AWS Certified Solutions Architect - Associate SAA-C03 Practice Test 35
Question 340
A Python service calls a sensitive vendor HTTPS API. After the vendor rotates certificates, a developer disables TLS certificate verification to make requests succeed. What should the architect require instead?
- Attach a wider VPC security group to the request-making instance so invalid server certificates become trusted.
- Turn off HTTPS and call the vendor's HTTP endpoint so no certificate error can occur.
- Encrypt the EC2 EBS volume and leave outbound HTTPS verification disabled permanently.
- Restore certificate-chain and hostname validation and repair the client trust store or hostname configuration as needed.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A verified TLS handshake protects endpoint authenticity. Disabling validation makes man-in-the-middle impersonation possible even when connections still appear encrypted.
Incorrect Answers
A:Network allow rules cannot establish a certificate chain of trust or correct a hostname mismatch in a TLS handshake.
B:Removing TLS eliminates channel encryption and authentication, worsening the problem rather than correcting certificate trust.
C:Encrypted storage does not authenticate a remote TLS peer or defend the live connection from active interception.
Question 341
An engineering team has an ACM certificate expiring and a customer-managed KMS encryption key scheduled for annual rotation. A manager claims rotating the KMS key will automatically renew the certificate on the website. How should the architect respond?
- Track TLS certificate renewal and KMS data-key rotation as separate lifecycles and verify each independently.
- Allow certificate expiration because KMS automatic rotation permanently validates all HTTPS client handshakes.
- Delete the KMS key immediately to force ACM to regenerate every public HTTPS certificate issued in the account.
- Change Route 53 record TTL from 60 to 300 seconds to reset both the certificate lifetime and key rotation schedule.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:TLS certificate validity controls endpoint identity while KMS key rotation governs protected cryptographic material for application data; rotating one does not extend the other's validity.
Incorrect Answers
B:KMS rotation has no effect on X.509 certificate expiration or public trust chains used by internet browsers.
C:Deleting an encryption key risks data availability and is unrelated to ACM public certificate renewal.
D:DNS caching behavior does not set cryptographic validity periods or manage either key lifecycle.
Question 342
A regulated signing service needs direct control of its hardware security modules, custom cryptographic operations and key custody beyond standard AWS-service encryption key integrations. Which AWS service is the better fit?
- Use CloudFront signed URLs as a replacement for all hardware key-custody and regulated signature requirements.
- Use AWS CloudHSM and integrate the signing application with supported HSM cryptographic APIs.
- Use AWS Shield Advanced to sign all application transactions with customer-generated HSM certificates.
- Use an S3 gateway endpoint, which provides customer-controlled hardware key generation and custom signing APIs.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:CloudHSM provides dedicated HSM infrastructure under the customer's operational and key-management control, suitable when bespoke crypto operations and direct custody are required.
Incorrect Answers
A:CloudFront signed URLs gate content requests and do not provide the requested dedicated HSM operational control.
C:Shield Advanced manages DDoS protections, not custom application cryptographic signing under user-managed HSM keys.
D:Gateway endpoints route private service traffic; they are not HSMs and cannot execute custom signing functions.
Question 343
An organization encrypts S3 objects, EBS volumes and RDS storage. Its security policy permits AWS-managed integration and centralized access auditing without operating its own HSM cluster. Which key service should be favored?
- Use Route 53 Resolver endpoints for all storage encryption requests because DNS directly replaces KMS authorization.
- Deploy CloudHSM solely because all AWS storage services automatically replace their KMS key choices with an arbitrary HSM key.
- Use AWS KMS keys with the supported S3, EBS and RDS service encryption integrations.
- Store plaintext encryption keys in a public S3 bucket to allow all three storage services to discover them.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:KMS provides integrated, policy-governed cryptographic key use for many AWS storage services while avoiding customer responsibility for CloudHSM cluster capacity and operations.
Incorrect Answers
A:Resolvers handle DNS queries and cannot issue or authorize encryption keys for managed storage services.
B:CloudHSM is not a transparent drop-in service-specific KMS key for every managed storage integration; extra application or architecture work is required.
D:Publishing secret keys is unsafe and unrelated to managed service-specific at-rest encryption integrations.
