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Question 81:
A Security Administrator notices that custom application signatures built in SmartConsole are not being triggered, even though traffic clearly matches the expected patterns. Logs show traffic categorized as generic TCP. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The application signature matching conditions and protocol context definitions
B) The DHCP relay timeout
C) The SMTP TLS downgrade protection
D) The cluster broadcast discovery frequency
Answer:
A
Explanation:
When administrators create custom application signatures in Check Point, the Firewall depends on specific matching conditions to correctly identify application traffic. These signatures require precise definitions, including protocol context, payload patterns, packet direction, and classification behavior. If a signature is misconfigured—even slightly—the Firewall cannot correctly evaluate it, and traffic defaults to generic classifications such as “Unknown TCP.”
The first configuration to check is the signature matching conditions. Administrators must verify that the signature defines the correct protocol context. Traffic inspected at Layer 7 must match the signature’s expected protocol, such as HTTP, HTTPS (with decryption), DNS, or raw TCP. If a signature is designed for HTTP payloads but the traffic is encrypted, the Firewall cannot match the signature unless HTTPS Inspection is enabled for that flow.
Incorrect byte offsets, payload expressions, or case sensitivity settings can also prevent detection. For example, if the signature looks for a specific string but does not account for variations in capitalization or whitespace, the pattern may never match. Adjusting regex-based patterns to be more flexible improves reliability.
Administrators must also confirm that the custom signature is enabled within the Application Control policy. Even a correctly built signature will not apply if the rulebase does not reference it. The signature must be associated with an Application Control rule that inspects the appropriate traffic. If a broad accept rule above the Application Control layer allows traffic without inspection, the custom signature will not trigger.
Another frequently overlooked factor is protocol validation. If regular expression patterns depend on specific packet structures that the originating application does not follow, traffic mismatches occur. Administrators should capture traffic packets using debugging tools to confirm the payload matches the signature criteria.
Option B concerns DHCP relay and has no bearing on application signature detection. Option C involves email encryption behavior and does not influence application-based inspection. Option D deals with cluster broadcast discovery but has no relationship to custom application signatures.
Therefore, reviewing matching conditions and protocol context definitions is the correct first step for ensuring custom signatures function properly.
Question 82:
A Security Administrator finds that IPS protections for DNS tunneling detection are not triggered even though suspicious DNS query patterns are present. Logs show DNS traffic being accelerated through SecureXL. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SecureXL acceleration templates and DNS deep inspection bypass behavior
B) The NAT loopback configuration
C) The SMTP banner message rules
D) The DHCP option 43 configuration
Answer:
A
Explanation:
DNS tunneling is a covert communication technique where malicious actors encode data inside DNS queries and responses. IPS protections for DNS tunneling rely on deep inspection of DNS payloads, query lengths, entropy analysis, subdomain patterns, and timing behavior. If SecureXL accelerates DNS traffic, the packets may bypass deep inspection entirely because acceleration usually sends traffic through the fast path, skipping IPS-level checks.
The first configuration to review is the SecureXL template and acceleration handling for DNS. SecureXL generates templates for high-volume, repetitive traffic flows, such as DNS queries. If DNS traffic is recognized as safe and allowed, SecureXL might accelerate subsequent packets. This prevents the IPS engine from analyzing DNS payloads, resulting in undetected tunneling activities.
Administrators can disable DNS acceleration or modify security settings to force DNS into the slow path for full inspection. Reviewing existing templates using diagnostic tools helps identify whether DNS flows are being accelerated. If DNS must be inspected consistently, administrators may configure exceptions in SecureXL to ensure DNS traffic always passes through IPS.
Another factor is CoreXL distribution. If CoreXL assigns DNS traffic to a core that does not run IPS inspection processes, payload evaluation may fail. Adjusting CoreXL affinity can ensure proper routing of DNS packets to the inspection cores.
Option B, NAT loopback, influences internal routing and has no impact on DNS deep inspection. Option C, SMTP banner rules, deals only with email protocol inspection. Option D, DHCP option 43, affects vendor-specific DHCP settings, unrelated to DNS tunneling detection.
Thus, reviewing SecureXL’s acceleration templates and DNS inspection bypass mechanisms is essential to ensuring DNS tunneling detections function properly.
Question 83:
A Security Administrator sees that high volumes of outbound HTTPS traffic are being dropped due to “TLS version unsupported” errors. The Firewall recently enforced minimum TLS 1.2 for outbound connections. Some legacy applications still use TLS 1.0 or 1.1. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTPS Inspection minimum TLS version policy and legacy application exceptions
B) The SMTP anti-malware scanning settings
C) The cluster topology broadcast behavior
D) The DHCP rebind timing
Answer:
A
Explanation:
When a Firewall enforces a minimum TLS version, it prevents the establishment of encrypted connections that use outdated or insecure TLS versions such as 1.0 or 1.1. If legacy applications still depend on older TLS implementations and the Firewall enforces TLS 1.2 or later, these applications will fail to connect and logs will record “TLS version unsupported.”
