CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 13
Question 120
A server's local audit log rotates unexpectedly several hours early, leaving a gap in recorded events. No approved logging change exists, but a disk-pressure alert occurred around the same time. What should an investigator do first?
- Declare deliberate log tampering solely because the rotation was early
- Rebuild the local index before making a preservation copy
- Correlate local and centralized logs, disk events, and relevant process activity
- Stop central forwarding so that the investigation generates no additional records
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A logging gap is an indicator requiring corroboration. The investigator should preserve remaining local files, examine disk utilization and rotation policy, identify processes or administrators that changed log settings, and compare the timeline with centrally forwarded records. If centralized logs continued uninterrupted, they may distinguish local storage failure from deliberate deletion; if forwarding also stopped, the scope of concern grows. The storage alert makes an operational cause plausible but not proven. Correlation allows investigators to characterize the anomaly accurately without destroying evidence or prematurely asserting tampering. This is an evidence-led response to suspicious logging behavior rather than a declaration based solely on one timestamp.
Incorrect Answers
A:Early rotation and missing intervals can indicate malicious log manipulation, but storage pressure or misconfiguration may cause the same symptoms. The problem includes a plausible operational explanation that must be tested. Naming tampering as confirmed before checking disk and process evidence would overstate what the timestamps prove. Preserve the anomaly and investigate independently rather than collapsing a suspicion into a verdict.
B:Rebuilding indexes or modifying a damaged log before preservation risks changing metadata and destroying evidence useful for forensic analysis. Responders should first secure copies of available logs and related artifacts under their evidence-handling procedures. Repair may later aid operational use, but an investigative first step should avoid altering the only local record of an unexplained gap. Central sources may provide an independent timeline.
D:Stopping central forwarding removes an independent evidence stream that might establish what happened during the local gap. It can also obscure subsequent activity while responders investigate. Additional logs may create volume, but that is a storage and filtering problem to manage without disabling security visibility. The organization should preserve centralized collection and use it as corroboration, not intentionally eliminate it.
Question 121
A privileged user has two overlapping authenticated sessions, one from a workstation not enrolled in the management platform. The account owner denies using that workstation. Which response best balances investigation and immediate account protection?
- Assume both sessions are safe because one passed MFA
- Terminate the unfamiliar session and erase its log records
- Prioritize investigation of the anomalous overlap while preserving logs and restricting suspect access
- Leave the unfamiliar session running until the next routine password rotation
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Two simultaneous privileged sessions from unexpected device contexts warrant urgent validation rather than waiting for a scheduled credential change. Analysts should preserve identity, endpoint, device-management, MFA, and resource-access records; verify the user's statement; and restrict or revoke the suspect session as risk and policy require. Valid authentication alone does not prove authorized use, particularly when a device is unmanaged and the owner disclaims it. The team should investigate token theft, credential compromise, and privileged actions while maintaining chain of custody. The recommended response is risk-based containment with evidence preservation and corroboration, not a categorical conclusion from one signal.
Incorrect Answers
A:An MFA result validates a factor challenge in a particular context, but it does not prove that every simultaneous session is legitimate. An attacker may steal sessions, exploit recovery processes, or use a previously authenticated device. The unmanaged workstation and user's denial are substantial anomalies that need corroboration. Treating a valid challenge as universal proof of session safety would overextend the trust decision.
B:Terminating a suspicious session may be an appropriate containment action, but deleting its logs destroys critical evidence about source, actions, and time. Responders need reliable records to determine what access occurred and whether other sessions are affected. The option combines a potentially useful protective measure with an unjustified evidence purge, making it unsuitable. Preserve the relevant telemetry before or alongside containment according to incident procedure.
D:Waiting for routine rotation leaves a potentially unauthorized privileged session active long enough to read or change sensitive systems. Session tokens may remain valid even after a password change unless explicitly revoked. The anomalous device and overlapping activity justify prompt triage. Scheduled credential hygiene is useful, but it is not an adequate immediate response to possible active compromise.
