Bot cannot analyze malicious callback patterns.
SecureXL may also incorrectly accelerate proxy traffic, bypassing Threat Prevention. Ensuring that SOCKS traffic is forced into the slow path prevents missed detections.
Option B deals with SMTP routing. Option C concerns DHCP MAC reservations. Option D involves cluster timers. These do not influence Anti-Bot detection behind SOCKS proxies.
Thus, enabling proxy-aware identity correlation is the correct first step.
Question 123:
A Security Administrator notices that Content Awareness is incorrectly flagging harmless JSON API responses as data leakage events. Logs indicate that Content Awareness interprets certain structured fields as sensitive identifiers. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Content Awareness data-type definitions and custom field exceptions for structured API responses
B) The SMTP queue depth limiter
C) The DHCP relay multiple-server configuration
D) The cluster connection stickiness delay
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Content Awareness analyzes data patterns in traffic to detect sensitive information. However, legitimate JSON API responses may contain numeric fields, hashed identifiers, session tokens, or structured account metadata that resemble sensitive data patterns. Without proper tuning, the Firewall may misinterpret benign JSON content as data leakage, resulting in false positives that disrupt application operations.
The first configuration to review is the Content Awareness data-type definitions. Administrators must verify whether the Firewall is applying overly broad detection patterns that misidentify JSON fields. Creating custom exceptions for specific field names or API endpoints helps prevent Content Awareness from flagging benign data. For instance, hashed session IDs may appear similar to credit card data unless Content Awareness is tuned to interpret context.
It is important to review the Application Control rule enforcing Content Awareness. If the rule applies to all HTTP traffic instead of specific endpoints, the Firewall may unnecessarily inspect API traffic. Restricting Content Awareness to areas where sensitive data movement is likely dramatically reduces false positives.
Another factor involves HTTPS Inspection. JSON content remains encrypted unless HTTPS Inspection is enabled. If Inspection is active but content parsing is misconfigured, the Firewall might misread partially decoded content structures. Ensuring proper decompression, decoding, and parsing of JSON improves accuracy.
Content Awareness also interacts with SecureXL. Accelerated sessions may bypass deep data scanning. If inspection inconsistencies exist, the Firewall may apply detection irregularly. Ensuring predictable inspection flows prevents erratic classification.
Option B pertains to SMTP queues. Option C deals with DHCP relay functionality. Option D concerns cluster delay mechanisms. None of these impact JSON data inspection.
Therefore, reviewing and tuning data-type definitions and JSON-specific exceptions within Content Awareness is the correct approach.
Question 124:
A Security Administrator finds that Threat Emulation is failing to analyze files downloaded via FTP. Logs show that the Firewall sizes the files as “unknown transfer type.” The FTP server uses passive mode with non-standard ports. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The FTP protocol inspection settings and passive mode port range configuration
B) The SMTP chunked message transfer mode
C) The DHCP Option 82 relay behavior
D) The cluster routed interface load sharing
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Emulation relies on accurate file extraction before sending content to the sandbox environment. For FTP transfers, the Firewall must interpret control and data channel behavior correctly. When FTP uses passive mode, the server selects a dynamic port for the data channel. If the FTP server uses non-standard ports outside of expected ranges, the Firewall may fail to link the control channel with the data channel. As a result, it interprets file transfers as unknown or malformed, meaning Threat Emulation cannot extract files for analysis.
The first configuration to review is the FTP protocol inspection settings. Administrators must ensure that the passive mode port range used by the FTP server is defined correctly in the Firewall. If the Firewall only expects standard passive port ranges but the server uses custom ranges, the Firewall cannot identify file transfers correctly.
Additionally, NAT can interfere with passive mode. If NAT modifies the IP or port communicated in the FTP control channel without adjusting payload values, the client and server may use mismatched ports. The Firewall may incorrectly assume no file transfer is occurring. Enabling FTP protocol strip-and-insert functionality helps ensure NAT aligns with FTP operations.
