CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 12
Question 110
Following a reboot, an unsigned driver reinstalls privileged hooks that hide malicious processes from common management tools. Ordinary users cannot see the persistence mechanism. Which category best describes the attacker's capability?
- Rootkit-like stealth and persistence at an elevated layer
- Ordinary user-level startup persistence through a registered login task that remains visible to process tools
- Process-name masquerading by a user-mode executable without hiding kernel-visible process records
- An encrypted mail attachment that has not yet arrived
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Rootkit techniques conceal unauthorized components by manipulating privileged interfaces, system views, or low-level hooks. The driver described here persists after reboot and hides processes from common tools, both consistent with stealth functionality intended to protect an intruder's foothold. Detecting such behavior may require trusted offline analysis, kernel telemetry, integrity measurements, and comparison against known-good system state because compromised tools may present misleading views. A rootkit is primarily defined by concealment and privilege, not necessarily a particular propagation method. Responders should avoid assuming that a clean ordinary process list proves the host is safe when the mechanism can influence those observations.
Incorrect Answers
B:An attacker may keep malware running after reboot by placing a user-mode task in a login autostart location. That is genuine persistence, so it competes with the rootkit diagnosis. It does not, by itself, install an unsigned privileged driver or hide running processes from ordinary management utilities. The telemetry shows elevated hooks that selectively conceal malicious processes after restart. Those stealth functions at a privileged layer are the distinguishing rootkit-like capability, not merely whether the malware launches automatically.
C:Process masquerading uses a plausible filename or icon to make malicious activity look routine in process lists. It is a real stealth tactic, but name deception alone does not alter the operating system's privileged process-enumeration behavior. The question describes a driver reinstalling privileged hooks and hiding processes from standard tools. That points to a rootkit-like mechanism operating at a deeper layer. Analysts should compare trusted offline or protected telemetry with ordinary user-mode process listings before assuming a name change explains the missing entries.
D:An encrypted email attachment awaiting delivery is a potential future payload, not an installed driver already executing after reboot. The described malware is active on the host and affecting process visibility. Its behavior is not defined by message transport or attachment protection. The relevant category is stealthy privileged persistence rather than a dormant inbound file.
Question 111
A public service is flooded with DNS responses from thousands of open resolvers it never queried. Packet analysis shows an attacker sent small DNS requests to those resolvers while spoofing the service's IP as the source. Which DDoS mechanism does this represent?
- Reflected amplification using intermediary DNS servers
- A direct application-layer flood sent by compromised clients without spoofed victims or DNS reflectors
- A TCP SYN flood that exhausts connection state without relying on DNS response amplification
- An approved security patch that temporarily restarts the service
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:In a reflected amplification attack, the adversary spoofs the victim's source address when sending small requests to third-party servers. Those servers send responses to the victim, and suitably chosen request types can cause substantially larger responses than the initiating packets. Many reflectors combine their traffic into a denial-of-service flood while obscuring the attacker's direct network source. Network operators can use source-address validation, rate limits, and protective DDoS services, while resolver operators should avoid unsafe open recursion or amplification configurations. The evidence specifically identifies forged-source DNS requests and unwanted replies from intermediaries, not a normal direct upload.
Incorrect Answers
B:A direct HTTP or application-layer distributed flood can overwhelm a public service with traffic from many attacker-controlled machines. It would show the senders themselves connecting to the target rather than replies from third-party resolvers. Here small DNS requests have the victim's address forged as their source, and numerous external DNS servers send larger unsolicited responses to the target. That reflection path, combined with possible response amplification, distinguishes the observed DDoS mechanism from a direct botnet request flood.
C:A SYN flood is another plausible denial-of-service mechanism; numerous uncompleted connection attempts can consume server or intermediary connection resources. It would be reflected in TCP handshake patterns, not unsolicited DNS answers arriving from thousands of open resolvers. The trace also shows small spoofed DNS queries triggering larger downstream replies. Those request-response relationships identify reflection and amplification. An incident team may block or rate-limit both types, but should classify the attack from the protocols and traffic direction actually observed.
