CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 35
Question 340
Before a new safeguard, a data-leakage risk has an estimated annualized loss expectancy (ALE) of $180,000. After installing the safeguard, estimated residual ALE is $45,000 per year. The control requires $30,000 annually to operate. Ignoring one-time implementation cost, what is the net annual financial benefit of the control?
- $180,000, because untreated ALE is the entire benefit regardless of control expense
- $135,000, because subtracting residual ALE is enough to produce the net benefit
- $105,000, because $180,000 minus $45,000 residual ALE minus $30,000 annual control cost equals the net benefit
- $75,000, because the residual ALE should be added to the control expense before subtracting the initial ALE twice
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The reduction in expected yearly loss is $180,000 minus $45,000, or $135,000. The organization must then account for the ongoing $30,000 annual control cost, leaving $105,000 net annual benefit under the simplified assumptions. This is an economic comparison, not proof that the control eliminates all breach risk: residual loss remains $45,000 per year in expectation. A complete business case may also consider implementation cost, uncertainty, nonfinancial impacts and compliance obligations. The question explicitly excludes one-time cost, so the calculation tests that recurring expense and residual exposure both affect the net benefit.
Incorrect Answers
A:Untreated ALE represents the expected annual loss without the safeguard, not the cash value automatically recovered after deploying it. Some expected loss remains and operating the control costs money. Treating the entire $180,000 as benefit ignores both material amounts in the scenario. The economic comparison needs baseline risk, residual risk and the recurring cost of the treatment.
B:Subtracting residual ALE from untreated ALE gives gross expected loss reduction, $135,000, before paying to operate the safeguard. The question asks for net annual benefit, so the $30,000 recurring cost cannot be omitted. This option would overstate the expected economic advantage even though its intermediate calculation is useful in the analysis.
D:The proposed $75,000 does not follow from the values using the correct net-benefit formula. Residual expected loss is subtracted once from the untreated baseline, then annual operating cost is also subtracted once. Double-counting residual exposure misstates the comparison. The analyst should retain clear definitions and units to avoid manipulating ALE figures inconsistently.
Question 341
An industrial control system has a low estimated annual likelihood of failure, but a single prolonged outage could endanger worker safety and halt a national fuel supply. A portfolio dashboard ranks the risk low because it mostly sorts by frequency. What should risk leadership do?
- Use average annual loss alone to classify this risk, leaving potential low-frequency catastrophic impact outside the decision
- Transfer only the modeled financial loss to an insurer and treat all remaining safety and continuity exposure as eliminated
- Keep the automated risk-matrix score unchanged and flag only high-frequency events for leadership review
- Assess catastrophic consequence, safety obligations and risk appetite explicitly rather than letting low frequency hide severe impact
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Risk prioritization must consider both likelihood and consequence, including impacts that are hard to express as expected dollars. A low-frequency fuel-supply disruption can carry unacceptable safety, regulatory or societal consequences. Leadership should use scenario analysis, worst credible impact, legal duties and defined risk appetite to select proportionate resilience or mitigation measures. Document uncertainty and escalation thresholds so the dashboard does not bury catastrophic exposures behind more frequent minor incidents. A quantitative average can inform decisions, but it should not be the only metric when the potential outcome exceeds organizational tolerance or affects human safety.
Incorrect Answers
A:Average annual loss can help compare some financial exposures and may inform treatment budgets. It can nevertheless obscure severe tail events when an industrial failure could endanger people or disrupt essential fuel supply. The case explicitly identifies high-consequence safety obligations that cannot be resolved through a single frequency-weighted number. Risk leadership should consider credible worst-case scenarios and stated appetite alongside likelihood-based measurements before deciding whether mitigation is adequate.
B:Insurance can compensate certain covered monetary losses after an event, subject to exclusions and limits. It cannot directly eliminate worker injury risk, national supply disruption or reputational consequences of a critical control-system failure. A policy may be part of financing residual risk, but the organization still has to analyze impact, legal obligations, safety controls and operational resilience. Automatically declaring the exposure resolved through financial transfer would misstate the residual consequences.
C:A standard heat-map score is useful for triage, and repeated failures can justifiably receive attention. However, treating frequency as the only escalation criterion would conceal a rare but plausible outage affecting worker safety and national fuel supply. Decision-makers need consequence-focused analysis and legally required safety thresholds in addition to frequency estimates. The existing score can remain a data point, but it cannot substitute for documented impact-driven review.
Question 342
An enterprise risk register records a cloud identity misconfiguration that could permit privileged access. The entry names no accountable decision-maker and uses 'security is better' as its only monitoring measure. Which improvement makes the entry actionable?