Another factor is SecureXL acceleration. If FTP data channels are accelerated while control channels are not, the Firewall loses file visibility. Disabling acceleration for FTP data flows enables Threat Emulation to inspect files consistently.
Option B covers SMTP behavior. Option C deals with DHCP relay functions. Option D relates to cluster routing but does not affect FTP parsing.
Thus, reviewing FTP passive mode configuration and protocol inspection is essential.
Question 125:
A Security Administrator observes that Anti-Scan protections are not activating on horizontal scans conducted across multiple subnets. Logs show the Firewall treats each subnet as separate zones, preventing correlation. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Anti-Scan zone-correlation settings and multi-subnet behavioral grouping configuration
B) The SMTP address rewriting rules
C) The DHCP failover state transition mode
D) The cluster broadcast health-check rule
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Anti-Scan protections identify patterns of scanning activity, such as probing multiple IP addresses or ports rapidly. However, when the Firewall is configured to treat each subnet as an independent zone, scans across multiple subnets are not recognized as part of the same event. This causes horizontal scans—those targeting many IP addresses across various subnets—to go undetected. The Firewall sees a collection of isolated events rather than a coordinated scan.
The first configuration to review is the Anti-Scan zone-correlation settings. Administrators must ensure the Firewall groups multiple internal subnets into unified inspection zones. This allows Anti-Scan protections to correlate activity across subnet boundaries. Without grouping, traffic appears unrelated, and no behavioral patterns emerge.
Another factor is how the Firewall interprets routing paths. If each subnet has a separate interface or VLAN, the Firewall may classify scanning traffic as independent per-interface activity. Adjusting zone assignments or creating logical groupings ensures behavioral detection applies across the environment.
Additionally, log rate-limiting can interfere with Anti-Scan. If the Firewall suppresses repetitive logs, it may fail to accumulate enough events to trigger scan detection. Increasing log granularity improves detection accuracy.
Option B concerns email rewriting. Option C handles DHCP failover. Option D handles cluster health checks. None of these relate to scan correlation.
Thus, reviewing zone-correlation settings enables consistent detection of cross-subnet scans.
Question 126:
A Security Administrator reports that HTTPS Inspection is not being applied to outbound Android device traffic. Logs show that Android devices are rejecting the Firewall’s CA certificate, causing TLS handshake failures. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The mobile device certificate deployment method and CA trust configuration for Android systems
B) The SMTP outbound retry timer
C) The DHCP rapid-commit negotiation bit
D) The cluster member multicast probing settings
Answer:
A
Explanation:
HTTPS Inspection relies on deploying a trusted Root CA certificate to all endpoint devices. This certificate allows the Firewall to intercept encrypted connections, inspect content, and re-encrypt traffic using a certificate signed by the organization’s internal CA. However, Android devices maintain stricter certificate trust policies than many desktop operating systems. If the Firewall’s CA certificate is not installed as a system-level trusted root on Android devices, TLS handshake failures occur, and Android rejects the intercepted connection. As a result, HTTPS Inspection is not applied, and the Firewall may log “certificate untrusted” or “handshake failure,” showing that Android devices are bypassing inspection.
The first configuration to review is the certificate deployment method used for Android. Administrators must ensure the certificate is deployed at the system level rather than user level, because Android only trusts user-installed certificates for browser traffic, not for system-level encrypted communications. Many applications, including Google Play Services, internal corporate apps, and cloud-based apps, rely on system trust stores. If the certificate is incorrectly installed in the user trust store, applications bypass inspection, resulting in failures.
Administrators may need to use Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions to push the certificate as a trusted system certificate. Without an MDM, Android devices require manual installation, which is prone to inconsistencies. Some Android versions also restrict third-party certificates for apps using certificate pinning. In such cases, exceptions must be created in HTTPS Inspection policies to avoid breaking critical applications.