The first configuration to review is the minimum TLS version policy in HTTPS Inspection. Administrators must verify whether the inspection layer is configured to block outdated TLS versions. While enforcing modern TLS versions is good for security, administrators must also ensure compatibility for internal or legacy systems. Creating exceptions for specific IP addresses, applications, or categories can allow older TLS versions temporarily until applications are upgraded.
Administrators should analyze which applications are failing and confirm their TLS negotiation behavior through packet captures. If the legacy applications cannot negotiate TLS 1.2, administrators can selectively bypass HTTPS Inspection or lower the minimum TLS version for specific traffic. Alternatively, enabling compatibility mode allows the Firewall to accept older TLS versions while still performing inspection.
Certificate-handling logic also influences TLS negotiations. If older applications do not support modern cipher suites or signature algorithms, the Firewall may reject traffic even if TLS version appears correct. Administrators may need to adjust the cipher suite restrictions in HTTPS Inspection for specific legacy applications.
Option B, SMTP anti-malware settings, deals with email processing and does not affect HTTPS enforcement. Option C involves cluster broadcast behavior and is unrelated to TLS version handling. Option D concerns DHCP timing and has no relationship to TLS negotiation.
Thus, the HTTPS Inspection TLS minimum version policy, along with appropriate exceptions, is the first configuration to evaluate.
Question 84:
A Security Administrator observes delays in SAML authentication for VPN users. Logs show that SAML metadata retrieval from the Identity Provider (IdP) intermittently fails. The Firewall acts as the Service Provider. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SAML metadata URL accessibility and certificate trust configuration
B) The NAT-T keepalive interval
C) The SMTP MTA routing rules
D) The DHCP address conflict logging
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SAML authentication requires the Firewall, acting as the Service Provider (SP), to download and interpret metadata from the Identity Provider (IdP). This metadata includes certificates, entity IDs, endpoints, and binding methods. If metadata retrieval intermittently fails, SAML authentication may stall or fail entirely. Logs usually reference metadata retrieval or certificate trust errors in such cases.
The first configuration to review is the SAML metadata URL accessibility. Administrators must verify that the Firewall can reach the IdP metadata URL without interruption. If routing issues, DNS failures, firewall policy blocks, or proxy restrictions interfere with metadata retrieval, authentication delays occur. Some IdPs use dynamic metadata endpoints, CDNs, or load-balanced URLs, so consistent access must be tested.
Certificate trust also plays a critical role. If the IdP rotates certificates or metadata signing keys, and the Firewall’s trust store is outdated, the Firewall cannot validate metadata signatures. This prevents the SP from trusting or parsing the metadata. Updating the trust chain or importing the new IdP certificate resolves this.
Administrators should verify whether metadata caching is enabled. If caching intervals are set too short, the Firewall will repeatedly attempt retrieval, amplifying the impact of any intermittent connectivity issue. Increasing the metadata refresh interval stabilizes authentication flows.
Option B, NAT-T keepalive, affects VPN tunnels but not SAML. Option C pertains to SMTP routing and is irrelevant here. Option D relates to DHCP issues and does not influence SAML authentication behavior.
Thus, checking metadata URL accessibility and certificate trust settings is the most important first step in troubleshooting SAML authentication delays.
Question 85:
A Security Administrator finds that Endpoint VPN users using the Capsule VPN client report random disconnections. Logs show that the endpoint’s IP address changes during the session because of network switching between Wi-Fi and cellular. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The VPN session mobility and roaming configuration for Endpoint clients
B) The SMTP anti-virus inspection level
C) The DHCP pool expansion
D) The cluster state synchronization timeout
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Endpoint VPN users often move between networks, especially on mobile devices. When switching from Wi-Fi to cellular or vice versa, the device’s IP address changes. Traditional VPN implementations tie the session to the source IP address. If the IP changes mid-session, the Firewall interprets it as a session hijack or replay attempt, dropping the connection. Capsule VPN supports roaming features that maintain VPN continuity even if the endpoint’s IP changes.
The first configuration to review is VPN session mobility and roaming settings. Administrators must ensure that the Firewall and VPN community support session rekeying and tunneling continuity under IP changes. Capsule VPN clients rely on specific VPN gateway settings that allow seamless transitions between networks. If mobility features are disabled, any IP change forces a tunnel teardown.
IKE and IPSec timers also affect mobility. Short lifetimes cause more renegotiations, increasing the likelihood of failure during network transitions. Adjusting timers to allow more stable roaming reduces disconnections.
Improper NAT traversal settings may also disrupt session continuity. If NAT-T is disabled or inconsistently configured, clients switching between NAT types (such as Wi-Fi networks vs. carrier CGNAT) may encounter tunnel failures. Ensuring NAT-T is enabled for all endpoints prevents mismatched addresses from breaking tunnels.
Option B pertains to email security and does not affect VPN mobility. Option C concerns DHCP pool sizes, irrelevant to mobile endpoint behavior. Option D relates to cluster synchronization and does not influence endpoint VPN session stability.
