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CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 18

Question 170

A financial services firm employs 1,200 people who work from home and regional offices. Employees access SaaS applications directly, but the existing security design backhauls all Internet traffic to a headquarters firewall, causing long delays and frequent capacity problems. The security team must retain consistent identity-aware browsing and data protection without trusting each home network. What architectural direction best addresses the placement problem?

  1. Remove web inspection from remote sessions to eliminate headquarters latency
  2. Deliver centrally governed security functions through distributed SASE points of presence near the users
  3. Publish the firm's database administration interfaces so remote employees connect without backhaul
  4. Retain mandatory headquarters backhaul and simply add a faster firewall appliance

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Secure Access Service Edge integrates distributed connectivity and cloud-delivered security capabilities under centrally managed policies. Instead of requiring each remote SaaS request to transit the headquarters data center, users can reach a nearby enforcement point where identity, device posture, web threats and data policies are evaluated as supported by the service. This reduces dependence on a single backhaul and can improve performance. The team must verify provider coverage, policy parity for on-premises applications, encrypted transport, logging and failover rather than assuming a product label provides complete protection. The architectural benefit is moving enforcement toward the traffic while retaining governance, not removing controls.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Removing inspection reduces latency, but it also discards the required policy enforcement for traffic leaving remote devices. The company still needs access authorization, threat filtering and appropriate data controls for SaaS use. Internet access from home is not inherently trustworthy just because it avoids an internal choke point. A distributed control design may solve both security and performance needs without abandoning inspection.

C:

Exposing database management ports would create new privileged Internet attack surfaces unrelated to the users' cloud application access. A database listener requires tightly scoped administrative reachability, strong authentication, and monitoring; it should not become a convenience route around remote-access design. It also provides no replacement for SaaS browsing inspection or data-loss controls. The proposed solution would worsen exposure while leaving the original policy-placement problem unanswered.

D:

A larger headquarters firewall might address appliance throughput, but all remote traffic would still depend on headquarters connectivity and the same geographically distant route. The design retains a single operational choke point and may still impose latency on direct SaaS sessions. Central appliances are appropriate for some private application traffic, but this firm needs distributed enforcement for users everywhere. Expanding one box is not equivalent to changing the placement of controls.

Question 171

A public authoritative DNS server answers Internet queries for the company's zones. It uses UDP for routine requests and TCP for large replies and an approved zone-transfer relationship with a named secondary server. Engineers are preparing firewall rules for the DNS tier. Which rule design provides the necessary functionality without opening unrelated internal systems?

  1. Permit inbound and outbound UDP/TCP 53 between any Internet source and every private DNS host
  2. Allow UDP 53 to the authoritative server but block all TCP 53 including the known secondary's zone transfers
  3. Permit TCP 53 from every source into the internal recursive resolver network while leaving the public authoritative host unreachable
  4. Allow needed UDP and TCP 53 to the named authoritative endpoints, and restrict zone transfers to specifically authorized peers

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The firewall must permit legitimate DNS queries to the public authoritative host over UDP and TCP as required, while limiting zone-transfer permissions to identified and authenticated secondaries. Rules should specify source, destination, direction and purpose; public clients may query the authoritative service without being granted network access to internal recursive resolvers. Transfers should additionally be controlled on the DNS service itself, for example with peer authorization and TSIG where applicable. Logging and testing should confirm that large responses work and unapproved AXFR attempts fail. Least privilege means accurately modeling necessary flows, not disabling a protocol DNS uses.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An indiscriminate port-53 policy expands the attack surface of private resolvers and creates unnecessary paths into internal DNS infrastructure. Authoritative public answers may legitimately be reachable from many clients, but this does not justify opening every internal host or permitting unrestricted zone transfers. Policies should separate public query service from administrative and replication flows. A blanket allow rule ignores that important distinction.

B:

TCP is part of normal DNS operation, including large responses and other cases where a UDP exchange is unsuitable; it is also commonly used for zone transfers. Blocking every TCP DNS connection would disrupt the explicit secondary-server requirement and could interfere with ordinary standards-based resolver behavior. Limiting the protocol to UDP is not the same as applying least privilege. The rule needs both protocol awareness and source/destination scoping.