Another factor is certificate validity. If the Firewall’s CA certificate uses outdated algorithms, weak keys, or expired signatures, Android systems may refuse it. Ensuring the certificate meets modern cryptographic standards and validity periods resolves this problem. Updating the internal CA or using a trusted enterprise CA ensures compatibility.
DNS filtering and SNI extraction also play a role. If Android apps use QUIC or HTTP/3, HTTPS Inspection may fail unless QUIC is blocked or downgraded to HTTP/2. Without proper protocol management, Android traffic may not be inspectable at all.
Options B, C, and D involve SMTP, DHCP, and cluster settings, which have no relation to Android certificate trust.
Thus, reviewing mobile certificate deployment and ensuring system-level CA trust is the correct first step.
Question 127:
A Security Administrator detects that Threat Emulation is not analyzing files uploaded through an internal web application. Logs show that the files never reach the inspection engine because the web application uses chunked HTTP uploads. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTP streaming and chunked-encoding file reassembly configuration
B) The SMTP VRFY command restrictions
C) The DHCP non-authoritative mode
D) The cluster heartbeat encryption mode
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Emulation needs complete file objects before sending them to the sandbox for analysis. When web applications use chunked HTTP uploads, files arrive in partial segments that must be reassembled by the Firewall before inspection can occur. If HTTP streaming or chunked-encoding support is misconfigured, the Firewall may fail to reconstruct the full file. This leads to logs indicating that the upload was detected but no file was extracted, meaning Threat Emulation does not analyze the content.
The first configuration to review is HTTP stream reassembly. Administrators must ensure the Firewall supports chunked transfer encoding for uploads. Many applications use chunked encoding for large files or real-time upload progress indicators. Without proper handling, the Firewall treats each chunk as a separate object rather than combining them into a complete file.
Another important factor is content length. Some chunked uploads omit the content-length header entirely, forcing the Firewall to rely solely on chunked reassembly. If the Firewall expects a content-length field but does not receive one, it may assume no file exists. Enabling flexible parsing for chunked requests resolves this issue.
HTTPS Inspection also plays a role. If chunked uploads occur inside an encrypted HTTPS session, the Firewall must decrypt, cache, and reassemble the chunks. Without adequate buffering, the Firewall may drop or skip chunks, especially under high load. Increasing memory allocation for inspection or adjusting buffer thresholds ensures full reassembly.
SecureXL must also be reviewed. If accelerated paths bypass stream reassembly, the Firewall may not detect file uploads at all. Disabling acceleration for HTTP upload paths ensures deep inspection.
Application Control signatures may also misclassify uploaded content. If the web application uses custom MIME types or non-standard content headers, the Firewall might skip inspection. Adding exceptions or custom content-type recognition allows more accurate file extraction.
Options B, C, and D relate to email, DHCP, and cluster behavior, none of which influence HTTP chunking.
Thus, reviewing HTTP chunked upload reassembly is the correct step.
Question 128:
A Security Administrator finds that DLP is not detecting sensitive data in outbound custom REST API calls. Logs show that the Firewall identifies the traffic as generic application data and does not parse JSON bodies. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The DLP advanced content-type parsing and JSON data inspection configuration
B) The SMTP TLS cipher preference
C) The DHCP vendor-class options
D) The cluster interface failure threshold
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Data Loss Prevention relies on parsing application-layer content to detect sensitive information. When custom REST APIs use JSON structures, the Firewall must be able to decode JSON bodies and interpret field names and values. If JSON parsing is not enabled or improperly configured, DLP cannot examine the content, even if sensitive data is present. Logs will show generic application data with no parsed metadata, resulting in missed detections.
The first configuration to review is advanced content-type parsing for DLP. Administrators must ensure that the Firewall recognizes the REST API’s MIME type—typically application/json. Some custom APIs use MIME types such as text/plain or multipart/form-data, which may cause the Firewall to misinterpret data formats. Updating DLP profiles to parse these MIME types allows JSON-aware inspection.