Thus, enabling and tuning VPN roaming and session mobility configurations is essential to maintaining stable connectivity for mobile Capsule VPN users.
Question 86:
A Security Administrator notices that Application Control fails to block certain cloud-based applications using QUIC, even though they are blocked when they fall back to HTTPS. Logs show that QUIC traffic is categorized as unknown UDP. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The QUIC inspection and categorization settings within Application Control
B) The SMTP routing table and MX preferences
C) The DHCP renewal interval
D) The cluster high-availability sync delay
Answer:
A
Explanation:
QUIC is a UDP-based transport protocol designed as a faster alternative to TLS over TCP. Many cloud applications, most notably those from major providers, attempt QUIC first and fall back to HTTPS only if QUIC is blocked or unsupported. Therefore, Application Control must be capable of identifying and categorizing QUIC traffic to apply the appropriate application rules. When the Firewall does not perform deep inspection of QUIC flows, it cannot classify the traffic and thus treats it as unknown UDP, allowing it if broad rules permit.
The first configuration to examine is the QUIC inspection settings within Application Control. Some Firewalls require explicit enabling of QUIC inspection because QUIC packets contain encrypted payloads starting early in the handshake. If inspection is disabled or unsupported, the Firewall cannot extract the necessary metadata for classification. Administrators should verify whether the current software version fully supports QUIC decoding and that QUIC signatures are updated through ThreatCloud.
Another factor is that Application Control depends heavily on protocols being processed in the slow path rather than the accelerated path. If SecureXL accelerates UDP flows, QUIC packets may bypass Application Control entirely. Disabling SecureXL templates for QUIC-like patterns or adjusting acceleration rules ensures QUIC packets reach the Application Control engine.
Firewall policies may also allow QUIC inadvertently. If an Access Control rule permits UDP/443 or UDP/80 without requiring application identification, QUIC flows match that rule before Application Control evaluates them. Reordering rules or enabling a requirement that all traffic matching certain ports undergo Application Control resolves this issue.
Option B concerns SMTP routing, which has no relevance to QUIC inspection. Option C deals with DHCP renewals and does not influence application categorization. Option D pertains to cluster synchronization delays and is unrelated to QUIC decoding.
Thus, reviewing QUIC inspection settings is essential to ensure Application Control can properly identify and block cloud applications using QUIC.
Question 87:
A Security Administrator finds that multiple VoIP calls using SIP are failing intermittently. Logs show “SIP malformed packet” events after enabling IPS protections for SIP signaling anomalies. Users report one-way audio and sudden call drops. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The IPS SIP protections and deep inspection thresholds for VoIP traffic
B) The cluster multicast mode
C) The DHCP boot options for PXE
D) The SMTP anti-spam score adjustment
Answer:
A
Explanation:
VoIP protocols such as SIP depend on precise packet formatting, correct sequencing, and timing-sensitive call setup. When IPS protections for SIP anomalies are enabled, the Firewall inspects SIP signaling messages for violations such as malformed headers, unexpected fields, or invalid state transitions. However, some SIP implementations, especially those used by legacy PBXs or cloud VoIP providers, use non-standard but legitimate SIP variations. IPS may mistakenly classify these as anomalies, resulting in packet drops that disrupt calls.
The first configuration to review is the IPS SIP protections. Administrators should evaluate whether strict SIP anomaly detection is enabled and whether certain protections need adjustment or disabling for specific networks. SIP headers vary dramatically between vendors. For example, some providers embed additional parameters in Contact headers or use proprietary session identifiers. If IPS expects strict compliance with SIP RFCs, legitimate traffic may be flagged incorrectly.
Deep inspection thresholds also affect VoIP performance. If IPS inspects every SIP message too aggressively, call setup latency increases. When SIP invites or 200 OK responses are delayed, endpoints may timeout, causing one-way audio or complete call failure. Adjusting inspection to detect only high-risk anomalies rather than all deviations improves reliability.
Administrators must confirm whether SIP ALG (Application Layer Gateway) behavior is enabled or disabled. Some environments require SIP ALG to manage NAT traversal, while others break when ALG interferes with SIP signaling. Coordinating IPS behavior with ALG settings is critical.
Option B concerns cluster multicast mode and does not affect SIP packet interpretation. Option C deals with DHCP PXE booting, unrelated to VoIP. Option D addresses email spam scoring, which has no relation to SIP signaling.
Thus, reviewing SIP IPS protections and inspection thresholds is essential to preventing false positives that break VoIP communications.
Question 88:
A Security Administrator notices that certain outbound SSH sessions are being blocked even though Access Control rules permit SSH. Logs show “SSH protocol mismatch.” The Firewall recently enabled SSH inspection features. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SSH inspection settings and compatibility with non-standard SSH client banners
B) The SMTP encryption enforcement level
C) The DHCP superscope allocation
D) The cluster probe timeout
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SSH inspection introduces capabilities such as protocol identification, anomaly detection, and brute-force attack prevention. However, SSH clients and servers sometimes use non-standard banners or negotiation behaviors. For example, some automated tools send custom identification strings, while embedded devices may use shortened protocol banners. When SSH inspection is strict, it may interpret these variations as protocol mismatches and block the session.