Question 122
Endpoint monitoring confirms ransomware is actively running on a user's workstation and sending connections toward nearby file servers. The responder is authorized to contain the incident immediately. Which first action most directly limits spread without intentionally destroying evidence?
- Install the next operating-system patch while keeping the host connected
- Isolate the workstation from production networks and preserve incident artifacts
- Immediately reboot the workstation to interrupt the payload without isolating network access or preserving volatile evidence
- Start restoring from backup while leaving the compromised sessions active
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Network isolation interrupts the compromised workstation's ability to reach other production hosts and shared resources, directly reducing the chance of further encryption or lateral movement. The EDR isolation function or a coordinated switch action can block hostile traffic while preserving available endpoint logs, memory or disk artifacts according to incident procedure. Containment is time-sensitive because the attacker is already making connections to nearby file servers. Responders should document actions, identify exposed credentials and shares, and coordinate recovery only after the threat is controlled. Isolation may affect business access and evidence acquisition, so the team should use an approved response method that maintains necessary forensic visibility where possible.
Incorrect Answers
A:Patching a vulnerable operating system can prevent future exploitation, but it does not reliably halt an already running ransomware process or its current network connections. Keeping the host connected allows further lateral movement and shared-file encryption while maintenance proceeds. Patches are part of remediation after containment and scoping; they are not the immediate protective boundary requested in this active-spread situation.
C:A restart might stop a currently running ransomware process temporarily, but it can also destroy volatile investigative evidence and trigger persistence mechanisms on boot. More importantly, it does not establish a containment boundary if the host reconnects to file servers afterward. The responder is authorized to isolate the endpoint and preserve artifacts, which directly reduces spread while maintaining investigative options. A reboot may be considered later under a coordinated response plan, but it is not the strongest initial action under these conditions.
D:Restoring files while the malicious process and sessions remain active risks re-encrypting recovered data and spreading the attack to newly accessible backup or file services. Recovery should follow effective containment, investigation of persistence, and validation that restored systems will not immediately be compromised again. Backups support resilience, but their use is not the strongest first step while ransomware is actively traversing the network.
Question 123
One compromised desktop on a flat corporate network can communicate directly with development servers, finance shares, and domain administration endpoints. Which architectural change most directly reduces lateral movement after an individual endpoint compromise?
- Apply additional host rules only to that desktop while keeping all other departments fully interconnected
- Segment systems by business function and enforce narrowly approved intersegment flows
- Require administrator MFA across all departments while retaining unrestricted workstation-to-server routing
- Add monitoring sensors but leave unrestricted cross-department routing
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Role-based network segmentation creates separate security zones for departments and critical infrastructure, with explicit policies permitting only necessary service-to-service communication. An attacker who compromises a finance workstation should not automatically reach domain management or development systems merely because they share corporate routing. Firewalls, ACLs, and identity-aware policies can enforce the boundaries, but the rules must be tested against legitimate application dependencies. Segmentation does not prevent initial endpoint infection, so endpoint protection and monitoring remain complementary. Its direct benefit is reducing the blast radius after compromise by removing unnecessary lateral paths, which is the specific weakness presented in the flat network.
Incorrect Answers
A:Host firewalls are useful for limiting a workstation's local inbound and outbound communications, but changing one desktop alone leaves the network architecture broadly permissive for other devices and future compromises. If an attacker moves to an unprotected host, the flat trust relationships remain. A systemic reduction in lateral movement requires boundaries between important resource groups rather than relying on a single endpoint configuration.
C:MFA reduces the chance that a stolen administrator password alone grants privileged access, and it is a useful defense against lateral movement that requires interactive authentication. The compromised desktop still has unrestricted network reachability to finance, development, and domain-management services. Attackers may exploit unauthenticated services, use already valid sessions, or target other reachable hosts. The requested architectural containment comes from enforcing intersegment communication boundaries rather than leaving all east-west paths open and relying solely on stronger administrator login checks.