C:

Recursive resolvers serve a different role from public authoritative servers. Making all internal recursive resolvers reachable for TCP queries would expose components not needed by Internet users and still fail to publish the intended authoritative zone service properly. The company should distinguish externally accessible authoritative endpoints from internal recursion, and prevent unauthorized transfer of complete zone data. This alternative misplaces the destination boundary rather than solving it.

Question 172

A branch firewall has a dedicated, physically isolated management interface reachable from an approved VPN and hardened jump host. Its HTTPS administration service is nevertheless configured to listen on both that interface and the public WAN interface. Passwords and TLS are already enabled. Which configuration change removes the unnecessary WAN-facing management listener while preserving the secure support path?

  1. Add stricter TLS certificate validation while leaving the HTTPS management service listening on both interfaces
  2. Permit public read-only management requests but block configuration changes at the application layer
  3. Bind the HTTPS administrative service exclusively to the dedicated management interface and validate that no WAN listener remains
  4. Rename the management hostname and hide the link from public search engines while retaining the WAN listener

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Binding the firewall's HTTPS administration daemon only to its isolated management interface prevents it from accepting direct WAN connections. Authorized engineers can still use the already approved VPN and hardened jump host to reach that interface, with individualized authentication and audit logs. The team should verify the active listening sockets and test both allowed management connectivity and denied external attempts, rather than assuming a saved setting took effect. This is a service-binding and management-plane separation decision: simply hiding a hostname or relying on TLS would leave the unnecessary public endpoint exposed. The route and listener controls must agree for the restriction to be effective.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Strong TLS certificate validation helps administrators authenticate the firewall they intend to manage, but it does not determine which local interfaces accept inbound connections. A public listener remains discoverable and available to attackers even if passwords and encryption work correctly. The question already gives a protected VPN and jump-host route; the missing control is service binding. Strengthening cryptography is complementary, but leaving an unnecessary WAN-facing socket active fails the exact reachability requirement.

B:

Application-layer read-only access restrictions can reduce harm from a compromised account, but a public management endpoint still exposes versions, authentication logic and potentially vulnerable request parsing to remote probes. The organization wants to remove unnecessary Internet reachability altogether. A management service can offer sophisticated role controls while remaining unsafe to expose broadly. Restricting the listener to the dedicated interface closes the public entry path before administrative privileges are even evaluated.

D:

A less obvious hostname may reduce casual discovery through search or guesswork, but scanners can identify listening services through Internet address and port probing without needing DNS. Search-engine exclusion is only a publication preference and does not enforce source authentication or network reachability. The firewall already has a separate trusted management interface, so continuing to listen publicly is unnecessary. The operator must change the service's actual interface binding and validate that the WAN socket is closed.

Question 173

A retail network firewall permits outbound TCP 443, and attackers have been using normal-looking HTTPS sessions to carry command-and-control and malicious application requests. Security wants policy decisions based on the actual permitted application behavior, where lawful decryption is authorized, not merely the destination port. Which capability best addresses the inspection requirement?

  1. Use next-generation firewall application-aware inspection with controlled TLS visibility and threat policies
  2. Keep only a Layer-4 rule accepting TCP 443 to the same destinations
  3. Block TCP 80 but leave all HTTPS payloads unexamined
  4. Deploy DNS filtering alone and assume it reveals every URL path and JSON request body

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A next-generation firewall can classify applications and use intrusion-prevention or threat-detection policies that examine traffic beyond the basic TCP port. For encrypted HTTPS sessions, content inspection requires an authorized TLS decryption point or suitable integration; application identification from metadata alone cannot reveal every malicious request. The team should evaluate privacy, certificates, performance, exceptions and how re-encryption protects internal links. This capability can distinguish suspect behavior carried through a normally permitted port and enforce more specific rules. It complements endpoint detection and secure application design, and its effectiveness depends on actual signatures, policy quality and visibility rather than a default checkbox.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A transport-layer rule can confirm that traffic uses TCP 443 and perhaps narrow addresses, but that does not reveal which application action or payload travels inside the session. Attackers can use HTTPS just as legitimate customers do, so allowing the port provides connectivity rather than behavioral assurance. Existing Layer-4 filtering remains valuable for reducing exposed ports but cannot alone identify malicious HTTP activity hidden in an authorized flow.