D:A maintenance patch may temporarily make a service unavailable, but it is a documented operational event rather than a flood of unsolicited DNS traffic. The captures show an external attack mechanism exploiting address spoofing and resolver response behavior. Restart schedules and patch records would not account for thousands of unrelated servers sending DNS responses to a nonrequesting victim.
Question 112
Customers enter the correct online banking hostname, but some are directed to a fake login server because a caching resolver has begun returning forged address records. Which attack mechanism should investigators prioritize?
- Typosquatting using a separately registered look-alike hostname that victims typed incorrectly
- BGP route hijacking that diverts packets while authoritative and cached DNS addresses remain correct
- Poisoning or malicious alteration of DNS resolution results
- A legitimate health check sent by an application load balancer
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:DNS poisoning occurs when false address information enters a resolver or cache, causing legitimate domain requests to resolve to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Users can type the right banking name and still reach a fraudulent destination if the resolver returns malicious records. Analysts should compare answers from authoritative and affected resolvers, inspect cache changes and validation, and look for the source of the forged data. DNSSEC validation and secure resolver operation can help where deployed, but clients must also validate TLS identities rather than trusting DNS alone. The decisive evidence is that incorrect address records are being supplied for the legitimate hostname, not that the user mistyped a phishing domain.
Incorrect Answers
A:Typosquatting routes victims to an attacker-controlled site by exploiting a mistyped or visually deceptive domain name. It can lead to fake banking login pages, so the result is superficially similar to this incident. The customers here enter the correct banking hostname; the fraudulent destination comes from altered cached resolver records for that real name. No typo or substitute registered hostname is needed. That evidence identifies DNS answer poisoning rather than deception through a look-alike domain registration.
B:BGP hijacking can steer traffic toward an unexpected autonomous system even when domain resolution returns the legitimate IP address. It is a genuine routing-layer concern and could also facilitate interception. The scenario specifies a narrower observation: a caching resolver returns forged address records for the correct banking hostname. That manipulation occurs before network routing, in the DNS resolution result itself. BGP path analysis may be useful if independent route anomalies appear, but it is not the mechanism established by these resolver records.
D:A load balancer may check application health and route traffic among approved backend services. The stem identifies false DNS records directing customers to an unauthorized login server, not a normal availability check within the bank's trusted deployment. Healthy application probes do not justify unverified resolver changes. The DNS trust path must be investigated rather than treating the redirect as routine routing.
Question 113
A threat actor records a network authentication exchange and later resubmits the captured authentication material to the same service. The service accepts the resubmission as a new authenticated session despite the earlier exchange having finished, and logs show no broad password-guessing activity. Which attack technique is most plausible?
- Password spraying a few weak passwords across many users
- Replay of captured authentication material accepted without adequate freshness protection
- Live credential relay that forwards a fresh authentication challenge to the legitimate server in real time
- Brute-force guessing of the same account's password
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A replay attack reuses a valid authentication message, response, or token in a later context to gain access. The attacker has captured material and resubmits it rather than discovering the user's password through trial and error. Protocols can resist replay by enforcing one-time challenges, sequence numbers, timestamps with appropriate windows, channel binding, or token-use restrictions. The exact weakness depends on the captured format; some securely designed exchanges cannot be replayed successfully even when observed. The scenario states the material is accepted, so insufficient freshness validation is the key mechanism. This differs from password spraying or a typo-domain lure because the attacker exploits reuse of existing authentication proof.
Incorrect Answers
A:Password spraying uses active login guesses distributed over many accounts to reduce per-user attempt volume. This case describes reusing captured material from a specific earlier exchange instead of sending candidate passwords. The defender should examine whether the protocol binds authentication responses to fresh nonces, timestamps, and intended peers. Guessing-based patterns would produce different log and network evidence.