D:Monitoring sensors can detect suspicious east-west movement and provide valuable investigation data, but they do not inherently prevent traffic between unrestricted departments. An attacker could still connect to file servers and administrative interfaces while alerts are being evaluated. Segmentation reduces reachable targets proactively; detection helps confirm or respond to attempted movement. Both are needed, but leaving every route open fails the stated architecture goal.
Question 124
An administrator portal is reachable from every Internet address and accepts a password as its only authentication factor. Select TWO measures that most directly reduce the risk of unauthorized privileged access while preserving a controlled administration path.
- Limit portal reachability to an approved management network or strongly authenticated access gateway
- Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for privileged users
- Add several more publicly reachable addresses to improve management availability
- Replace named administrators with one widely shared privileged account
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Reducing reachable sources constrains who can even attempt administrative access, shrinking exposure to scanning, guessing, and protocol vulnerabilities on the portal. An authenticated gateway or restricted management network can enforce device and identity requirements before routing the session. Administrators should document a safe recovery path so isolation does not prevent emergency management. This is one of the two required measures because the current unnecessary public reachability is an explicit risk factor. A network restriction does not by itself prove the user's identity, so it pairs effectively with strong multifactor verification at the privileged login.
B:Phishing-resistant MFA reduces the chance that a stolen or guessed password can be used to log in as an administrator. Hardware-backed authenticators or comparable origin-bound methods can resist common relay and credential-capture attacks better than passwords alone. The portal must correctly enforce the factor for privileged identities, recovery and break-glass flows, and administrative APIs. This is the second required measure because the stem explicitly identifies single-factor password authentication. MFA does not eliminate every risk of a public management interface, so pairing it with restricted reachability provides defense in depth across both authentication and network exposure.
Incorrect Answers
C:More public addresses may provide some resilience for a management endpoint, but they also retain or expand its exposure to external probing. The problem asks for fewer unauthorized access opportunities, not additional publicly reachable entry points. Availability should be designed through a secure administrative architecture, such as resilient gated access paths, rather than exposing the same password-only portal on more Internet interfaces. This option does not meet either identified security need.
D:Shared privileged identities remove individual attribution and concentrate access risk in one credential that many people know. Even if the password were complex, its distribution would make compromise and misuse harder to trace. The better design is named accounts with least privilege and strong authentication, possibly mediated by a privileged access system. Replacing individuals with a shared account worsens accountability and does not reduce public reachability.
Question 125
A vendor publishes a validated security patch for an actively scanned Internet-facing application component. The administrator has tested the patch in staging and prepared a verified rollback plan. Which mitigation should the organization prioritize?
- Ignore exposure urgency and wait for an arbitrary routine maintenance date
- Use an intrusion-prevention signature as a permanent substitute for the available fix
- Deploy the supported patch through an approved risk-based change window
- Restrict administrator logins only while leaving the vulnerable public service untouched
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A validated vendor patch directly removes or reduces the known software weakness that attackers can reach. Since staging tests and rollback preparation have already been completed, the organization should coordinate prompt production deployment using a window proportionate to exploit risk and service impact. Predeployment backups, documented ownership, monitoring, and post-patch verification reduce operational uncertainty. Interim access restrictions may remain useful until rollout is finished. The key distinction is addressing the vulnerable component itself instead of only adding compensating sensors or making an unrelated administrator-login change. Timely patching is central to vulnerability mitigation when a trustworthy remedy is available.
Incorrect Answers
A:Routine maintenance schedules help coordinate changes, but an Internet-facing exploitable component may require faster treatment based on severity, exploitability, and business exposure. Ignoring that urgency could leave a known weakness available to attackers while a tested correction exists. The organization should assess the risk and authorize a suitable deployment window rather than use the calendar alone as its security decision.