- Make the technician fixing the cloud IAM policy the risk owner, and use the closure of that one ticket as the only indicator.
- Assign an accountable risk owner and a measurable indicator such as count and age of excessive privileged entitlements
- Track overall identity-platform uptime as the risk indicator while leaving the privileged-access finding without a named owner.
- Assign the SOC analyst who monitors sign-in alerts as risk owner, using the number of alert tickets without privilege context as the metric.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A useful register entry identifies who is accountable for treatment and how exposure will be observed. The risk owner can approve mitigation plans within delegated authority, track deadlines and escalate residual exposure. A measurable key risk indicator might monitor excessive role assignments, stale privileged accounts, or time to remediate dangerous grants, with defined thresholds and reporting frequency. These measures directly reflect the cloud-identity scenario rather than vague improvement language. Periodic review can update the risk rating when controls or business context change. This creates a practical link between identified exposure, monitoring and governance decisions.
Incorrect Answers
A:A technician should own the assigned corrective task and record whether its configuration change succeeded. That does not make the technician accountable for accepting residual enterprise exposure, especially if privileged entitlements recur through other workflows. Ticket closure is also a single task result rather than a continuing risk indicator. The register needs an appropriately authorized decision owner and a measure that reveals whether excessive privileges remain or return.
C:Service uptime is a useful availability measure, and an identity provider could operate reliably while granting too many powerful roles. It does not track the specific risk that a misconfiguration permits privileged access. Without an accountable owner, an unfavorable metric also lacks an authorized person to decide treatment or acceptance. A count and age of inappropriate elevated grants would be more informative for this exposure.
D:SOC analysts can detect suspicious sign-ins and provide investigative evidence. Their alert triage responsibility does not necessarily include authority to accept identity-system risk on the organization’s behalf. Raw ticket volume also fluctuates with detection rules and benign login behavior, and may miss standing privileged permissions. A risk owner and measure tied to excess entitlements are needed even when SOC monitoring is effective.
Question 343
A hospital cannot install the mandated EDR agent on a legacy imaging device for eight months. The engineering team has isolated the device on a restricted network and provided evidence of monitoring, but the risk assessment still rates the residual exposure above the hospital's normal acceptance threshold. The team wants to mark the device compliant automatically because those compensating measures exist. Which risk-management decision should occur?
- Consider the isolated network proof that the residual risk is zero and close the register entry without review
- Ask the device operator to accept the organization's residual cybersecurity risk merely because it is essential for clinical care
- Defer any formal exception decision until the next routine audit because the engineering team has already implemented partial compensating controls
- Escalate the measured residual exposure to the accountable risk owner for an explicit, time-limited treatment or acceptance decision with follow-up evidence
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Because the assessed residual exposure remains above the normal acceptance threshold, the accountable risk owner must evaluate whether the business can tolerate that risk, require additional treatment, limit use or approve a defined temporary exception through the authorized process. Present the device's criticality, likely threat paths, segmentation and monitoring evidence, known gaps, replacement date and review triggers. Document the decision and monitor the agreed key risk indicators until the agent or supported replacement becomes available. This tests escalation of residual risk and accountable acceptance when compensating controls do not demonstrably reduce exposure below appetite. The presence of an exception form alone is insufficient if the wrong person accepts unmeasured risk.
Incorrect Answers
A:Network isolation can materially reduce paths to a vulnerable device, but it does not eliminate local access, misuse by trusted administrators or weaknesses in the remaining management interfaces. The question already states that assessed residual risk exceeds the normal threshold. An engineer cannot infer zero risk solely from one compensating control or erase a recorded exposure without an accountable decision. Validate the measures and present their limitations to the risk owner rather than converting a reduction into an unsupported claim of full compliance.
B:Clinical necessity strongly affects the business impact of taking the device offline, and operational staff should contribute evidence about safety and availability. It does not automatically give the device operator organizational authority to accept cyber risk on behalf of patients and business owners. The risk owner or formally delegated decision authority must understand likely consequences, compensating-control effectiveness and the replacement timetable before choosing how to proceed. A device user's operational responsibility is not a substitute for enterprise risk governance.
C:Network isolation and monitoring can reduce exposure while a legacy imaging device remains unsupported by mandated EDR, but the scenario explicitly states that residual risk still exceeds normal tolerance. Leaving the risk unapproved until a scheduled audit would amount to silent acceptance without proper authority or monitoring triggers. The accountable risk owner must consider additional treatment, restricted use or a time-limited exception now. The control evidence informs that decision; it does not remove the need for one.