C:An adversary-in-the-middle relay forwards an active challenge or response during a current authentication exchange, potentially acting as the user's intermediary. That can compromise some protocols without separately guessing passwords. This scenario instead says the attacker records an exchange and reuses the material later, after the original authentication sequence has finished. The time-separated reuse makes replay the more precise term. Both attack types depend on protocol properties, but live forwarding and delayed resubmission require different incident evidence and controls.
D:Brute-force guessing attempts different candidate passwords against one identity until a guess works. In this case the actor reuses captured authentication material and does not submit thousands of guesses. Password complexity could remain strong while a replay-vulnerable protocol accepts a previously observed response. Prevention therefore requires freshness and session controls rather than only improving password strength.
Question 114
Multiple employees join what appears to be their office Wi-Fi SSID. Soon afterward, the login gateway's certificate changes unexpectedly, and a newly discovered unauthorized AP is relaying connections between users and the network. What attack position is plausible?
- An on-path wireless interception arrangement using a rogue intermediary
- Ordinary Wi-Fi roaming between authorized access points that preserve the gateway certificate and configured trust
- Local DNS cache poisoning that sends browser requests to a false server without creating a rogue wireless intermediary
- Deauthentication flooding that repeatedly disconnects stations but does not relay their traffic through a rogue access point
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:An unauthorized access point that impersonates a familiar SSID and relays user traffic can position an attacker between clients and their intended services. Unexpected gateway certificate changes further raise concern about interception or impersonation, although they require validation rather than automatic assumptions. Analysts should compare AP identifiers, wireless controller records, certificate chains, DNS behavior, and client associations while isolating the rogue infrastructure. Proper end-to-end TLS validation can block many interception attempts even if Wi-Fi association is deceived. The central clue is the intermediary controlling the network path, not merely that a wireless link exists. This is an on-path interception risk with possible evil-twin elements.
Incorrect Answers
B:Normal roaming moves a device between managed access points while maintaining the corporate wireless security and backend gateway identity. Changes in association records may therefore appear during legitimate movement. The case explicitly identifies an unauthorized radio impersonating the office SSID, forwarding traffic, and a changed gateway certificate that employees did not expect. Those facts are not explained by approved roaming alone. Analysts should verify wireless controller inventory and certificate continuity before treating the suspicious AP as harmless infrastructure.
C:A poisoned DNS cache can redirect users to a fake gateway or website and may lead to certificate warnings, making it a reasonable competing hypothesis. The stem contains additional radio evidence: an unauthorized access point is actively relaying client connections under the familiar SSID. DNS poisoning alone does not account for that wireless intermediary. Investigators should still examine DNS answers, but the attacker-controlled AP and relay behavior more directly support an on-path wireless position that may include evil-twin impersonation.
D:Forged wireless deauthentication frames can force clients off a network and cause repeated reconnects, sometimes as a precursor to an evil-twin attack. A simple disconnect flood is a plausible Wi-Fi threat but does not by itself explain the newly observed AP that forwards users' communications or the unexpected gateway certificate. Those facts indicate a more developed interception position. Responders should investigate radio disruption if logged, yet the stated evidence concerns an active intermediary rather than only service interruption.
Question 115
Network traces show a client originally offered strong TLS cipher choices, but a middlebox altered negotiation messages so the session fell back to an obsolete weak mode. What type of attack should the SOC investigate?
- Credential reuse between unrelated application accounts
- A server administrator enabling legacy TLS cipher suites intentionally without manipulation of the client offer
- Cryptographic downgrade through manipulation of protocol negotiation
- A certificate misissuance or trust-store compromise that spoofs server identity without reducing negotiated cipher strength
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A downgrade attack attempts to force communicating peers to use an older or weaker protocol version, cipher, or security feature than they otherwise support. The evidence shows strong TLS offers being removed and a weak mode selected, which suggests an on-path party manipulated negotiation. Correctly designed handshakes authenticate negotiated parameters and clients should refuse unsafe versions or suites rather than silently fall back. Analysts should inspect both endpoints' supported configurations, middlebox behavior, and any permitted compatibility exceptions. The critical failure is reduced cryptographic protection caused by altered negotiation, not mere use of a certificate or an unrelated password problem. Security depends on what was actually negotiated, not only what endpoints initially offered.