B:IPS rules or virtual patching can reduce exploit attempts and buy time when a vendor fix is unavailable or cannot yet be deployed. They may miss novel payloads, be bypassed, or disrupt legitimate requests. With a supported, validated patch and rollback ready, detection or blocking signatures should complement rather than indefinitely replace remediation. The underlying vulnerable code would otherwise remain on the public service.
D:Hardening administrator access is good practice, but it does not necessarily stop exploitation of an unauthenticated vulnerability in a public application endpoint. The stem points to remotely exploitable code reached over the Internet, not merely a weak administrative login. A prompt supported patch addresses that exposed defect more directly. Management-plane restrictions can supplement the fix, but cannot be assumed to cover every public attack path.
Question 126
Visitor-facing reception kiosks already use an enforced allowlist based on trusted software publishers. The same publisher also signs diagnostic tools that visitors have no reason to run, and some of those tools can be downloaded through the approved browser. IT must keep approved kiosk applications and their signed updates working while preventing the unapproved tools from launching. What policy design best meets this requirement?
- Trust every executable signed by any publisher already allowed on the kiosk, including diagnostic tools
- Limit enforcement rules to approved application identities and verified update paths, with centrally reviewed narrow exceptions
- Use malware reputation scanning on downloaded tools while leaving all publisher-signed software eligible to execute
- Switch to audit-only allowlisting so the team can investigate nonapproved application launches later
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A curated executable allowlist can distinguish the kiosk applications from other tools signed by the same publisher. Enforcement rules should identify the intended executable, valid signed update mechanism, and protected installation path, using file hashes or maintainable publisher/product attributes where suitable. Unapproved diagnostics should remain blocked even though their signature verifies. A narrow, recorded exception workflow lets authorized maintainers add legitimate dependencies without allowing arbitrary downloads to run. This is more specific than simply enabling allowlisting: the policy must account for publisher scope, safe updates, and visitor access. Regular audit review can identify rule errors while keeping preventive execution decisions active.
Incorrect Answers
A:A trusted publisher signature helps establish who signed a file, but authorizing everything that publisher signs can inadvertently authorize unrelated maintenance and diagnostic tools. The kiosk's legitimate business tasks do not require those programs, and a visitor may intentionally download them. A publisher-wide rule is easier to manage but does not implement the requested restriction to approved application identities. Tighter, tested allowlist conditions and controlled software-update identities are therefore necessary rather than treating signature validity as blanket permission to execute.
C:Malware reputation scanning may identify known malicious or suspicious downloads and should complement the kiosk's controls. It can also miss harmless but unauthorized diagnostic software, because that software need not contain malware. In the scenario the problem is that a broadly trusted publisher signs more tools than the kiosk is allowed to run. Scanning alone cannot limit authorized software to the short approved business list; it targets maliciousness rather than whether a particular program is needed for the kiosk role.
D:Audit-only allowlisting records a program launch or attempted launch without preventing the program from starting. It can help build a safe inventory during rollout and reveal which update binaries require approval. Here, however, the kiosks already run in enforcement mode and visitors can deliberately retrieve unwanted tools. Switching to audit-only mode would convert a preventive gate into retrospective evidence, leaving the unwanted signed tools executable while an analyst reviews logs. The required outcome must be enforced at launch time.
Question 127
Several corporate laptops repeatedly resolve known command-and-control hostnames. The hosts' IP addresses rotate often. The SOC wants to stop future connections based on those names and retain an audit trail of attempted lookups. Which control fits best?