Question 344
A holding company owns a startup investment arm that accepts uncertain high-growth ventures and a regulated utility subsidiary that prioritizes service safety and predictability. Both business units present comparable cybersecurity risks. What should the risk committee consider before deciding treatment thresholds?
- The enterprise's differentiated, documented risk appetite and tolerance for each business activity, bounded by mandatory safety and legal duties
- One identical high-risk threshold for both units because they have the same parent organization
- Treat the investment arm’s high-risk appetite as permission to waive mandatory privacy or safety baselines for every new venture
- The number of open help-desk tickets as the only measure of acceptable enterprise risk
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Risk appetite expresses how much uncertainty leadership is willing to pursue to achieve objectives, while tolerance defines acceptable variation around those objectives. Different business models may justify different thresholds, provided neither can disregard mandatory legal, safety or contractual requirements. The committee should document acceptable exposure for growth-oriented ventures versus essential regulated services, approve escalation boundaries and review decisions as conditions change. The same technical vulnerability can have very different consequences depending on criticality and business context. This approach respects the organization's strategic choices without mistaking appetite for a license to ignore baseline controls or external obligations.
Incorrect Answers
B:A uniform threshold may appear simple but can ignore the fundamentally different consequences of a utility outage and a speculative investment loss. Common minimum security requirements can still apply to both units, while treatment and escalation limits reflect their objectives. The question explicitly describes different tolerance for uncertainty, so treating them as identical may distort prioritization.
C:A growth business may accept greater uncertainty to pursue returns, but appetite is bounded by legal obligations, contractual commitments and required enterprise controls. Leadership should differentiate treatment thresholds based on business purpose and consequence without discarding baseline duties. A high appetite is not a standing waiver for any exposure. The regulated utility’s potentially catastrophic service impacts reinforce why documented, business-specific tolerance and escalation rules must remain explicit.
D:Help-desk volume can reveal support demand, but it does not measure potential impact of a safety event, data breach or financial loss. The metric is not calibrated to risk tolerance for either unit. Leadership needs business impact, likelihood and external obligations to set meaningful thresholds. Ticket counts may supplement operational monitoring but are insufficient as the sole risk-appetite measure.
Question 345
A retail app team proposes a customer-location tracking feature. The feature is optional, contributes no significant revenue and would introduce sensitive data handling and third-party sharing risks. Leadership decides not to build or operate it at all. Which risk response is this?
- Risk mitigation by applying controls to the location feature after launch
- Risk avoidance by eliminating the activity that would create the identified exposure
- Risk transfer through a future insurance policy covering location data breaches
- Risk acceptance by acknowledging the exposure and continuing location collection
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Risk avoidance removes the source of exposure by declining an activity, feature or business practice. In this case, leaders choose not to collect and share location information at all, so the specific risks arising from that proposed capability do not materialize. The decision may sacrifice some potential feature value, but the stem states that its business benefit is negligible. Documenting the decision and checking for related hidden data collection helps ensure the avoided activity is truly absent. Avoidance differs from reducing a feature's risk with controls or accepting its remaining exposure after launch.
Incorrect Answers
A:Mitigation lowers the likelihood or impact of an activity that continues, such as minimizing location data, encrypting it or restricting third-party access. The company instead declines to implement the feature. No new location collection exists to mitigate in the described decision. Controls on other application data remain relevant but do not change the treatment category for this specific proposed functionality.
C:Insurance or contractual allocation might shift some financial consequences after a location-data incident, but it would not prevent collection or exposure if the feature were built. No transfer arrangement is described, and leadership explicitly removes the proposed activity. The response is avoidance, not allocating its residual costs to another party.
D:Acceptance requires proceeding with an exposure while deliberately tolerating residual risk under authorized governance. Here leadership refuses to create the new exposure because the business value is low. There is no continuing location-tracking risk to accept from this feature. Recording why the idea was rejected makes the distinction clearer than a generic acknowledgment of privacy concerns.
Question 346
A regional company cannot fully prevent storm damage to a warehouse despite physical protections. It purchases a commercial policy that will reimburse covered building and equipment losses, while its own team remains responsible for continuity of shipments. Which risk response is illustrated?
- Risk avoidance because all warehouse operations stop when insurance is issued
- Risk acceptance because the company does not expect any payout
- Risk transfer of specified financial consequences through insurance while operational exposure remains
- Risk elimination because an insurer prevents the damaging storm from occurring
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Insurance can transfer or share specified financial loss with an insurer under contractual terms. Here property damage may be reimbursed up to limits and after deductibles, but the storm can still disrupt the warehouse and customer shipments. The company must retain continuity, safety and operational recovery responsibilities and understand exclusions. A sound risk response records which financial impacts are insured, which residual costs remain and who manages response activities. The distinction matters because transferring monetary consequences does not reduce the probability of the weather event or guarantee uninterrupted service. Other controls and contingency plans may still be necessary.