Incorrect Answers
A:Credential reuse occurs when the same secret is accepted by different accounts or systems, allowing one exposure to affect multiple services. The traces show negotiation choices being stripped or altered, not an attacker trying shared passwords. Strong account practices are valuable, but they would not fix a protocol that accepts a weaker security mode after adversarial interference.
B:A legitimate configuration can permit obsolete TLS algorithms for compatibility, which is itself a serious security weakness. If the server and client freely negotiated such an option without third-party interference, the primary finding would be insecure protocol configuration. This trace records a middlebox altering negotiation messages that originally offered stronger choices. That active downgrade influence is the decisive malicious technique. Analysts should still harden both endpoint configurations because a safe client must refuse weakened handshakes rather than rely solely on an absence of attackers.
D:Improperly issued certificates or hostile trust anchors may help impersonate a service and intercept sessions, and should be investigated when certificate evidence changes. Such identity attacks do not necessarily strip strong algorithm offers or force a weaker protocol version. The present packet trace specifically shows negotiation parameters being modified before an obsolete mode is selected. A downgrade attack is therefore the direct explanation of the observed cryptographic weakening. Certificate validation remains essential, but it addresses a different trust property than negotiation integrity.
Question 116
A developer demonstrates two distinct software packages that have been specially constructed to produce the same output under a legacy hash algorithm. What cryptographic property has the demonstration defeated?
- First-preimage resistance, shown by recovering a chosen original package from only its digest
- Second-preimage resistance against a fixed, pre-existing package supplied by an independent verifier
- Resistance to a password-spraying attack against user accounts
- Collision resistance of the hash function
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Collision resistance is the property that finding two different inputs with the same cryptographic digest should be computationally infeasible for the intended security level. The constructed packages directly violate that expectation for the legacy algorithm. If a signer approves one package but another has the same digest, poorly designed verification can be subverted depending on the signature format and threat model. The demonstration does not imply that the hash can be reversed or that a private key was recovered. The proper response is to migrate integrity and signature workflows away from collision-weakened functions to suitable modern algorithms and verify how those digests are actually used.
Incorrect Answers
A:First-preimage resistance concerns the difficulty of finding any input that matches a specific digest when only that digest is given. The demonstration constructs two different packages with the same output; it does not show reconstruction of a hidden original package from a standalone hash value. That is a collision, which is a different security property. Weak collision resistance may threaten signature workflows, but analysts should not claim that the function has been inverted or that first-preimage attacks are practical from this evidence alone.
B:A second-preimage attack starts with a specific fixed message and seeks a different one producing the same digest. A collision demonstration may allow an attacker to choose both messages in advance instead, which is not the same problem. The stem only states that two specially constructed packages collide under a legacy algorithm; it does not identify a fixed trusted package selected independently before the attack. The demonstrated broken property is collision resistance, while a second-preimage claim needs stronger and different evidence.
C:Password spraying uses a small password set against many accounts and targets authentication weaknesses. Two files producing the same hash do not indicate login guessing or account enumeration. Hashes may be involved in password storage, but this scenario is about the collision property of a digest algorithm on arbitrary package content. The distinction is cryptographic integrity versus online credential attacks.
Question 117
A public web server receives requests containing repeated `../` components, URL-encoded separators, and attempts to retrieve configuration files outside its intended document root. What attack technique should defenders investigate?