Field-level inspection is also important. JSON payloads often contain nested structures, arrays, or encoded fields. DLP must be configured to recognize specific field patterns, such as account_number, token, personal_id, or other context-defined labels. Without custom signatures or field mappings, DLP cannot associate JSON fields with sensitive data categories.
HTTPS Inspection also plays a critical role. If API calls occur over HTTPS, the Firewall cannot inspect JSON content unless decryption is active. If Inspection is disabled, DLP cannot function. Ensuring that the REST API domain is included in HTTPS Inspection rules is required for JSON visibility.
Another factor is content compression. Many APIs use gzip or deflate compression to reduce bandwidth. If decompression is not enabled, DLP cannot parse the compressed data. Enabling automatic decompression resolves this.
SecureXL acceleration may inadvertently bypass deep inspection. If accelerated paths apply to API servers, JSON content may not be fully analyzed. Disabling acceleration for the relevant REST endpoints ensures proper DLP processing.
Options B, C, and D pertain to unrelated systems.
Thus, enabling JSON-aware DLP parsing is the correct first step.
Question 129:
A Security Administrator reports that Anti-Virus protections are failing to inspect files downloaded over SMBv3. Logs show the Firewall marks SMBv3 traffic as encrypted. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SMBv3 encryption and signing inspection capability and fallback enforcement
B) The SMTP queue retry interval
C) The DHCP route propagation setting
D) The cluster failover sync direction
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SMBv3 supports both encryption and signing to ensure secure file transfers. When SMBv3 encryption is enabled on servers or clients, file content becomes unreadable to the Firewall. As a result, the Firewall marks SMB traffic as encrypted and cannot extract file content for Anti-Virus scanning. This leads to a situation where file downloads bypass inspection entirely, posing a security risk.
The first configuration to review is SMBv3 encryption handling. Administrators must determine whether SMB encryption is required for specific environments. If file scanning is essential, they may need to disable SMB encryption for trusted internal networks or configure servers to selectively disable encryption for inspection gateways.
Alternatively, if encryption cannot be disabled, endpoint protections such as endpoint Anti-Virus or Threat Emulation must be used. The Firewall cannot break SMB encryption without violating protocol integrity.
SMB signing also complicates inspection. Even if encryption is disabled but signing is enforced strictly, the Firewall cannot modify or inspect payloads. Adjusting signing policies may be necessary for environments requiring inspection.
Administrators should also verify whether the Firewall supports SMBv3 parsing in the current software version. Some Firewalls only support SMBv1/v2 inspection. Upgrading the software may enable additional capabilities.
SecureXL acceleration may also bypass SMB inspection. SMB is often accelerated for performance reasons, but accelerated paths disable deep inspection. Disabling acceleration for SMB traffic ensures full inspection.
Options B, C, and D relate to functions outside SMB inspection.
Thus, reviewing SMBv3 encryption and signing configuration is the correct starting point.
Question 130:
A Security Administrator notices that Threat Extraction is not generating sanitized versions of downloaded Office documents for certain users. Logs show that the Firewall classifies their downloads as “streaming content” instead of file downloads. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The content-type header detection and file download identification settings
B) The SMTP queue garbage-collection routine
C) The DHCP reservation conflict resolver
D) The cluster log persistence timeout
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Extraction requires the Firewall to identify when a user downloads a supported file type such as .docx, .xlsx, or .pptx. If the Firewall incorrectly categorizes the connection as streaming content, it will not process the file through Threat Extraction. This misclassification often occurs when servers provide files using non-standard MIME types or streaming transfer methods.
The first configuration to review is content-type header detection. Administrators should ensure the Firewall accurately interprets MIME headers sent by servers. Some applications use MIME types such as application/octet-stream or custom vendor-specific types, which may confuse the Firewall. Adding custom mappings enables the Firewall to recognize these headers as file downloads.
HTTP response headers must also be reviewed. If the content-disposition header is missing or incorrectly formatted, the Firewall may not identify a file download event. Correct header formatting ensures Threat Extraction triggers as expected.