Incorrect Answers
A:Avoidance would require discontinuing or not undertaking the exposed warehouse activity. The company continues using the facility and only arranges compensation for certain losses. This does not remove the warehouse from the storm path. A separate decision to move operations entirely out of the exposed location could be avoidance, but that action is not described here.
B:Acceptance is an explicit decision to retain risk, often after evaluating residual exposure. The insurer's contractual payment commitment changes who bears certain financial costs, making transfer the primary response. The company still accepts some operational and deductible exposure, but that does not erase the transfer mechanism. A single treatment can leave residual risk without being classified entirely as acceptance.
D:An insurance contract cannot change storm frequency or stop physical damage. It may fund recovery after an event, subject to policy conditions, but preventive controls and continuity planning remain necessary. The answer incorrectly treats financial reimbursement as elimination of the hazard. The question distinguishes monetary consequences from service interruption, making that limitation central.
Question 347
A security team documents a low-impact finding affecting a noncritical internal dashboard. Remediation would cost far more than the reasonably estimated loss, and compensating network restrictions are already effective. The authorized business risk owner signs a dated decision to retain the remaining exposure. Which treatment was selected?
- Formal risk acceptance with accountable approval and periodic review of residual exposure
- Risk avoidance by retiring the dashboard immediately
- Risk transfer because the owner signed a decision record
- Classify the existing network restrictions as sufficient mitigation without recording a separate decision about the remaining exposure
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Risk acceptance is a conscious, authorized decision to retain a defined level of exposure after understanding its likelihood, impact and current safeguards. The owner has evaluated the economics and recorded approval, so the risk remains in the register with a rationale, expiration or review date and monitoring conditions. Acceptance is not a synonym for ignoring the finding; changes in asset criticality or attack exposure should trigger reconsideration. The existing network restrictions may already mitigate part of the original risk, but the signed decision concerns the remaining exposure. A documented, bounded residual-risk acceptance fits the facts better than an unapproved exception or speculative remediation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Avoidance would remove the risky activity or asset, such as decommissioning the dashboard. The company continues operating it with accepted residual risk. Retirement might be a valid future option if circumstances change, but it was not the chosen response. The described approval retains the exposure under oversight rather than eliminating its business use.
C:A signed decision record documents accountability, but it does not transfer liability to an insurer or vendor. Risk transfer requires a distinct arrangement allocating certain consequences to another party. Here the owner explicitly chooses to retain the remaining risk, which is acceptance. The signature authorizes the decision rather than changing the party that bears the consequences.
D:Restricting network access is mitigation and may have reduced the original dashboard risk. The scenario nevertheless describes a distinct governance decision after those controls: the authorized business owner signs to retain the residual finding because additional repair costs outweigh expected loss. Calling only the existing controls the final treatment ignores the explicit risk-acceptance action. The register should distinguish mitigation already implemented from the bounded acceptance of what remains.
Question 348
A manufacturer has repeatedly detected unauthorized RDP attempts against a maintenance jump host. The team implements network restrictions, phishing-resistant MFA and session monitoring while retaining controlled remote support. Which risk treatment and verification strategy best describe this choice?
- Avoidance: stop remote maintenance entirely and therefore do not measure controls
- Mitigation: reduce unauthorized access likelihood and measure rejected attempts, MFA enforcement and privileged-session anomalies
- Acceptance: keep unrestricted RDP while documenting that attacks may happen
- Transfer: purchase cyber insurance and assume all login risk is gone
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Mitigation lowers likelihood or consequence while the activity continues. Restricting reachable sources, enforcing phishing-resistant MFA and monitoring privileged sessions directly reduce the chances of unauthorized RDP use and improve detection. Validate effectiveness through firewall-denial telemetry, enrollment checks, access logs, test attempts and review of unexpected privilege elevation. Controlled remote support remains available, so the risk is not avoided. Metrics should be interpreted carefully, because more rejected attempts can indicate attempted abuse or improved visibility rather than a proven reduction in threat volume. The decision combines preventive and detective controls with measurable evidence of their operation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Stopping remote maintenance would remove the remote access activity, which is avoidance, but the scenario specifically retains authorized support. The implemented measures make existing access safer rather than canceling the underlying service. Monitoring controls is still necessary because mitigation effectiveness can degrade over time. Avoidance does not describe a service kept available behind strengthened restrictions.