- SQL injection through a query parameter that changes the meaning of a database statement
- Directory traversal through untrusted path components
- Operating-system command injection using shell metacharacters instead of traversing a filesystem path
- A normal encrypted-backup restore to local storage
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Directory traversal uses relative path components or equivalent encodings to escape a directory boundary that an application should enforce. Sequences such as `../` are characteristic attempts to reach parent directories, and the requested configuration files are outside the authorized web root. Robust defenses include canonicalizing paths safely, using allowlisted file identifiers or secure directory handles, and enforcing filesystem permissions so a web process cannot read sensitive locations. Encoding variations matter because naive string filters may miss equivalent paths. The presence of traversal syntax in logs signals an attempted technique, though successful disclosure must be established by response and server evidence rather than assumed from the request alone.
Incorrect Answers
A:SQL injection occurs when untrusted input alters a database query's syntax or semantics, often exposing records or changing authorization checks. It is a serious web application risk, so it is a reasonable competitor in an HTTP log investigation. The observed strings are parent-directory path components and encoded separators aimed at filesystem configuration files outside the web root. No database operation, SQL tokens, or backend query modification is described. Path normalization and directory-boundary enforcement are the more relevant defenses for this attempt.
C:Command injection happens when an application passes untrusted text into a shell or process invocation in a way that allows commands to be added or changed. Web requests can carry such payloads, but evidence would normally include command separators, shell expansion, or a vulnerable execution sink. This record shows relative path markers and attempts to read files outside a permitted directory. A directory traversal classification better matches the path syntax; shell execution has not been established by the supplied log entries.
D:A backup restore reads previously protected data and reconstructs files in an authorized target location under a recovery workflow. The suspicious HTTP requests are unsolicited attempts to read files outside the server's allowed directory. No authenticated recovery job or trusted backup repository appears. The requested files and traversal syntax indicate an attempted boundary escape rather than normal restoration.
Question 118
EDR records an unsigned executable launched from a user's Downloads folder. It opens a high-privilege handle to LSASS on a Windows endpoint and writes a memory dump to a temporary directory. Which activity should responders prioritize investigating?
- Password spraying against remote accounts via an identity-provider login page
- Theft of stored browser authentication cookies from the user profile rather than a dump of LSASS memory
- Potential extraction of credentials from the Windows authentication process
- Extraction of local password hashes from the SAM registry hive without reading live LSASS process memory
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:LSASS handles sensitive Windows authentication state, and unauthorized reading or dumping of its memory can expose credential material depending on system protections and configuration. The process's unusual launch location, unsigned status, privileged handle, and dump creation together justify investigating credential dumping. Responders should preserve relevant endpoint telemetry and file evidence, isolate the device if necessary, determine which identities may be affected, and consider credential revocation. Some approved troubleshooting or security tools legitimately access LSASS, so the exact executable and authorization should be confirmed before a final verdict. The immediate priority is the potential credential-access technique rather than a remote guessing campaign.
Incorrect Answers
A:Password spraying uses online login attempts against many usernames, often from a remote client. The reported process operates locally, obtains access to LSASS memory, and creates a dump file. That sequence is not itself a series of identity-provider password trials. A dumped credential might support later online abuse, but the immediate behavior to investigate is local memory access and credential collection.
B:Stealing browser cookies or OAuth tokens can let an attacker impersonate a logged-in user, and an unknown executable from Downloads could plausibly attempt this. Browser profile extraction does not normally require opening LSASS with high privilege or writing a dump of that process. The telemetry points to Windows authentication state in LSASS rather than a browser session store. Both techniques warrant containment, but the specific process handle and memory-dump target support potential credential dumping from the operating system's authentication subsystem.
D:The Windows Security Account Manager database can contain credential hashes and is another target for credential dumping. An attacker might copy protected registry hives for offline analysis instead of accessing a running LSASS process. Here EDR sees a privileged handle opened to LSASS and a memory dump written to disk. That is a different collection path from copying SAM registry files. Analysts should preserve process and file telemetry and not collapse all credential theft into the same memory target.