The first configuration to review is SSH inspection settings. The Firewall’s SSH parser must properly interpret client banners, key exchange parameters, and handshake sequences. Administrators should identify whether strict mode is enabled. Strict mode evaluates every deviation as suspicious, while compatibility mode allows minor differences. If standard SSH tools work but customized or legacy devices fail, adjusting strictness is necessary.
Inspection may also interfere with port-forwarding sessions. SSH tunnels multiplex multiple streams. If the Firewall attempts to interpret tunneled content incorrectly, it may block connections. Disabling deep inspection for known trusted SSH endpoints prevents false positives.
Another factor is whether the Firewall requires specific key lengths or algorithms. If legacy devices use outdated algorithms such as SHA-1 or small Diffie-Hellman groups, the Firewall may reject the handshake. Reviewing cryptographic enforcement requirements helps maintain compatibility.
Option B pertains to email encryption and has no relevance to SSH. Option C concerns DHCP superscopes and is irrelevant. Option D relates to cluster probing, not SSH inspection.
Thus, reviewing SSH inspection strictness and compatibility settings is the correct initial step to resolving SSH protocol mismatch drops.
Question 89:
A Security Administrator detects that various SaaS services fail during uploads. Logs show that large POST requests are dropped with “HTTP body too large for inspection.” HTTPS Inspection is enabled, and the services use modern TLS. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTP/HTTPS Inspection maximum body size and streaming inspection thresholds
B) The SMTP header normalization settings
C) The DHCP reservation lease timers
D) The cluster sync interface bandwidth
Answer:
A
Explanation:
When HTTPS Inspection is enabled, the Firewall decrypts HTTPS sessions, inspects HTTP payloads, and re-encrypts traffic. For large file uploads, especially those performed by SaaS services, the HTTP body may exceed the Firewall’s configured inspection limit. If the body size surpasses the maximum inspection threshold, the Firewall drops the packet for safety, resulting in upload failures.
The first configuration to review is the maximum HTTP body size for inspection. Administrators should confirm whether the current threshold is appropriate for modern SaaS use cases. Many services routinely upload large objects—video files, documents, or application updates. To accommodate these, the Firewall must support streaming inspection or an increased maximum body size.
Streaming inspection allows the Firewall to examine portions of the HTTP body in segments instead of buffering the entire payload. If streaming is disabled, the Firewall attempts to buffer too much data and may run out of memory or hit size limits. Enabling streaming alleviates this issue.
Administrators should also verify whether HTTPS Inspection exceptions are configured for trusted SaaS domains. If a service is verified and safe, bypassing inspection may increase performance and reduce unnecessary enforcement overhead.
Option B deals with SMTP normalization and is unrelated. Option C concerns DHCP lease timers, irrelevant to HTTP body handling. Option D deals with cluster synchronization bandwidth but does not influence inspection limits for HTTP payloads.
Thus, reviewing HTTP body-size inspection settings and enabling streaming is key to resolving SaaS upload failures.
Question 90:
A Security Administrator finds that SNMP traps sent from the Firewall to a monitoring server are being rejected. Logs from the monitoring server show “trap authentication failed.” The Firewall recently updated its SNMP community configuration. What should be checked first?
A) The SNMP trap community string and allowed destination configuration
B) The SMTP connection timeout
C) The DHCP default gateway option
D) The cluster member state timeout
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SNMP traps use community strings for authentication. When the Firewall sends a trap, the monitoring server verifies whether the trap originates from an approved source and whether the community string matches. If these do not align, the server rejects the trap with an “authentication failed” message.
The first configuration to check is the SNMP trap community string on the Firewall. Administrators should confirm that the community defined for traps matches the one configured on the monitoring system. Even minor variations such as whitespace or capitalization cause authentication failures.
The destination IP address must also be configured correctly. If the monitoring server expects traps from specific IPs or networks, and the Firewall sends traps from a different interface or NATed address, the monitoring system may reject them. Administrators should ensure that the traps originate from the correct interface and that Access Control rules permit outbound SNMP traffic.
SNMP version mismatches also cause authentication failures. For example, if the Firewall uses SNMPv2c but the monitoring server expects SNMPv3, traps will be rejected. Reviewing version compatibility helps ensure proper reception.
Option B deals with email timeout behavior and is unrelated. Option C pertains to DHCP gateway options, not SNMP. Option D involves cluster states, which do not affect SNMP trap authentication.
Thus, verifying trap community strings and destination permissions is the correct starting point.