C:

Blocking cleartext HTTP may prevent an insecure transport protocol, which is valuable in an appropriate configuration. Yet the observed threat is already traveling inside HTTPS. Removing TCP 80 does not inspect application fields, detect malicious commands, or constrain the permitted encrypted connections. The organization needs security functionality where the actual suspicious traffic is visible and a response can be enforced, not a change to an unused port rule.

D:

DNS filtering can block access to known malicious domains and provide useful destination telemetry. It does not see individual URL paths, HTTP request bodies, or content after an HTTPS session is established, especially when DNS names are not a useful discriminator. Even sophisticated DNS threat intelligence cannot guarantee that every harmful request uses a known bad hostname. In this scenario the missing feature is application-aware inspection, not solely domain-based reputation.

Question 174

A conference center correctly places visitors on an Internet-only guest Wi-Fi VLAN, with firewall rules blocking all corporate subnets. During testing, two unrelated visitor laptops connected to that same SSID can still access each other's Windows file shares. The center wants to prevent direct guest-to-guest reachability while keeping ordinary Internet browsing. What is the best additional control?

  1. Change the public SSID name and keep the same wireless forwarding behavior
  2. Enable wireless client isolation or an equivalent enforcement policy that blocks peer-to-peer forwarding inside the guest network
  3. Require a captive-portal acknowledgement but leave visitor-to-visitor sessions permitted
  4. Tighten the inter-VLAN rule to corporate networks without changing same-guest-subnet access

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Client isolation prevents wireless stations associated with the same guest infrastructure from directly communicating where the access point or controller enforces it. That addresses the observed SMB connection while retaining permitted Internet traffic through the guest gateway. The implementation must cover the relevant APs, VLANs and any alternate wired or routed paths; some deployments require switch ACLs or private VLAN features in addition to a WLAN setting. Test both client-to-client and client-to-corporate reachability after configuration, because inter-VLAN isolation was already working. This is a distinct boundary inside the guest population, protecting visitors from attacks by other untrusted visitors on the same SSID.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Renaming the SSID changes which label visitors select, not the forwarding relationship between devices sharing that wireless segment. Both clients would still be able to address each other at layer two or three if the access point continues to bridge their traffic. Network names can support user experience and policy identification, but they do not provide guest-to-guest isolation by themselves. The peer path must actually be blocked.

C:

A captive portal can communicate terms and may provide visitor authentication or accounting, but accepting a policy does not stop one guest endpoint from contacting another. A malicious or compromised visitor can ignore a written prohibition. The explicit problem is technical lateral reachability, so the control must filter or isolate the packets themselves. Policy acknowledgements may complement enforcement but cannot substitute for it.

D:

The firewall already separates the guest network from corporate assets, and that protects a different trust boundary. Two clients in the same guest segment may exchange traffic without traversing the corporate-facing firewall at all. Strengthening only the guest-to-corporate rule therefore leaves their SMB path unchanged. The team must implement guest client isolation or equivalent intra-segment restrictions where that peer traffic is forwarded.

Question 175

An intrusion-detection appliance passively monitors a switch SPAN port near a customer API. It can count outbound TLS flows, identify destination addresses, and read handshake metadata, but the security team expects it to detect a malicious value inside an encrypted JSON request. The appliance has no session keys or authorized decryption integration. Which conclusion is technically sound?

  1. The appliance may inspect observable traffic metadata but cannot read the encrypted HTTP payload without a legitimate decryption capability
  2. A mirror port supplies plaintext copies of all TLS records to any connected sensor
  3. A publicly trusted server certificate gives passive sensors the symmetric keys used for every active session
  4. Disable HTTPS for the API so every packet sensor can inspect user data directly