If HTTPS Inspection is disabled, the Firewall cannot view response headers for encrypted traffic. Enabling Inspection allows the Firewall to see content-type and content-disposition headers.
Compression and chunked streaming also affect classification. If content arrives in fragmented or streaming form, the Firewall may not recognize a file boundary. Adjusting stream reassembly settings ensures files are reconstructed properly.
SecureXL acceleration may also cause inspection bypass for streaming flows. Ensuring Threat Extraction bypass is disabled for these flows helps maintain detection accuracy.
Options B, C, and D involve unrelated systems.
Thus, reviewing content-type detection and file identification settings is the correct first step.
Question 131:
A Security Administrator notices that Application Control is not identifying traffic from a cloud-hosted CRM platform. Logs show that the Firewall classifies all traffic as generic HTTPS rather than the specific application. The CRM uses dynamically changing IP ranges and relies heavily on SNI for application identification. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTPS Inspection SNI extraction capability and dynamic Application Control signature updates
B) The SMTP message-retry fallback
C) The DHCP prefix delegation support
D) The cluster global state retention value
Answer:
A
Explanation:
When cloud applications use large, rapidly changing IP ranges, IP-based application identification becomes unreliable. Application Control depends heavily on SNI extraction from TLS handshakes to detect which cloud application is being accessed. If HTTPS Inspection is not correctly configured to extract SNI fields, the Firewall sees only encrypted traffic and cannot match it to application signatures. As a result, traffic is classified simply as HTTPS, which prevents enforcement of application-based rules and logs the sessions inaccurately. Reviewing SNI extraction is the first step because SNI values identify domains inside encrypted traffic without requiring full SSL interception.
Cloud applications often host multiple services behind shared IP addresses, meaning domain-based identification is the only reliable method. If HTTPS Inspection is disabled or only partially enabled, the Firewall cannot read TLS metadata, and Application Control signatures fail to match. Ensuring the Firewall can parse ClientHello packets and read SNI fields allows accurate application recognition.
Additionally, Application Control signatures must be regularly updated. If signature updates are outdated, new CRM subdomains may not be recognized. Some cloud vendors frequently add new hostnames, and the Firewall must stay synchronized with vendor updates through automatic or manual signature updates.
DNS caching behavior should also be reviewed. If DNS queries bypass the Firewall, the Firewall lacks domain-to-IP context. Enforcing DNS inspection or redirecting DNS queries ensures the Firewall can tie IP address flows to domain names.
SecureXL acceleration may also cause TLS metadata to bypass deeper inspection layers. Disabling acceleration for relevant apps ensures consistent SNI parsing. Finally, administrators can create custom application signatures if the CRM uses proprietary behaviors.
Options B, C, and D pertain to unrelated functionalities and have no effect on Application Control classification. Thus, reviewing SNI extraction and signature updates is the correct step.
Question 132:
A Security Administrator reports inconsistent logging for files scanned by Threat Emulation. Some files show full emulation reports, while others only show partial metadata with no sandbox details. The affected files are downloaded through a CDN with segmented caching. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Threat Emulation cache behavior and CDN-segment awareness for file hashing
B) The SMTP DKIM verification
C) The DHCP classless-static-route option
D) The cluster Virtual MAC persistence setting
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Emulation relies on file hashing to determine whether a file was previously analyzed. When files are delivered through a CDN using segmented caching, multiple versions of the same file may exist across different CDN nodes. If each CDN node delivers slightly different segments, timestamps, or compression signatures, the Firewall may generate inconsistent hashes. This leads to erratic detection: some versions match known hashes and trigger instant verdicts, while others appear new and require full analysis. Reviewing Threat Emulation cache behavior is the key because CDN segmentation distorts file fingerprint consistency.
Administrators should verify whether the Firewall uses SHA-1, SHA-256, or composite hashing. Threat Emulation may misinterpret file chunks if the CDN compresses or modifies headers, causing mismatched hashes. Ensuring file hashing occurs on the fully reconstructed file rather than partial segments resolves detection inconsistencies. This also depends heavily on HTTP reassembly settings.