Question 344
An application built around AWS KMS Encrypt and Decrypt is being migrated to CloudHSM to satisfy custom cryptographic module requirements. An engineer expects to pass the CloudHSM key ID to the KMS API unchanged. What is the design correction?
- Replace every KMS API parameter with a VPC subnet ID because CloudHSM keys are selected by subnet.
- Enable CloudFront Origin Shield, which translates CloudHSM key operations to KMS requests transparently.
- Change the application security group to open all TCP ports and keep the original KMS calls unchanged.
- Plan an explicit application cryptography integration with CloudHSM-compatible clients and key handling rather than treating it as an interchangeable KMS key.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:CloudHSM offers customer-managed HSM operations through distinct interfaces. Existing KMS API and service-key integrations do not automatically accept arbitrary CloudHSM key identifiers.
Incorrect Answers
A:Subnets affect where client communication reaches the HSM service, not the cryptographic key identifier or API compatibility.
B:Origin Shield optimizes CDN fetches and has no function as a cryptography API protocol translator.
C:Network reachability alone does not implement the separate CloudHSM crypto integration and key management.
Question 345
A service adopts AWS CloudHSM for custom signing operations. The operations team plans a single HSM and assumes AWS will operate its application-side quorum, backup and cluster recovery just like the managed KMS service. What needs to change?
- Put the only HSM in an S3 bucket to let S3 automatically recreate its private keys after failure.
- Enable CloudWatch log retention only; log archives will replace an unavailable HSM for live signing requests.
- Design and operate a suitably redundant CloudHSM cluster and an application recovery process appropriate to the service objectives.
- Treat a single CloudHSM as highly available across all AZs automatically, without cluster design or client recovery.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:CloudHSM requires explicit customer-side management of cluster availability and application crypto integration. One device is an avoidable failure point for critical signing operations.
Incorrect Answers
A:HSMs are computing security modules, not files that can be moved to object storage to provide transparent recovery.
B:Logs are useful evidence but cannot perform crypto operations or provide HSM cluster failover capability.
D:HSM availability depends on actual cluster architecture and client behavior; a solitary member is not multi-AZ fault tolerance.
Question 346
A payments service runs active read APIs in two AWS Regions and has a central database credential stored in Secrets Manager in the primary Region. The application needs a locally accessible copy of this same credential in the second Region, encrypted using an approved customer-managed KMS key there. The primary rotation workflow should remain authoritative. What configuration meets these needs?
- Use Secrets Manager multi-Region secret replication to the secondary Region, select the supported replica-Region KMS key, authorize regional clients and allow the primary secret’s rotated value to propagate.
- Place the plaintext password in a shared S3 bucket and retrieve it from either Region, because S3 cross-Region replication automatically preserves Secrets Manager rotation metadata.
- Create a second unrelated secret with a manually maintained password and rotate both independent secrets on different schedules, assuming their values will remain identical.
- Configure a second-region AWS KMS alias that points directly at the primary Region KMS key and assume the secret content appears in Secrets Manager without replication.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Secrets Manager natively replicates encrypted secret values and metadata into selected Regions, with an optional KMS key in each replica Region. Rotation of the primary propagates the new value; clients still require appropriate regional permissions and should validate the replica status.
Incorrect Answers
B:Copying plaintext to S3 exposes credentials outside the dedicated secret lifecycle. S3 object replication does not implement Secrets Manager replication, rotation stages or encrypted replica-secret access.
C:Two separately managed secrets introduce drift and competing rotations. They do not preserve the requested single authoritative rotation lifecycle across the two Regions.
D:KMS aliases identify KMS keys in their own applicable scope; an alias alone neither replicates a Secrets Manager secret nor creates the secondary Region secret and its permissions.
Question 347
A custom AWS Secrets Manager Lambda rotation function has created a new RDS credential version labeled AWSPENDING, applied the new password to the database, and successfully tested it. Applications still fetch the old password because they request the default secret version. The rotation process has not run its final promotion step. Which action should the rotation implementation perform?
- Delete the entire secret so the application cannot retrieve a stale AWSCURRENT version.
- Rotate the KMS key protecting the secret and leave all secret version labels unchanged; KMS rotation promotes the pending database password.
- Ask each application to fetch AWSPENDING indefinitely, bypassing the stable current-version contract for normal secret consumers.