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The SPAN sensor sees copies of packets, not decrypted HTTP data. It can often inspect IP addresses, timing, packet lengths, some handshake details and other metadata not protected by the particular TLS configuration, which may still support useful detections. But an encrypted JSON body is cryptographically inaccessible without the session secrets or a properly authorized inspection point. Modern TLS key exchange prevents recovering session content merely by knowing a public certificate. If the organization requires HTTP-content inspection, it should integrate with a lawful termination or security gateway and protect the resulting plaintext and keys. Disabling transport security is unnecessary and dangerous. The key distinction is between flow visibility and payload visibility.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A mirror port replicates the traffic as it appears on the wire. If the API uses TLS, the HTTP request body is still ciphertext in that copy. Mirroring does not alter encryption keys, reconstruct plaintext, or turn the monitoring sensor into a terminating endpoint. A packet capture may be extremely detailed while revealing no usable application payload. Inspection strategy must account for cryptographic placement, not simply packet completeness.

C:

The server's public certificate lets clients validate an identity as part of a TLS handshake; it does not disclose the negotiated symmetric traffic keys. In modern configurations even possession of a server private key generally does not retrospectively reveal sessions protected by ephemeral key exchange. A passive IDS without session secrets therefore cannot read encrypted JSON by trusting the website's certificate. This option confuses public identity verification with decryption authority.

D:

Turning off HTTPS would expose API tokens, personal data and business transactions to eavesdropping and modification across untrusted paths. It trades one visibility problem for a serious confidentiality and integrity weakness. Authorized inspection is normally implemented at a protected TLS termination point, with appropriate privacy and downstream encryption decisions. The ability to scan plaintext cannot justify removing essential transport protection for customers.

Question 176

An e-commerce platform has five application servers behind a common hostname. During flash sales, new client sessions should be distributed among healthy servers. If one node fails its health check, new requests must stop going there without requiring customers to change addresses. Which component directly implements this behavior?

  1. A standalone port-filtering firewall with no backend health or distribution function
  2. Publish all five application-server addresses with DNS round-robin records and do not track instance health
  3. Configure CPU-triggered instance autoscaling without adding a front-end service to select healthy servers for client requests
  4. A load balancer with application-instance health monitoring and request distribution

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A load balancer provides a stable front-end address and routes requests across available application instances using defined distribution algorithms. Health probes can remove a failed or unready node from new traffic, reducing errors during flash-sales demand. The implementation should account for session affinity when necessary, draining connections before maintenance, backend capacity and what health endpoints actually measure. A healthy probe is not proof that requests are secure, so access control and application inspection remain separate responsibilities. The distinguishing function here is dynamic selection of healthy back ends while maintaining a consistent public entry point for customers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A firewall restricts which flows are permitted and can protect the application segment, but a simple rule set does not decide which backend node should receive each new customer session. Some integrated firewall platforms include distribution functions, yet the option specifies a standalone filter without them. The requested behavior needs instance selection and health-based routing, not only allow and deny decisions.

B:

DNS round robin can spread some client resolutions over multiple host addresses, and it may reduce load concentration in simple deployments. It does not reliably stop sending new sessions to a failed node based on timely health checks, and cached DNS answers can linger after records change. Customers may also experience different backend addresses or service behavior depending on resolver caching. The stated requirement calls for one stable entry point with active backend selection and health-driven removal, which a properly configured load balancer provides.

C:

Autoscaling adjusts the available number of application instances, which helps absorb changing demand. It does not by itself make one public hostname distribute each new client session or stop routing to an unhealthy node. New instances also need registration, readiness verification and connection-draining policies. The scenario asks for health-aware front-end traffic distribution among existing nodes, not only automatic fleet-size management. Capacity automation works well alongside a load balancer but is not a replacement for its request-routing function.

Question 177

An R&D laboratory blocks direct Internet routes from analyst workstations because research documents are highly confidential. Analysts still need to retrieve approved external web documentation, and the security office needs user attribution and destination logs. Which network intermediary most directly enables this model?