CDN optimization techniques like byte-range requests or content slicing can produce slightly different binary content structures. Threat Emulation engines must fully reconstruct multi-part HTTP responses before computing hashes. Misconfigured reassembly results in incomplete logs with missing sandbox details.
HTTPS Inspection also affects this process. If the CDN uses TLS session reuse or QUIC, some file downloads may bypass inspection entirely. Blocking QUIC ensures all CDN-delivered files use HTTPS, allowing full decryption and reconstruction.
Administrators may also create exceptions for CDN domains if consistent inspection is essential. For example, forcing CDN traffic through slower but more accurate inspection paths prevents acceleration from interfering with emulation.
Options B, C, and D cover email, DHCP, and cluster structure topics, none of which affect Threat Emulation reporting. Thus, analyzing cache behavior and CDN segmentation is the correct first step.
Question 133:
A Security Administrator finds that Anti-Virus scanning is not triggered for files transferred over SFTP. Logs indicate that the Firewall categorizes the sessions as “encrypted SSH tunnel” and skips inspection. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SFTP protocol-handling policy and fallback controls for encrypted SSH file transfers
B) The SMTP envelope-recipient validation
C) The DHCP option 66 boot server configuration
D) The cluster topology broadcast setting
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SFTP operates entirely within an SSH tunnel, encrypting both control and data channels end-to-end. The Firewall cannot inspect SFTP file transfers because decrypting SSH would require breaking the encryption, which is not supported for security and protocol integrity reasons. As a result, Anti-Virus cannot extract files from SFTP sessions, and logs correctly show “encrypted SSH tunnel – bypassed.”
The administrator must review SFTP handling policies, which include fallback measures such as blocking SFTP, restricting it to specific users, or limiting it to trusted hosts. Anti-Virus inspection itself cannot function on encrypted sessions, so controlling protocol use is the only viable strategy.
Another relevant configuration is Application Control rules. If SFTP is allowed without restrictions, malware can bypass Anti-Virus. Administrators may enforce restrictions based on user identity, Active Directory groups, or network segments.
Threat Prevention policy layers must also be reviewed. If a rule does not enforce advanced protections on SSH tunnels, the Firewall may allow SFTP without imposing protocol-based restrictions. Adjusting rule placement ensures SSH tunnels are analyzed for behavior even when content is encrypted.
SecureXL may also bypass deep inspection for SSH, depending on throughput settings. Ensuring SSH flows are not accelerated maintains consistent protocol enforcement.
Options B, C, and D relate to unrelated subsystems and do not affect encrypted file inspection. Therefore, reviewing SFTP protocol handling is the correct step.
Question 134:
A Security Administrator sees that Anti-Phishing protections do not activate for emails received through an internal mail relay. Logs show that the Firewall classifies inbound SMTP traffic as “trusted internal source” and skips inspection. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SMTP trust classification settings and inspection mode for internal relay traffic
B) The DHCP round-robin address assignment
C) The SMTP VRFY command availability
D) The cluster state-synchronization interface priority
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Anti-Phishing relies on analyzing SMTP traffic before it reaches users. However, many organizations route inbound email through internal relay servers before delivering messages to endpoints. If the Firewall classifies traffic from the internal relay as trusted, it may skip Anti-Phishing inspection under the assumption that the relay already filtered malicious emails. This causes phishing attempts to reach users without proper scanning.
The first configuration to review is SMTP trust classification. The Firewall must classify internal mail relays as untrusted for inspection purposes, even though they are trusted in the network sense. Administrators should adjust inspection rules so inbound SMTP from internal relays still undergoes Anti-Phishing analysis. This ensures malicious links, spoofing indicators, and fraudulent domain signatures are detected.
In addition, TLS offloading by the internal relay may obscure email metadata. If the relay terminates and re-encrypts SMTP TLS sessions, the Firewall only sees re-encrypted data, not original headers. Configuring the relay to pass original headers intact helps the Firewall detect suspicious patterns.