- Block only the IP addresses observed in one DNS response at the firewall
- Apply protective DNS response-policy blocking or sinkholing with query logs for the verified domains
- Observe DNS traffic in alert-only mode without changing responses
- Enable browser reputation warnings for dangerous websites while retaining normal DNS answers and no central query logging
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A protective resolver can apply a response policy to verified malicious hostnames so managed clients do not receive usable command-and-control answers, while recording the originating device, queried name, and time. Sinkholing can also direct attempts to controlled monitoring infrastructure where appropriate, making residual infection behavior visible. The rules should be specific and reviewed because broad wildcard blocking can disrupt legitimate services or drive malware toward alternative resolvers. Endpoint configuration must actually enforce use of the managed resolver, and responders should still isolate compromised hosts. The key technical advantage is acting on domain identifiers despite rotating IPs, with retained query telemetry for attribution and incident analysis.
Incorrect Answers
A:A firewall block for the addresses returned at one moment may miss later command-and-control servers as the malicious domains rotate their IP mappings. It can still be useful as a short-lived supplemental containment measure, but does not reliably follow the hostile identifiers across address changes. The requirement explicitly targets hostname-based resolution while preserving evidence, which makes a managed DNS policy more suitable than a static snapshot of IPs.
C:Alert-only monitoring may show that laptops continue to query hostile domains, but it does not interrupt resolution or the subsequent connection. The SOC asks for both prevention and evidence. Passive detection meets only the latter requirement and leaves the active command-and-control path intact. Detection can accompany response-policy enforcement, but cannot replace it in this case.
D:Browser reputation services can warn users before they visit a known malicious page, which can reduce some phishing and drive-by download risks. Command-and-control programs may resolve hostnames independently of the browser and never display a warning to the user. The SOC needs enforcement at the managed DNS resolver plus recorded lookups for each endpoint. Browser warnings alone do not block all name resolution or preserve the requested DNS audit evidence, especially when malicious IP addresses change frequently.
Question 128
An employee laptop containing confidential client documents is stolen. Investigators believe the thief could remove the internal SSD and attach it to another computer to inspect stored files. Which safeguard most directly protects the data at rest?
- Require a biometric Windows sign-in and strong screen lock but leave the SSD unencrypted
- A policy reminding employees not to leave laptops unattended
- Use a mandatory encrypted VPN for all laptop network sessions without encrypting the internal drive
- Full-disk encryption with appropriately protected unlock and recovery keys
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Full-disk encryption protects the laptop's stored blocks so a thief who removes the SSD cannot readily read the contents without the required cryptographic material. The protection depends on appropriate key storage, authentication configuration, and device state; a laptop stolen while unlocked may present different risks from one powered off and securely locked. Recovery keys should be escrowed under controlled access so authorized restoration remains possible without exposing them broadly. Remote wipe can complement encryption when the device reconnects, but it cannot be counted on against an offline thief. This directly addresses the specified physical-media attack path and confidentiality objective.
Incorrect Answers
A:Biometric sign-in and an enforced screen lock can prevent casual misuse of a powered-on or stolen laptop through its normal operating system interface. They do not protect raw storage if an attacker removes an unencrypted SSD and reads it from another device. The question explicitly assumes that physical removal path. Full-disk encryption with appropriately protected recovery material addresses the contents independently of normal login controls, whereas a lock screen relies on the installed operating system continuing to mediate storage access.
B:Security-awareness policy can reduce theft risk by encouraging employees to watch devices and report losses quickly. However, the laptop has already been stolen, and a policy cannot make its unencrypted files unreadable. A preventive behavioral control is helpful before loss, while cryptographic storage protection limits disclosure after the thief obtains the hardware. The safeguards serve different stages of risk.
C:A corporate VPN can protect network traffic between a laptop and an approved gateway, and may be a required control for mobile workers. It does nothing to encrypt files already written on a stolen SSD when the thief removes that drive and reads it offline. The relevant data state is at rest, with the operating system and network protections bypassed. Drive encryption with key protection is the direct safeguard; secure transport is complementary when the employee transmits documents over a network.
Question 129
Security staff notice unusual outbound DNS queries from several laptops. Responders need to connect each query to an endpoint, user, and EDR event at approximately the same time. Which logging design best supports that investigation?