  1. An authenticated outbound web proxy with explicit destination policy and egress permitted only from the proxy
  2. An unrestricted default route from every laboratory workstation to the Internet
  3. Install endpoint data-loss-prevention agents while allowing analysts to request documentation through unrestricted outbound tunnels
  4. Use an authenticated full-tunnel VPN that gives researchers direct Internet egress but only records session start and end times

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

An authenticated forward proxy mediates outbound HTTP or HTTPS requests on behalf of laboratory clients and can enforce a centrally managed list of approved destinations. With direct Internet egress denied, users cannot bypass its access policy simply by changing browsers. Per-user authentication and appropriate logs help investigators associate transactions with identities; TLS inspection, if required, must be deliberately authorized and configured. The proxy should also be patched, monitored and protected against misuse as an open relay. This provides controlled outbound retrieval without granting every sensitive workstation an independent Internet path. It does not automatically prevent every type of data exfiltration, so egress filtering and data controls remain important.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A default route allowing all analyst workstations directly onto the Internet would bypass the security team's central approval and logging point. Even if hosts retain endpoint protections, individual external connections could occur without the requested destination filtering or reliable user attribution. The firm's goal is not simply to restore connectivity; it is to permit necessary documentation access through a controlled channel. Direct routing defeats that design.

C:

Endpoint DLP may detect or block some transfers of research data based on classification and content policy. It does not necessarily enforce a central allowlist of documentation sites or provide consistent proxy-mediated user and destination audit logs across arbitrary outbound tunnels. An analyst could still reach destinations not approved by the security office, depending on what the DLP product recognizes. The laboratory needs a network egress chokepoint with explicit destination authorization, with DLP as a useful complementary safeguard.

D:

A full-tunnel VPN can encrypt traffic and identify the connecting employee, making it a legitimate remote-access tool. If it simply gives broad Internet reachability, it does not enforce the laboratory policy that individual analyst workstations lack direct external routes. Session start and end logs also may not identify which documentation domains each analyst visited. The requirement is filtered outbound retrieval with per-request destination logging. A forward web proxy can provide that control if bypass paths are denied.

Question 178

A company has implemented carefully restricted IPv4 access lists on all campus routers. A new employee laptop obtains a global IPv6 address and reaches an internal management service that IPv4 rules would have blocked. Administrators discover no corresponding IPv6 policy. What is the appropriate security design correction?

  1. Apply equivalent intent-based access restrictions and logging to IPv6 paths, then validate both protocol stacks
  2. Deploy an IPv6-only host firewall on laptops but leave the campus routers' IPv6 paths unrestricted
  3. Add IPv6-to-IPv4 translation and assume the existing IPv4 access lists will cover every native IPv6 path
  4. Block IPv6 on all campus interfaces without checking which applications or management services require it

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

IPv4 and IPv6 can use independent routing, neighbor discovery, and firewall rule sets. A restrictive IPv4 ACL does not automatically cover packets carried over IPv6, so an overlooked second protocol becomes a bypass around the intended management boundary. Engineers should inventory IPv6 addresses and routes, translate the actual authorized flows into equivalent IPv6 policy, and validate both ingress and egress enforcement. They should account for IPv6-specific control-plane traffic, including necessary ICMPv6 messages, instead of blindly copying every port rule. Logging and testing should confirm that approved services remain usable while unauthorized management access is denied. Dual-stack designs need security parity rather than assuming one stack controls the other.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Endpoint host firewalls can protect individual managed clients and are valuable complementary controls. The observed gap is that a globally addressed laptop can reach a protected internal management service through unrestricted IPv6 routing. The host firewall of one device does not enforce the intended network boundary for every other device or protect the target service. Equivalent router and gateway policies must be verified across both address families.

C:

A translation gateway can apply a controlled policy at a particular IPv4/IPv6 boundary, but native IPv6 communication may bypass that gateway entirely. Translation also does not automatically copy the organization's existing security intent to each IPv6 interface. Since the laptop already reached an internal service through unfiltered IPv6, administrators need explicit route-level and endpoint policy coverage, rather than relying on an inferred inheritance rule.

D:

Disabling a protocol can reduce a particular attack path but may also disrupt necessary services and encourages configuration drift when teams reenable it without a security plan. The organization has deliberately deployed dual-stack addressing and needs equivalent restrictions and logging. An inventory-driven temporary block might be justified during containment; an untested campus-wide ban is not the appropriate durable mixed-stack security design.