C:Keeping unrestricted RDP would preserve the original attack surface, whereas the team has actively restricted access and added strong authentication. Acceptance could apply to the residual risk after controls, but the primary treatment is mitigation. A written acknowledgment alone would not explain the preventive configuration and evidence-based validation in the scenario.
D:Insurance may compensate some financial effects, but it neither enforces MFA nor restricts RDP connections. The described protections change technical likelihood and detection, not contractual liability allocation. Even with insurance, credential compromise and service impact remain possible. Treating insurance as the mechanism here ignores the concrete security measures actually deployed.
Question 349
A logistics provider performs a business impact analysis after realizing its warehouse scanning system, order database and customer dispatch portal share a single network service. Management must decide which services to recover first after a regional disruption. What should the analysis primarily establish?
- Only the software patch versions installed on each server
- Only the inventory book value of network switches, without business process owners
- Critical business processes, dependencies, maximum tolerable disruption, impact over time and recovery priorities
- Rank the recovery sequence solely by server criticality labels from IT inventory, without measuring affected customer processes and dependencies
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A business impact analysis identifies which activities are essential and how interruption consequences grow over time. The provider should map scanning, order processing and dispatch dependencies, assess revenue and operational impacts, and determine maximum tolerable disruption and target recovery requirements with business owners. A shared network service may be a critical dependency even if its equipment cost is modest. This evidence supports recovery sequencing and investment decisions that reflect customer service needs, not arbitrary technology preferences. The BIA is not itself the complete disaster recovery procedure, but it provides the business rationale and timing constraints that recovery designs must satisfy.
Incorrect Answers
A:Patch versions matter to vulnerability and asset management, yet they do not reveal which order-processing function will fail first or how business impact changes during an outage. A recovery plan can include software inventory, but a BIA needs process owners, dependencies and tolerable interruption. Ranking only by versions could leave the most critical warehouse function unprotected.
B:Network equipment value is not a substitute for the consequences of losing a service it enables. A low-cost switch might support high-value shipment operations; an expensive server might be nonessential temporarily. Business impact analysis ranks functions by interruption consequences and dependencies rather than by purchase price alone. Excluding process owners would omit the operational knowledge necessary to define appropriate recovery targets.
D:An infrastructure inventory helps identify systems and support staff, but server criticality labels may not reflect the business impact of unavailable shipments and dispatch. A modest network dependency could halt the entire warehouse operation even if its equipment is inexpensive. The BIA must work with business owners to trace process relationships, disruption consequences and maximum tolerable downtime. Technology labels should inform that analysis rather than decide the recovery order alone.
Question 350
An online claims portal has a contractual requirement to be usable again within three hours of a major outage. The contract allows up to 20 minutes of recent transaction data loss, but the architect is asked specifically for the maximum service-restoration duration. Which objective captures that duration?
- A recovery point objective of three hours, because it measures service downtime
- Mean time between failures of three hours, because it measures allowable outage duration
- Mean time to repair from the last month, because an observed average is automatically a contractual target
- A recovery time objective (RTO) of three hours, distinct from the 20-minute recovery point objective
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:RTO is the target maximum elapsed time to restore a service after disruption. The portal must return to usable operation within three hours, so its RTO is three hours. The separate 20-minute allowance concerns RPO, the maximum acceptable age or amount of transaction data lost relative to the incident. Architecture should support both requirements through tested failover, application recovery, dependencies and appropriately frequent backups or replication. Meeting one objective does not ensure the other. The architect should also define when the outage clock begins and what 'usable' means under the contract so restoration tests evaluate the right outcome.
Incorrect Answers
A:RPO defines acceptable data loss measured in time, not how long the application may remain unavailable. Here the data-loss allowance is 20 minutes, while the service recovery deadline is three hours. Interchanging these targets could lead to a system that restarts quickly but loses too much data, or preserves data yet violates downtime commitments. The request asks for the restoration-duration metric.
B:MTBF is an observed or estimated reliability measure describing average time between failures for a repairable system. It is not a recovery deadline set by a business contract. A portal could have long intervals between failures yet recover too slowly during a rare outage. The three-hour requirement belongs to RTO, not to an equipment reliability statistic.
C:MTTR describes an observed or estimated average repair or recovery duration under a defined measurement approach. A mean from previous incidents can inform design but does not establish the contractual maximum acceptable downtime. If average repair takes three hours, some failures may take longer. The contract's required restoration target is an RTO and should be tested explicitly.