Question 91:
A Security Administrator finds that HTTP/2 traffic is not being correctly identified by the Application Control blade, leading to misclassification of several web-based applications. Logs show the traffic is treated as generic HTTPS. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTP/2 inspection settings and protocol decoding support within Application Control
B) The SMTP Relay preference settings
C) The DHCP failover server role configuration
D) The cluster synchronization protocol version
Answer:
A
Explanation:
HTTP/2 introduces a completely different structure from HTTP/1.1. Instead of textual headers and line-based exchanges, HTTP/2 uses binary framing and multiplexing. Due to this shift, Application Control engines must include specific decoding capabilities to inspect HTTP/2 traffic accurately. If these decoding components are not enabled or the Firewall uses an older signature set that does not fully interpret HTTP/2, the Firewall cannot identify applications that depend on modern protocols. In such cases, traffic defaults to being classified as generic HTTPS, which may result in incorrect policy enforcement.
The first configuration to review is the HTTP/2 inspection support within the Application Control blade. Administrators must verify whether HTTP/2 decoding is enabled and if the current software version supports full protocol parsing. Check Point updates Application Control signatures regularly, and older versions may require upgrades or patches to decode HTTP/2 frames. If the Firewall lacks modern signature support, multiplexed HTTP/2 streams appear indistinguishable from encrypted HTTPS traffic.
Another significant factor relates to SecureXL acceleration. When acceleration templates identify traffic as generic HTTPS, the Firewall may bypass Layer 7 inspection entirely. This means HTTP/2-specific metadata will not reach the Application Control engine. Administrators may need to disable acceleration for certain HTTPS destinations or refine policy rules to force traffic into the slow path.
HTTPS Inspection also plays an important role. If HTTPS Inspection is not enabled, HTTP/2 sessions—especially those using ALPN to negotiate protocol upgrades—remain fully encrypted, making application detection impossible. Administrators should confirm that HTTPS Inspection rules include applications that require Layer 7 analysis.
Additionally, some browsers or applications negotiate HTTP/2 only when specific cipher suites or TLS options are supported. If the Firewall interferes with these negotiation parameters during TLS interception, the session may fall back to HTTP/1.1, or the Firewall may misinterpret the flow. Adjusting cipher suites and ALPN support within HTTPS Inspection can correct this behavior.
Option B, SMTP relay configurations, affects only email communications. Option C, DHCP failover settings, influences IP address availability but not application identification. Option D, cluster synchronization protocol version, does not relate to HTTP/2 decoding.
Therefore, reviewing HTTP/2 protocol decoding settings is the appropriate initial step to ensure correct Application Control handling.
Question 92:
A Security Administrator notices that BGP routing updates received through a VPN tunnel are being dropped. Logs show messages indicating “invalid BGP payload.” The VPN tunnel uses route-based VPN with dynamic routing enabled. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The VPN interface MTU/MSS settings and fragmentation handling for BGP packets
B) The SMTP TLS negotiation timeout
C) The DHCP class options
D) The cluster virtual MAC behavior
Answer:
A
Explanation:
BGP routing updates are sensitive to packet size, especially when transmitted across VPN tunnels. Route-based VPNs encapsulate packets, which increases their size. If BGP packets become too large for the MTU of the VPN interface, fragmentation occurs. Some Firewalls drop fragmented BGP packets due to strict protocol expectations or IPS protections, resulting in messages such as “invalid BGP payload.” When fragmentation affects BGP update packets, the receiving peer cannot correctly assemble the update, leading to dropped routes, session resets, or full neighbor flaps.
The first configuration to review is the VPN interface MTU and MSS settings. Administrators must ensure that encapsulation overhead is accounted for. For example, IPSec adds overhead for ESP headers, authentication data, and possible NAT traversal encapsulation. If the MTU is too high on a routed VPN interface, packets may exceed path MTU and require fragmentation. Since BGP packets often include multiple paths or attributes within a single update message, fragmentation is common unless MTU settings are optimized.
Adjusting the VPN interface MTU or TCP MSS clamping ensures that packets fit within the allowable size limits without requiring fragmentation. Administrators may also configure BGP to send smaller messages, though this is less common. It is crucial to verify that Path MTU Discovery works correctly across the VPN tunnel; if PMTUD is blocked or misconfigured, devices may continue sending oversized packets without realizing they cannot pass through the tunnel.
Option B concerns SMTP behavior and has no relevance to BGP. Option C deals with DHCP class options, unrelated to routing. Option D pertains to cluster MAC management and does not affect BGP payload processing.
Thus, reviewing MTU/MSS settings and fragmentation handling is the correct step toward resolving BGP packet drops over VPN tunnels.
Question 93:
A Security Administrator finds that Zero-Day malware downloads from an internal testing server are not being detected by Threat Emulation. Logs show that the files are cached and bypassed on subsequent downloads. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Threat Emulation caching behavior and file-hash bypass settings
B) The SMTP antispam Bayesian learning settings
C) The DHCP option 12 hostname configuration
D) The cluster failover priority
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Threat Emulation uses several mechanisms to optimize performance. One of these is caching. When a file is analyzed and determined to be benign, the Firewall stores its hash to avoid re-emulating the same file in the future. This provides significant performance improvements in environments with repeated file downloads. However, in testing environments where administrators intentionally download malware samples—including updated variants—this caching behavior causes issues. The Firewall may assume that a file is previously known and safe, bypassing emulation even if the actual file has changed.