Question 179

A consulting firm stores unredacted client tax records in a shared storage array. Hardware technicians routinely exchange drives, and the storage provider operates the physical rack. The customer needs records unreadable from removed media while preventing storage technicians from obtaining decryption keys. Which protection is most appropriate?

  1. Depend on restrictive folder names without encrypting the stored blocks
  2. Encrypt the stored records with keys controlled separately from the storage operator
  3. Require TLS for client uploads but store the completed database in plaintext on the array
  4. Keep the active decryption keys on the same publicly accessible storage share

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Encryption at rest converts the sensitive record content into ciphertext that requires authorized cryptographic keys for recovery. If the customer controls key access through a separate key-management service or suitably protected hardware, a technician obtaining raw drive media should not automatically obtain usable plaintext. The design must manage key rotation, service authorization, backups and recovery, because inaccessible keys can make otherwise intact records unrecoverable. Key management also needs separation from the storage operator's ordinary duties. This is stronger than relying on folder-level permission or transit security alone, but it does not replace application authorization for users who legitimately decrypt records.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Folder labels and directory paths organize files, but do not make raw disk sectors unintelligible to someone who can access storage media. An operating-system permission may help while the system is running, yet a technician with physical access can potentially bypass that filesystem context. The scenario specifically requires protection from media access, so confidentiality must extend to the stored blocks themselves. Policy names alone are not encryption.

C:

TLS protects uploads as they travel between client and service, which is important over an untrusted network. After termination, however, the database may write plaintext blocks to the shared array. A drive technician could inspect those blocks without ever intercepting the network. Transit encryption therefore addresses a different data state. The firm needs encryption that remains effective when the disks are handled outside the running application.

D:

Placing keys on the same broadly accessible share allows someone who copies encrypted blocks to copy the material needed to decrypt them. Encryption algorithms may be strong, but the separation requirement fails if decryption access follows the storage operator automatically. Keys must be protected with independent authorization, restricted service identities and appropriate audit trails. Key co-location without controls defeats the stated defense against technicians.

Question 180

A hospital computes a clinical risk score using decrypted patient values inside a cloud virtual machine. The VM host administrator can ordinarily inspect guest memory, and the hospital wants to reduce exposure while processing without forbidding the computation. Which design most directly addresses data-in-use protection?

  1. Process sensitive portions inside a supported confidential-computing enclave, verifying attestation before releasing the decryption key
  2. Use stronger disk encryption with customer-owned keys but run the calculation in a conventional VM memory context
  3. Require TLS for data transfer but make no change to what the host can inspect after decryption
  4. Harden the guest operating system and restrict its own administrator accounts while leaving the host memory-access model unchanged

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A trusted execution environment can provide hardware-backed isolation of a workload's sensitive memory from parts of the surrounding host, depending on the platform and threat model. Remote attestation allows a key-management service to check that an approved enclave is running before releasing decryption material. The team must examine side channels, enclave configuration, trusted code size and how results leave the protected environment; confidential computing is not unconditional protection from every administrator or compromise. In this scenario the exposure occurs during computation, after network and disk encryption have already done their jobs. Processing within attested isolated memory is the relevant additional boundary.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Customer-managed encryption keys can reduce the exposure of stored patient files and allow the hospital to control disk-decryption access. But the scoring program must still obtain plaintext in memory, which can be visible to a sufficiently privileged host operator on the conventional execution platform described. Better disk protection addresses data at rest, not the specific data-in-use threat. Attested confidential-computing isolation is the more direct mitigation when computation must continue without exposing the work set to the host.

C:

TLS protects data between endpoints and does not determine whether the hypervisor or host operating system can inspect a guest's memory. Once the application decrypts records for scoring, confidentiality depends on the execution environment. Using strong transport encryption is still valuable, but it cannot alone protect plaintext from a privileged infrastructure administrator. The solution must address the point at which values are actively processed.

D:

Guest hardening, patching and least-privilege administrator roles can reduce compromise from inside the virtual machine. Those controls may still depend on a virtualization boundary controlled by the cloud host, which is precisely the privileged observer identified in the question. If a host operator can inspect guest memory by design, guest-side account restrictions alone do not close that exposure. A protected execution environment with attestation gives the key service a basis to release secrets only to the intended isolated workload.

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