Another factor is ICAP or MTA-based scanning. If the Firewall uses MTA mode, internal relay traffic must be forwarded to the Firewall MTA rather than bypassing it. Adjusting mail routing rules ensures consistent Anti-Phishing inspection.
Options B, C, and D do not influence SMTP classification for phishing detection. Thus, correcting trust classification for internal relays is the correct step.
Question 135:
A Security Administrator notes that Threat Prevention is not detecting malicious activity in outbound DNS requests. Logs show only DNS metadata, with no behavioral inspection. The DNS queries come from a caching DNS server rather than individual clients. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The DNS inspection mode and client attribution settings for caching DNS servers
B) The SMTP SASL authentication negotiation
C) The DHCP failover-peer hold time
D) The cluster interface load-balancing factor
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Prevention engines—such as Anti-Bot, Anti-Virus, and Threat Intelligence—depend on accurate DNS visibility to detect suspicious domains, fast-flux indicators, and C2 communication patterns. However, when outbound DNS originates from a caching DNS server, the Firewall sees only the caching server’s IP rather than the individual client devices that initiated the requests. This creates attribution problems and prevents behavioral detection.
The first configuration to review is DNS inspection mode. The Firewall must be configured to inspect DNS queries deeply rather than only parsing metadata. Additionally, client attribution settings must be enabled so the Firewall can associate DNS queries from the caching server with the original clients that generated them. Some deployments require EDNS0 Client Subnet (ECS) support or internal tagging mechanisms that pass client identifiers through the DNS server.
Without attribution, the Firewall cannot correlate repeated suspicious queries with specific infected devices. Anti-Bot signatures fail because all queries appear to come from a single legitimate caching server.
DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS may also cause inspection gaps. If the caching server uses encrypted DNS protocols and HTTPS Inspection is not enabled, the Firewall cannot analyze query payloads. Ensuring standard DNS is used for internal caching restores visibility.
Administrators may also need to redirect DNS queries or enforce DNS forwarding through the Firewall. This enables the Firewall to see both client-side queries and caching behavior simultaneously.
Options B, C, and D concern unrelated systems. Thus, reviewing DNS inspection and attribution configuration is the correct first step.
Question 136:
A Security Administrator notices that Threat Prevention is not inspecting files downloaded through a newly integrated cloud ERP system. Logs show that the Firewall categorizes the traffic as proprietary binary streams without identifying any file objects. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The proprietary application parsing profile and file-extraction mapping for the ERP protocol
B) The SMTP connection-timeout fallback
C) The DHCP NAT-relay behavior
D) The cluster synchronization heartbeat interval
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Cloud ERP systems commonly use proprietary or partially standardized binary protocols to transfer files, metadata, and encrypted records. Unlike regular web downloads that use HTTP-based MIME headers, ERP applications may wrap downloaded files inside custom frames or structured binary messages. Threat Prevention can only inspect a file if the Firewall is able to understand where file boundaries begin and end. This requires a properly configured parsing profile for the ERP application. Reviewing and enabling the correct application parser ensures that the Firewall can identify file payloads and pass them to Threat Emulation or Anti-Virus. Without file-boundary mapping, the Firewall cannot extract objects and therefore logs only binary streams. This misclassification prevents sandboxing and leaves potential malware undetected. Options B, C, and D do not influence proprietary-decoder behavior, making A correct.