The first configuration to review is Threat Emulation caching and hash-based bypass settings. Administrators should check whether hash caching is enabled for both local and cloud emulation profiles. If caching is active, the Firewall may skip analyzing files that share identical or similar hashes, even if actual content differs. Test malware often includes slight modifications but may still produce similar hash patterns depending on the hashing algorithm. Clearing the cache or disabling caching temporarily ensures fresh emulation.
Threat Extraction can also contribute. If extraction sanitizes the file and caching is performed on the sanitized output rather than the original file, subsequent tests will bypass emulation. Administrators must confirm that Threat Extraction is not interfering with the raw file analysis workflow.
Furthermore, the Firewall may treat files from internal servers as trusted if they match trusted zones or categories. Adjusting threat profiles for internal networks ensures that all files undergo evaluation regardless of origin.
Option B deals with spam filtering logic and is unrelated. Option C concerns DHCP hostname assignment, irrelevant to file emulation. Option D, cluster failover priority, does not influence threat cache behavior.
Thus, reviewing Threat Emulation caching behavior and hash-based bypass rules is essential for ensuring malware testing files undergo proper analysis.
Question 94:
A Security Administrator observes inconsistent URL categorization results during web filtering. Some URLs are categorized correctly while others intermittently appear as “uncategorized,” leading to incorrect enforcement. Logs show occasional connectivity issues to Check Point’s categorization service. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Firewall’s DNS resolution, HTTPS connectivity, and update access to the URL categorization cloud
B) The SMTP header rewrite settings
C) The DHCP scope lease duration
D) The cluster probing interval
Answer:
A
Explanation:
URL categorization relies on real-time communication with Check Point’s cloud-based categorization service. Although the Firewall caches known categories, uncached or recently modified URLs require live lookup. If the Firewall intermittently loses connectivity to the categorization cloud, it cannot retrieve results for newly queried URLs, defaulting to an “uncategorized” state. This affects Access Control and Web Filtering decisions.
The first configuration to review is DNS and HTTPS connectivity from the Firewall to the categorization cloud. Administrators should ensure that DNS servers used by the Firewall respond consistently. If DNS resolution intermittently fails, the Firewall cannot reach categorization endpoints. Additionally, HTTPS access to URL categorization servers must be validated. Access Control rules, proxy requirements, or outbound restrictions may block or delay queries.
TLS inspection can also interfere with categorization. If HTTPS Inspection attempts to intercept connections the Firewall itself initiates, categorization requests may fail due to certificate mismatches. These internal requests must bypass HTTPS Inspection or be placed in a trusted category.
Administrators should also inspect the Firewall’s update status. If Anti-Bot or Application Control updates are outdated, cached categories may be stale. Ensuring regular access to Check Point’s update servers stabilizes categorization results.
Option B concerns SMTP header rewriting and does not influence web categorization. Option C, DHCP lease durations, has no bearing on URL lookups. Option D involves cluster probing and is unrelated to cloud access.
Thus, reviewing DNS, HTTPS connectivity, and update access ensures consistent categorization performance.
Question 95:
A Security Administrator sees that SMBv3 encryption-enabled shares are accessible internally, but throughput drops significantly when encryption is negotiated. The Firewall performs Content Awareness scanning on SMB. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SMB encrypted-session handling settings and Content Awareness compatibility
B) The SMTP DKIM signature verification
C) The DHCP helper-address forwarding
D) The cluster CoreXL CPU distribution
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SMBv3 supports encryption for file transfers, significantly improving security but also changing how data flows through the Firewall. When encryption is enabled, SMB traffic becomes opaque to many inspection engines, including Content Awareness. If the Firewall attempts to inspect encrypted SMBv3 streams without appropriate handling, performance degradation occurs. Some Firewalls either disable inspection entirely or attempt partial inspection, leading to latency and throughput issues.
The first configuration to review is the SMB encrypted-session handling setting within Content Awareness. Administrators must verify whether the Firewall is attempting to inspect encrypted SMB traffic. If so, disabling inspection of encrypted SMB sessions or creating exceptions for trusted internal servers prevents unnecessary overhead. Content Awareness is most effective when traffic is unencrypted; encrypted streams require alternate security measures such as endpoint scanning or server-side monitoring.
Performance issues may arise when the Firewall enforces a fallback mechanism, such as decrypting and reassembling SMB packets for inspection. This is highly CPU-intensive. Adjusting Content Awareness rules to bypass encrypted sessions eliminates this bottleneck.
Administrators must also consider SecureXL behavior. Encrypted SMB should ideally be accelerated, but if the Firewall forces it into the slow path due to Content Awareness rules, throughput drops dramatically. Ensuring correct acceleration templates helps maintain performance.
Option B is related to email authentication. Option C pertains to DHCP forwarding. Option D, while related to CPU distribution, is secondary to encrypted content handling.