- Store only per-subnet DNS counts and inspect them after the next shift
- Centralize time-synchronized DNS, identity, and endpoint events with source attribution
- Capture a few gateway packets without knowing which internal client generated them
- Save only successful DNS answers while discarding query timestamps
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Centralized logs from DNS resolvers, endpoints, identity services, and relevant network devices can be correlated when timestamps are synchronized and source identifiers are preserved. For each suspicious hostname, responders should be able to trace a query to a client address or device identity, map that to an authenticated user when appropriate, and compare nearby EDR process or network events. Time synchronization, reliable ingestion, retention, and privacy controls all affect investigative usefulness. The goal is not merely collecting more bytes but preserving relationships that allow an analyst to reconstruct the origin and context of an attempted connection. This directly addresses the requirement for per-query attribution and incident correlation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Aggregate DNS counts can identify trends, but they usually lose the device and user context needed to determine which laptop made a specific suspicious request. Delayed shift reviews may also miss time-sensitive incident response opportunities. The question requires precise attribution and correlation with EDR activity, so coarse network totals are insufficient as the principal evidence source.
C:Gateway packet sampling may show some suspicious domains, but NAT, sampling gaps, and absence of endpoint identity mapping can make attribution to a particular laptop impossible. It also may not capture the process that issued the query. Packet collection can complement centralized telemetry, but it is not sufficient alone when the investigation specifically needs to tie DNS behavior to users and EDR events.
D:Retaining only successful answers discards failed or blocked lookups that can reveal attempted command-and-control contact. Removing timestamps prevents accurate correlation with endpoint alerts or authentication events. The question asks for a timeline and source mapping, so preserving query records with time and device context is necessary. Such selective logging would undermine rather than support attribution.
Question 130
A storage device that held confidential customer records has been decommissioned and will leave company custody. Staff propose a quick directory deletion and then donation to a recycler. Which disposal method provides defensible residual-data protection?
- Remove filesystem directory entries and assume deleted records are unrecoverable
- Perform a quick filesystem format and rely on the empty directory listing as proof that data was purged
- Overwrite only the visible existing files while ignoring unallocated, spare and reallocated media areas
- Perform media-appropriate sanitization or verified destruction with a documented record
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Media sanitization uses a method suited to the storage technology and its sensitivity, such as supported secure erase or cryptographic erase with validated key handling, or physical destruction where reuse is inappropriate. Solid-state drives and magnetic disks may require different procedures because of remapping and internal controller behavior. The organization should verify completion, protect custody during transport, and retain disposal certificates or equivalent evidence linked to the asset. Merely deleting directories or renaming a volume does not reliably remove recoverable content. The goal is preventing a future owner or recycler from accessing prior customer data while maintaining accountability for how the media was retired.
Incorrect Answers
A:Deleting file names or directory entries often marks storage areas as available without erasing the underlying content. A recipient with forensic tools may still recover confidential fragments, depending on media and filesystem behavior. The question explicitly concerns transfer outside the organization, so mere logical deletion is not defensible residual-data treatment. Secure media sanitization addresses the physical persistence of stored information.
B:A quick format usually rebuilds filesystem metadata and can make a drive appear empty to ordinary users. It is not reliable sanitization of underlying sectors, flash translation layers, or remapped blocks containing previous customer data. Before the media leaves custody, the team needs a method appropriate to that technology and sensitivity, followed by verification and custody records. Formatting may be part of an approved disposal process but is not, by itself, proof that recovery is infeasible to the required level of effort.
C:Overwriting current file contents can reduce some recoverability, particularly on media where the tool reaches the actual locations holding those bytes. It may leave deleted files, remapped sectors, SSD overprovisioning, snapshots, or controller-managed copies outside the overwrite scope. The departing storage device held confidential records, so partial visible-file treatment does not meet a defensible residual-data protection requirement. A documented media-specific sanitization or destruction approach with verification addresses the full device and its relevant exposure model.