Question 137:
A Security Administrator finds that Application Control fails to classify traffic from a collaboration suite that relies heavily on WebSocket extensions. After the initial handshake, the Firewall logs the communication as generic TCP. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The WebSocket extension-parser settings and HTTP Upgrade-header inspection
B) The SMTP retry-backoff tuning
C) The DHCP subnet advertisement flags
D) The cluster split-brain recovery delay
Answer:
A
Explanation:
WebSocket-based collaboration suites often use specialized extensions for real-time messaging, presence updates, and session synchronization. Although the initial upgrade request is standard HTTP, all later messages travel within extended WebSocket frames. If the Firewall is not configured to parse extended WebSocket operations—such as binary frames, masked frames, JSON-control channels, or application-specific subprotocols—it will treat all subsequent traffic as generic TCP. Application Control depends on parsing these frames to identify which specific collaboration module is being accessed. Reviewing the WebSocket parser ensures the Firewall examines both handshake headers and ongoing frame metadata. Without this inspection, the Firewall cannot enforce application-layer rules. Options B, C, and D do not affect WebSocket parsing and are therefore not relevant to classification issues.
Question 138:
A Security Administrator sees Anti-Virus and Threat Extraction failing to process documents transferred through HTTP/2 from a cloud file-sharing service. Logs show “multiplexed encrypted frames” instead of clear file data. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTP/2 decoding engine, including stream-multiplex reassembly and TLS visibility
B) The SMTP content-stamp validator
C) The DHCP interface-lease alignment
D) The cluster interface auto-balancing logic
Answer:
A
Explanation:
HTTP/2 is built on multiplexed binary frames, meaning multiple concurrent streams travel over a single TCP connection. When cloud services deliver files using HTTP/2, the Firewall must be able to reassemble interleaved frames into complete file objects. Threat Extraction and Anti-Virus cannot function unless file payloads are reconstructed properly. Reviewing the HTTP/2 decoding engine ensures the Firewall understands stream identifiers, CONTINUATION frames, and compressed header blocks. Additionally, since HTTP/2 almost always operates over TLS, HTTPS Inspection must be active to expose frame contents. If TLS inspection is disabled or misconfigured, the Firewall sees only encrypted multiplexed frames and cannot extract file content. Options B, C, and D do not influence HTTP/2 reassembly, so A is the correct choice.
Question 139:
A Security Administrator realizes that IPS is not detecting attacks traveling through an SD-WAN edge device that encapsulates site-to-site traffic using proprietary overlay tunneling. The Firewall shows all packets as overlay frames without inner payload visibility. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SD-WAN tunnel-decapsulation settings and inner-packet inspection policies
B) The SMTP payload-size negotiation control
C) The DHCP relay-and-forwarding mode
D) The cluster failover trigger threshold
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SD-WAN overlay tunnels typically encapsulate multiple internal sessions inside a single logical tunnel. IPS cannot analyze attacks inside the encapsulated content unless the Firewall is configured to decapsulate the overlay protocol. Some SD-WAN vendors use proprietary encapsulation formats, meaning the Firewall must use a dedicated parser to extract internal IP, TCP, and application-layer packets. Reviewing SD-WAN tunnel-decapsulation ensures that the Firewall receives usable inner traffic. If SecureXL acceleration is enabled for such tunnels, deep inspection may be bypassed; disabling acceleration for overlay traffic may be required. IPS can only detect attacks once the inner payload is visible. Options B, C, and D have no relevance to SD-WAN overlay parsing and therefore cannot resolve the issue. Option A is the correct action.
Question 140:
A Security Administrator notices that Content Awareness is unable to detect sensitive document uploads to a corporate sync tool that uses incremental delta synchronizations. Logs show “partial update fragments” rather than full file uploads. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The delta-update file-reconstruction profile and the merge-processing engine
B) The SMTP content-replacement rule
C) The DHCP router-discovery extension
D) The cluster unicast-distribution preference
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Content Awareness requires full file reconstruction before analyzing document content for sensitive data. Many enterprise sync tools use delta synchronization, sending only modified blocks instead of entire files. If the Firewall does not have the appropriate delta-merge logic, it sees only update fragments rather than complete documents. Without combining these fragments into a full object, Content Awareness cannot inspect the material. Reviewing delta-update reconstruction ensures the Firewall can assemble incremental blocks into a complete file before inspection. HTTPS Inspection may also be needed if the sync tool encrypts transfers. Options B, C, and D are unrelated to delta-sync processing. Option A is therefore correct.