Therefore, reviewing SMB encryption handling in relation to Content Awareness is the correct first step.
Question 96:
A Security Administrator finds that certificate-based VPN authentication fails after the Certificate Authority renewed its root certificate. Logs show “untrusted CA” errors on the Security Gateway. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The trusted CA store on the Security Gateway and certificate chain validation settings
B) The SMTP message retry interval
C) The DHCP relay multi-scope mapping
D) The cluster failover heartbeat frequency
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Certificate-based VPN authentication depends on a fully trusted certificate chain that the Security Gateway can validate. When a Certificate Authority renews or rotates its root certificate, the Security Gateway must trust the new root certificate and any intermediate certificates involved. If the Gateway’s trusted CA store is outdated or missing newly issued certificates, it will interpret certificates from VPN clients or peers as untrusted. This results in authentication failures and logs referencing “untrusted CA” or “certificate chain validation failed.”
The first configuration to examine is the trusted CA store on the Security Gateway. Administrators should verify whether the new root certificate and all intermediate certificates are present. If not, they must be imported manually or updated through automatic CA synchronization. VPN certificate validation relies on the entire chain, not just the issuing certificate. Therefore, even if the immediate issuer remains unchanged, a rotated or replaced root CA breaks trust unless the Gateway recognizes it.
Another important aspect is chain ordering. The Gateway must receive certificates in the correct sequence: client certificate, intermediate certificate, and root certificate. If certificates are sent or stored out of order, validation fails even if all certificates are available. Some certificate deployments include incomplete chains, which cause intermittent authentication problems. Administrators should confirm that the VPN clients present the full chain or configure the Gateway to supplement missing certificates from its store.
Revocation settings must also be reviewed. If CRL or OCSP servers change as part of the CA renewal, and the Gateway cannot reach updated revocation URLs, the Gateway may reject certificates due to inability to validate revocation status. Administrators should ensure that CRL distribution points and OCSP responder URLs are reachable.
Option B concerns SMTP retry behavior and has no relevance to certificate validation. Option C deals with DHCP relay functions, unrelated to VPN authentication. Option D pertains to cluster heartbeat frequency and does not affect certificate trust.
Thus, verifying and updating the trusted CA store is the correct first step when VPN certificate validation fails after CA rotation.
Question 97:
A Security Administrator observes that outbound SSH traffic to cloud servers is intermittently blocked by Threat Prevention. Logs show “high-entropy outbound packet detected.” Developers confirm they are using SSH with compression enabled. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The Threat Prevention high-entropy traffic inspection thresholds and exceptions for compressed SSH
B) The SMTP queue retention
C) The DHCP option 66 TFTP server parameter
D) The cluster pivot-table update interval
Answer:
A
Explanation:
High-entropy detection is a mechanism used by Threat Prevention to identify potential data exfiltration. Malware often uses encrypted or highly compressed outbound streams that appear random. However, legitimate encrypted protocols such as SSH, especially when compression is enabled, also generate payloads with high entropy. If Threat Prevention thresholds are too strict, the Firewall may misinterpret legitimate compressed SSH traffic as suspicious. Logs showing “high-entropy outbound packet detected” indicate that the Firewall has flagged the payload as potentially obfuscated malicious content.
The first configuration to review is the Threat Prevention profile’s high-entropy traffic inspection settings. Administrators need to adjust entropy thresholds or create exceptions for specific SSH destinations or internal development servers. Compression within SSH (often negotiated in the handshake) increases entropy significantly. If the profile does not account for this behavior, false positives are inevitable.
Administrators may also examine whether SSH traffic is being forced into a deep inspection mode that is inappropriate for encrypted sessions. Some security engines attempt pattern matching on encrypted data, which is ineffective and prone to misclassification. Configuring the Firewall to recognize SSH with compression as legitimate and exempting it from certain Threat Prevention checks allows security without hindering developer workflows.
Another factor to consider is SecureXL acceleration. If SSH traffic intermittently bypasses or enters deeper inspection based on session conditions, inconsistency in inspection paths can lead to intermittent blocks. Ensuring predictable handling through policy refinement resolves this.
Option B concerns SMTP queue retention and has no relevance to SSH. Option C deals with DHCP PXE booting and is unrelated. Option D pertains to cluster synchronization updates, not entropy detection.
Thus, reviewing Threat Prevention’s high-entropy inspection thresholds and configuring exceptions for compressed SSH traffic is the correct initial step.
Question 98:
A Security Administrator notices that inbound HTTPS connections to a load-balanced web farm fail when HTTPS Inspection is enabled. The Firewall drops the connection with “certificate name mismatch.” The load balancer uses SNI to direct traffic to backend servers. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The HTTPS Inspection SNI handling settings and certificate validation logic
B) The SMTP greylisting schedule
C) The DHCP failover binding update rate
D) The cluster interface multicast mode
Answer:
A
Explanation:
Server Name Indication (SNI) is a TLS extension that allows clients to specify the hostname they intend to reach, enabling load balancers or servers to present the correct certificate. When HTTPS Inspection is enabled, the Firewall intercepts TLS traffic and must correctly parse the SNI field to choose or validate certificates. If SNI parsing is incorrect, incomplete, or disabled, the Firewall may expect a certificate matching the external hostname but instead see a backend certificate that the load balancer uses internally. This discrepancy triggers “certificate name mismatch” errors.