- Run the rotation finish step to move AWSCURRENT to the verified pending version, retaining the prior credential version as AWSPREVIOUS.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Secrets Manager returns AWSCURRENT by default. After the pending credential is tested, the finish step promotes it to AWSCURRENT and preserves the former current version as AWSPREVIOUS for controlled recovery.
Incorrect Answers
A:Deleting a secret disrupts access and discards the controlled version transition; the tested replacement value must be promoted, not the entire secret removed.
B:KMS key-material rotation protects encrypted data keys but does not change Secrets Manager staging labels or the default password version returned by GetSecretValue.
C:AWSPENDING identifies a version under rotation and is not the normal application retrieval contract. Leaving consumers pinned there can cause inconsistency and future rotation failures.
Question 348
A payments platform must let one named partner IAM role in another AWS account retrieve a sensitive API secret. A change proposal attaches a secret resource policy whose Principal is a wildcard. The security team needs a guard that rejects such broadly accessible secret policies while still permitting an explicitly named partner. What should the application deployment pipeline implement?
- Grant the external account access to an S3 access point and retain the wildcard Secrets Manager resource policy; the access point will govern secret reads.
- Use a narrowly scoped Secrets Manager resource policy for the partner role, and call PutResourcePolicy with BlockPublicPolicy enabled to reject overly broad access grants.
- Enable Secrets Manager automatic rotation but leave the wildcard principal in the resource policy; rotation prevents external retrieval.
- Add a Secrets Manager interface VPC endpoint only in the producer VPC and retain the wildcard principal, assuming endpoint connectivity changes cross-account resource authorization.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The resource policy must identify the intended external role, while BlockPublicPolicy asks Secrets Manager to reject broadly accessible grants at policy attachment. The partner also needs applicable IAM and key permissions.
Incorrect Answers
A:An S3 access point controls S3 resources and is not evaluated as authorization for a Secrets Manager secret. The wildcard secret resource policy would remain a separate exposure.
C:Rotating a secret changes its value but does not revoke a principal that the secret resource policy permits. A wildcard principal must be fixed independently of credential rotation.
D:An interface VPC endpoint provides a private API connectivity path, not a substitute for secret resource-policy principal restrictions. Authorized callers outside that VPC remain governed by IAM and the secret policy.
Question 349
A rotated database secret sometimes points to a credential that fails authentication. Operators propose deleting the previous valid secret version immediately, even while rotations are failing. What operational control is preferable?
- Monitor rotation failures and preserve a tested recovery path using appropriate secret-version stages and database credential checks.
- Assume Secrets Manager automatically repairs any malformed custom rotation function without monitoring.
- Delete all former secret versions before verifying the rotated database login works.
- Disable CloudWatch alarms so rotation errors stop appearing and do not interrupt users.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Rotation can fail between setting and verifying credentials; safe runbooks validate the target before promoting a new version and preserve recovery where policy permits.
Incorrect Answers
B:Custom rotation and target application integration still require validation, monitoring and a failure-recovery design.
C:Premature deletion discards recovery state and can extend an authentication outage when the new credential is invalid.
D:Hiding rotation errors does not repair mismatched target credentials and removes useful operational evidence.
Question 350
A catalog application stores confidential customer records in DynamoDB. Its owners want an AWS-managed table encryption mechanism using a customer-controlled KMS key with appropriate access governance. Which configuration addresses stored-table data?
- Enable HTTPS for API requests only and regard plaintext persisted table data as meeting the at-rest key requirement.
- Select DynamoDB server-side encryption with the permitted customer-managed AWS KMS key and authorize its use.
- Create a DynamoDB global secondary index and let it provide encryption key material for the base table.
- Put a NAT gateway in the DynamoDB request path so the gateway encrypts all stored records at rest.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:DynamoDB supports server-side encryption at rest, including an eligible customer-managed KMS key. Access to that key must be governed independently of application item permissions.
Incorrect Answers
A:TLS protects transit; it is not a customer-managed encryption key for the persisted DynamoDB table data.
C:A GSI supports alternate access paths, not cryptographic key management for at-rest encryption.
D:NAT gateways enable certain outbound IPv4 traffic and cannot configure DynamoDB table encryption or manage its data keys.