Question 119
Hundreds of failed sign-ins begin within minutes of a scheduled application rollout. Logs show an old service repeatedly using a cached password that was invalidated during the change. What is the best initial interpretation?
- Treat high failure volume as conclusive proof of an external brute-force attack
- Assume attackers deliberately reset the service account during deployment
- Disable identity audit logs to reduce the repeated-alert volume
- Investigate a stale automated credential or rollout misconfiguration before assigning hostile intent
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The rollout timing and repetitive attempts from a known decommissioned service point toward a stale secret or misconfigured automation. That is a plausible explanation, not an automatic acquittal of all activity. Responders should confirm the source process, account, change ticket, credential rotation history, and whether any unexpected hosts participated. Once verified, the team can update or retire the old job and reset thresholds to avoid repeated lockouts while keeping audit records. This distinction matters because legitimate configuration drift can mimic common attack indicators. Good triage weighs correlated context instead of equating any burst of failures with an external attacker.
Incorrect Answers
A:Repeated failures can indicate brute force, but an automation loop with an outdated saved password can produce a similar high-volume pattern. The timing immediately after deployment and the known service's cached secret provide a concrete benign failure hypothesis. Analysts should correlate source systems, attempted account names, scheduled jobs, and change records instead of treating frequency alone as proof of adversarial activity. Severity may still justify containment while evidence is gathered.
B:The service-account password may have changed under an approved rollout or credential rotation, and a dependent job may not have received the update. No evidence indicates an adversary initiated that change. Assuming hostile modification could misdirect response and delay restoration. The team should verify actual change records and the account's secret distribution path before deciding why automation is using an invalid password.
C:Disabling auditing would reduce noisy alerts but also destroy visibility at a time when unexpected authentication failures need explanation. If a real adversary were present, turning off logs could conceal their attempts. The proper response is to validate the service dependency, correct its credential use, and tune detections if justified without sacrificing essential evidence. Alert noise does not make monitoring expendable.
Question 120
A server's local audit log rotates unexpectedly several hours early, leaving a gap in recorded events. No approved logging change exists, but a disk-pressure alert occurred around the same time. What should an investigator do first?
- Declare deliberate log tampering solely because the rotation was early
- Rebuild the local index before making a preservation copy
- Correlate local and centralized logs, disk events, and relevant process activity
- Stop central forwarding so that the investigation generates no additional records
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A logging gap is an indicator requiring corroboration. The investigator should preserve remaining local files, examine disk utilization and rotation policy, identify processes or administrators that changed log settings, and compare the timeline with centrally forwarded records. If centralized logs continued uninterrupted, they may distinguish local storage failure from deliberate deletion; if forwarding also stopped, the scope of concern grows. The storage alert makes an operational cause plausible but not proven. Correlation allows investigators to characterize the anomaly accurately without destroying evidence or prematurely asserting tampering. This is an evidence-led response to suspicious logging behavior rather than a declaration based solely on one timestamp.
Incorrect Answers
A:Early rotation and missing intervals can indicate malicious log manipulation, but storage pressure or misconfiguration may cause the same symptoms. The problem includes a plausible operational explanation that must be tested. Naming tampering as confirmed before checking disk and process evidence would overstate what the timestamps prove. Preserve the anomaly and investigate independently rather than collapsing a suspicion into a verdict.
B:Rebuilding indexes or modifying a damaged log before preservation risks changing metadata and destroying evidence useful for forensic analysis. Responders should first secure copies of available logs and related artifacts under their evidence-handling procedures. Repair may later aid operational use, but an investigative first step should avoid altering the only local record of an unexplained gap. Central sources may provide an independent timeline.
D:Stopping central forwarding removes an independent evidence stream that might establish what happened during the local gap. It can also obscure subsequent activity while responders investigate. Additional logs may create volume, but that is a storage and filtering problem to manage without disabling security visibility. The organization should preserve centralized collection and use it as corroboration, not intentionally eliminate it.