The first configuration to review is the Firewall’s SNI handling within HTTPS Inspection. Administrators must verify that SNI parsing is enabled and that the Firewall correctly identifies the intended hostname. If the load balancer uses SNI to route to backend servers that use internal certificates, the Firewall may block the connection unless exceptions are configured. Creating bypass rules for internal server names or configuring inspection to rely on SNI rather than backend certificates solves the issue.
Additionally, administrators should check whether the Firewall re-signs certificates with its own CA. If the Firewall-generated certificate does not reflect the correct SNI name, clients detect mismatch errors. Updating the certificate presented by the Firewall or adjusting inspection rules ensures proper alignment with SNI.
Some load balancers also modify TLS traffic in ways that complicate inspection. Offloading, re-encryption, or SSL-bridging may mask or alter SNI fields. In such cases, exceptions for load-balanced traffic or bypassing inspection for specific hosts prevents false mismatches.
Option B involves SMTP greylisting and is unrelated. Option C pertains to DHCP failover and has no influence on TLS interception. Option D deals with cluster multicast mode and does not affect SNI parsing.
Thus, reviewing SNI handling in HTTPS Inspection is the correct first step.
Question 99:
A Security Administrator finds that IPS protections for SQL injection are not triggering on traffic directed to a web application behind a reverse proxy. Logs show that traffic appears to originate from the proxy rather than the actual client. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The reverse proxy header insertion and X-Forwarded-For handling for client IP preservation
B) The SMTP banner rewrite functionality
C) The DHCP option 3 router assignment
D) The cluster failover ACK delay
Answer:
A
Explanation:
IPS needs to see the true client IP and complete HTTP request structure to detect SQL injection attempts effectively. When a reverse proxy sits in front of the web application, it often replaces the client IP with its own. If the Firewall only sees traffic from the proxy, IPS may not evaluate the real request patterns, headers, or client behaviors. The X-Forwarded-For header is commonly used to preserve client identity. If the proxy does not insert this header, or if the Firewall is not configured to interpret it, IPS detection becomes less accurate.
The first configuration to review is the reverse proxy header handling. Administrators must ensure that the proxy inserts a proper X-Forwarded-For header indicating the source client IP. The Firewall should then be configured to recognize and use this header for IPS analysis. Without it, the Firewall sees all requests as identical flows from the proxy, reducing visibility and making pattern differentiation impossible.
Additionally, administrators must validate whether the proxy modifies URLs, rewrites paths, or alters query strings. If SQL injection payloads are normalized or encoded differently by the proxy, IPS signatures may no longer detect them. Adjusting proxy settings to pass original request data or configuring IPS signatures to match modified patterns enhances accuracy.
Option B concerns SMTP behavior. Option C deals with DHCP routing. Option D pertains to cluster behavior. None of these influence HTTP header preservation.
Thus, reviewing X-Forwarded-For insertion and Firewall interpretation is the correct first step.
Question 100:
A Security Administrator discovers that SmartEvent is failing to correlate large distributed port-scanning attempts. Logs show that the correlation unit is overloaded and dropping events. What configuration should be reviewed first?
A) The SmartEvent correlation capacity, event rate limits, and hardware resource allocation
B) The SMTP smarthost selection
C) The DHCP subnet gateway redirects
D) The cluster multicast probing setting
Answer:
A
Explanation:
SmartEvent correlation depends on processing large volumes of logs quickly. Distributed port scans generate enormous amounts of connection attempts, each producing a log entry. If the correlation unit is underpowered or configured with insufficient event capacity, it cannot process logs quickly enough. This results in dropped events, incomplete correlation, and failure to detect malicious scanning activity.
The first configuration to review is SmartEvent correlation capacity and resource allocation. Administrators must determine whether the hardware supporting SmartEvent has sufficient CPU, RAM, and disk I/O to handle peak log volumes. If not, performance tuning or hardware upgrades are necessary.
Event rate limits also influence behavior. SmartEvent may drop events when limits are exceeded. Adjusting thresholds, enabling distributed correlation, or adding additional correlation units helps alleviate overload. Administrators should review log indexing and archiving schedules, as heavy indexing significantly slows event ingestion.
Another important factor is log transfer from Security Gateways to SmartEvent. If log forwarding is delayed, SmartEvent receives bursts instead of steady flows, overwhelming correlation processes. Ensuring consistent, high-bandwidth log forwarding improves stability.
Option B deals with email relaying. Option C involves DHCP redirects. Option D concerns cluster multicast settings. None of these affect SmartEvent correlation.
Thus, reviewing correlation unit capacity and event handling configuration is the correct first step.
